NO MORE EXCUSES: PERRY’S ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT A GOLAN DEPLOYMENT OBLIGES CONGRESS TO DEBATE THE IDEA NOW!
(Washington, D.C.): On Monday, the Clinton
Administration came out of the diplomatic closet on a
singularly dubious initiative: After nearly two years of
demurring about its readiness to place U.S. troops to the
Golan Heights as part of a peace agreement between Israel
and Syria, the Administration had Secretary of Defense
William Perry confirm that such a deployment is in the
works.
The timing of the Secretary’s announcement suggests
two possibilities: On the one hand, it may indicate
that the Israeli-Syrian negotiations are now truly in the
“end-game” phase. After all, the
Administration has long sought to defer debate and
preclude effective opposition to a deployment of U.S.
forces on the Golan. To this end, Clinton officials have
insisted that it was “premature” even to
discuss the idea since the peace negotiations were so
fluid and so uncertain of success. Sound familiar? The
Administration also said it was “premature” to
talk about a U.S. deployment in Bosnia — until, that is,
the Dayton deal was signed. At that point, of course, it
became “too late” to challenge what was
portrayed as the essential underpinning of the Bosnian
peace agreement. Assuming a similar stratagem is being
employed today, Secretary Perry’s statement would
appear to indicate confidence that a Syrian-Israeli
accord is reaching a similar, “inevitable”
status.(1)
On the other hand, the Perry announcement may
simply reflect a sense that there is a narrow window in
which to commit the U.S. to a Golan “peace
enforcement” mission. If, as seems likely,
American personnel start taking casualties in Bosnia,
there will not only be enormous pressure to bring them
home. There will also probably be no appetite for
deploying other units to what is potentially an even more
dangerous locale. The Golan Heights are, it should be
remembered, in close proximity to the Syrian and Lebanese
headquarters and training camps of most of the world’s
most dangerous terrorist organizations. But if the
Clinton Administration can act while the Bosnia operation
appears to be proceeding smoothly, questions about the
wisdom and workability of a Golan deployment are likely
to be muted.
Stonewalling Hard Questions
Either way, Secretary Perry’s statement about the
Golan deployment seems to reflect a perception that the
Administration need not address detailed substantive
concerns that have been expressed about this initiative
by knowledgeable, responsible critics. In particular, no
effort has been made to respond to the troubling findings
of an in-depth study
of a Golan deployment published in October 1994 by the
Center for Security Policy and entitled U.S. Forces
on the Golan Heights: An Assessment of Benefits and Costs.
Among the eleven former senior defense officials who
authored this study were five retired four-star flag
officers — three of whom, Admirals Carl Trost and Elmo
Zumwalt and General Al Gray, served as members of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. The other authors were: General
John Foss, General Bernard Schriever, Lieutenant General
John Pustay, Richard Perle, Eugene Rostow, Henry Rowen,
Douglas Feith and Frank Gaffney. Among their more
important findings were the following:
- “Peacekeeping and other ‘smaller-scale’
operations, including a deployment on the Golan
Heights, would have to be judged expendable if
international crises arose and required
reallocation of units and resources. A
misunderstanding or lack of clarity on this point
would damage U.S. credibility. The United
States has an interest in ensuring that its
Israeli allies realize that U.S. peacekeeping
forces on the Golan might not be present at a
time of tension in the future should they be
required to fill a gap elsewhere.” - “There is danger that a U.S. Golan
deployment might deter the wrong party…The
United States could harm its own interests and
damage regional stability by deploying
peacekeeping forces whose effect would be to
deter defensive Israeli military action rather
than aggressive military action by Syria…It
would be neither in the U.S. interest, consistent
with Israel’s security nor conducive to genuine
stability in the Mideast to have U.S. forces
serving in such a way as to deter not Syrian
aggression but Israeli defense.” - “A U.S. ‘honest broker’ role as provider of
peacekeeping forces on the Golan will likely
strain relations between Israel and the United
States in the event of tension between Syria and
Israel. The United States and Israel are unlikely
to react harmoniously to signs that Syria may be
violating its treaty obligations or preparing an
aggression. The presence of U.S. troops in the
region would give the United States 1) an added
incentive to urge restraint (perhaps undue
restraint) upon Israel, 2) a greater claim for
deference from Israel and, therefore, 3) greater
potential for a bitter falling out in the event
that Israel deems it necessary to act
inconsistently with U.S. wishes.” - “Syria can be expected: 1) to exploit its
position vis à vis U.S. forces on the
Golan to dilute the U.S.-Israeli relationship,
insisting that the United States act
‘even-handedly’ between Israel and Syria and 2)
to press the United States to wipe the slate
clean on such bilateral problems as Damascus’
continuing support for international terrorism,
drug-trafficking, proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and counterfeiting of U.S.
currency.” - “It has been suggested that U.S.
peacekeeping forces on the Golan mission would
create no more difficulties than has the U.S.
contingent in the Multilateral Force and
Observers (MFO) in the Sinai. The risks of a
Golan deployment, however, are significantly
greater than those attending the Sinai
mission…U.S. troops on the Golan would have a
truly dangerous mission in a high-tension region.
