National Defense Panel Implicitly Assails Clinton’s Decision To Veto Programs Needed To ‘Deny Enemies the Use of Space’

Will the U.S. Military Be Heard From Next?

(Washington, D.C.): As the Center for Security Policy had urged,⁽¹⁾ the congressionally mandated
National Defense Panel (NDP) emphasized the importance riding on control of space for the
United States’ future terrestrial military operations and civilian economic interests. The relevant
section of the report, entitled Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century (see
the attached) correctly observes that the “unrestricted use of space has become a major strategic
interest of the United States.” To do so, the NDP declares, the United States will — among
other things — have to have “the capability to deny enemies the use of space.”

The Need for U.S. Space Dominance

Unlike the Clinton Administration, which has in the past issued policy statements declaring a
similar view, the NDP recognizes that such “unrestricted use” cannot be taken for granted.
Its report emphasizes that:

“Our enemies, however, will seek to develop their own space capabilities or to gain
access to space-derived products. The explosion in the commercial use of space will
afford them the opportunity. As the costs of getting to space and operating there
decline — and we expect that they will — not only will we see more satellites in space,
but more military organizations will have the means to access them.”

The blue-ribbon NDP found that “space power is an integral part of the revolution in
military affairs and a key asset in achieving military advantage in information operations.”
The commission, comprised of distinguished retired four-star flag officers and civilian specialists
in military affairs, goes on solemnly to declare that, “The United States cannot afford to lose
the edge it now holds in military-related space operations.”

Unfortunately, as the panel observes:

“…Our space program has vulnerabilities. The small number of U.S. launch
installations and present launch processes increase our vulnerabilities and costs of
accessing space. Our assets in space are also vulnerable and they lack the ability to
detect attack. Our protection and denial capabilities are rudimentary, limited to
encryption of communication links, some degree of hardened electronics, and enough
redundancy to guard against catastrophic loss of capabilities. Denial of enemy space
capabilities is largely limited to neutralizing enemy ground installations
employing conventional or special operational forces.

“Greater accessibility to space by our competitors will strongly influence the
struggle for advantage in military operations. For example, an adversary
could use commercial or third-party national remote-sensing and communications
satellites, along with space-based navigation data, to help identify or target
forward-deployed U.S. forces and fixed facilities such as ports, airfields, and
logistics centers. Therefore, we must take steps now to ensure we have the
capability to deny our enemies the use of space.” (Emphasis added.)

Clinton’s Opposition to U.S. Space Control

In light of this analysis, it is of grave concern that President Clinton decided on 14 October 1997
to line-item veto three programs central to the United States’ future ability to “deny our enemies
the use of space.” As the Center for Security Policy warned on the following day:

“Yesterday, President Clinton exercised his line-item veto authority for the first time
for policy reasons and with potentially devastating consequences for the national
security. With his excising of three items contained in the FY1998 Defense
Appropriations Act — the Clementine Microsatellite Technology Demonstrator (also
known as Clementine II), the Army’s Kinetic-Kill Anti-Satellite Interceptor and the
Military Space Plane — Mr. Clinton has terminated technology development
programs whose unavailability as deployed capabilities may prove disastrous in future
conflicts.”⁽²⁾

Especially alarming is evidence that the President’s vetoes were motivated by a desire not to
pursue U.S. space control programs that might complicate arms control negotiations now
underway with Russia, or that might be prohibited by a treaty that could emerge from those
negotiations. As the Center noted on 6 November 1997 in releasing relevant excerpts of a letter
from Russian President Boris Yeltsin that gave rise to talks now underway concerning bans on
anti-satellite and related weapons: “While such negotiations will do nothing to enhance the
security of U.S. space assets, it can reliably be expected to preclude the United States from
developing and fielding virtually all systems relevant to space control.”⁽³⁾

While the NDP did not specifically address the feasibility or wisdom of arms control initiatives
pertaining to anti-satellite weapons or other space control technologies, the import of its analysis
and recommendations could not be more clear: The United States must have the capability to
deny adversaries the use of space for military purposes. It follows that an agreement which
precludes the U.S. from having such capabilities would be inconsistent with the Nation’s future,
vital security requirements.

The Bottom Line

Whatever one thinks of the rest of the National Defense Panel report,⁽⁴⁾ it has rendered a distinct
public service with respect to its recommendations concerning space control. Arguably nowhere
is its overarching warning more applicable: “Only one thing is certain: The greatest danger
lies in an unwillingness or an inability to change our security posture in time to meet the
challenges of the next century.” (Emphasis added.)

It now falls to the U.S. military to come up on the net about the need to reverse President
Clinton’s policy-motivated line-item vetoes in order to assure the “a robust space Science and
Technology program” and capability to “deny our enemies the use of space” called for by the
NDP. The International Landmine Ban being signed today by many countries but not by the
United States is a vivid reminder that the armed forces’ refusal to go along with political
initiatives that are inconsistent with national security can spare our men and women in uniform —
and the national interests they are sworn to protect — the disastrous effects of well-intentioned but
unacceptable arms control schemes.⁽⁵⁾

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1. See the Center’s Decision Brief entitled Will The National Defense Panel Save The Most
Decisive Factor In Determining The Future National Defense — Space Control? (No. 97-D
181, 26 November 1997).

2. See the Center’s Decision Brief entitled Clinton Legacy Watch # 8: Denying U.S. Military
The Ability To Dominate the Next, Critical Theater of Operations — Space (No. 97-D 153, 15
October 1997).

3. See the Center’s Decision Brief entitled Well Done, Weldon: Senior Legislator Refuses to
Accept Factually Incorrect ‘Political Correctness’ From Gen. Lyles; Syndrome Evident in
Wake of Vetoed U.S. Space Control Programs (No. 97-D 167).

4. The Center will be addressing the contributions of the National Defense Panel report as a whole
in a forthcoming Decision Brief.

5. For more on the pivotal role played by retired and serving U.S. military officers in staving off
the dangerously unverifiable, unenforceable and ineffective ban on anti-personnel landmines, see
(among other Center papers) its Decision Brief entitled ‘Let Us Count the Ways’ The Landmine
Ban Would Disserve U.S. Interests (No. 97-D 184, 2 December 1997).