They would face threats from terrorists in Syria
and Lebanon and would be caught in the middle of
heavily armed forces in the event of renewed
hostilities. None of these dangers face U.S.
troops in the Sinai MFO.” - “There is no mission or rationale for a
U.S. peacekeeping force on the Golan that would
justify the resulting costs and risks. Indeed,
the net effect could be negative for Israel’s
security and regional stability, while the
consequences could include the loss of U.S. lives
and, possibly, a credibility-damaging retreat of
the U.S. forces under terrorist fire. In any
event, such a deployment would increase the
danger of direct U.S. involvement in a future
Middle East war and undermine Israel’s standing
with the U.S. public as a self-reliant
ally.”
The Bosnia Precedent?
Subsequent to the publication of the Center’s
analysis, the Clinton Administration has dispatched U.S.
forces to Bosnia pursuant to the peace treaty negotiated
at Dayton, Ohio. This deployment may raise two further
issues: First, a centerpiece of President Clinton’s sales
pitch for the Bosnia mission was that it would be led by
American officers in the NATO command structure — as
opposed to the discredited UNPROFOR arrangement. Since
NATO is unlikely to play a similar role in any Golan
Heights peacekeeping operation, will U.S. participants be
asked to serve under U.N. or other foreign commanders?
And second, as noted in a recent Center for Security
Policy Decision Brief concerning Yevgeny
Primakov’s appointment as Russian Foreign Minister,
operation may have created a troublesome formula for a
Golan deployment in one other respect:
“[Primakov] may well demand that the
precedent established in Bosnia — namely, placing
Russian troops beside American ones in multinational
peacekeeping operations — must apply to the
treaty-monitoring deployment on the Golan Heights
formally proposed this week by U.S. Defense Secretary
William Perry. Such a step would greatly exacerbate
the problematic nature of such a deployment. It would
also provide a pretext for a Russian military
presence in the Middle East and a rubric for renewed
Russo-Syrian military ties.”
The Bottom Line
The foregoing concerns are serious ones, raised by
serious people. If nothing else, the gravitas of
the authors of the Center’s critique ought to oblige the
Clinton Administration to address their concerns before
embarking upon a U.S. deployment on the Golan Heights.
In any event, the Congress must ensure that an
opportunity is afforded to consider such concerns — and
to debate whatever response the Administration ultimately
does make to them — prior to the United States
becoming formally committed to so strategically
portentous and potentially dangerous a deployment. As
the distinguished authors of the Center for Security
Policy study noted: “If the subject is now debated
and Congress and the executive branch decide to oppose a
deployment of U.S. troops on the Golan, Israel and Syria
could take this into account in their negotiations and
devise alternative security arrangements accordingly.
Such a decision would be far less disruptive if made now
than if deferred until after a Syrian-Israeli deal is
concluded.”
Beyond the immediate issue of a prospective Golan
deployment, however, loom two larger questions with which
Congress must also promptly come to grips: 1) Should
routine use be made of U.S. military personnel in
peacekeeping operations? 2) And what arrangements must be
put into place to stop the serious erosion that has been
occurring in the Congress’ constitutional prerogatives
with respect to the authorization of and funding for
American military operations? The Center for Security
Policy looks forward to contributing to future
deliberations on these critical questions.
(1) If the U.S. and Israeli
governments are becoming sanguine that a deal with Syria
is inevitable, it is unsettling — to say the least —
that the most critical aspects of such a deal seem to be
far from agreed. As the New York Times reports
today: “…Israeli [officials] say that [the
recently completed] rounds of talks did not address
several important issues: how to guarantee Israeli
security once the Golan is returned, the timetable for
the Israeli withdrawal and for mutual demilitarization
and water rights.”
(2) See Restoration Watch
#7: Primakov’s Promotion Marks Major Step on the Road
‘Back to the USSR’ (