Nuclear nonsense in North Korea

By getting back on the nuclear merry-go-round with North Korea, the U.S. has given Kim Jong-Il plenty to smile about.

For six years, the Bush Administration took a firm stance on North Korea and its nuclear program.   It resisted being drawn in to the endless rounds of bait and switch by which Pyongyang had ensnared the previous administration.   It even labeled the North as a player in the tripartite “Axis of Evil.”

And, after Kim Jong-Il’s October explosion of a nuclear device, the President threatened “serious repercussions” for Kim and stated that such provocation “would not be tolerated.”

Last week, that all changed.   The Bush Administration stunningly reversed its earlier policy and inked a deal that will give the North $400 million dollars in aid including contingent promises for 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil.   The U.S. also pledged to end its sanctions on Banco Delta Asia, which was found to be laundering $100 “supernotes” to help finance Kim’s tottering tyranny.

[More]

In return, the North has agreed to suspend enrichment within 60 days, allow for an as-yet unspecified program of inspections, and to make provisions for future “discussions” about the state of its nuclear program.   Alarmingly, the accord does not even specifically address Pyongyang’s uranium-based weapons program which is at the root of the current contretemps.

This hardly seems like a fair deal.

It’s Been Tried Before

As John Podhoretz points out in the New York Post, this new agreement is but the latest in a long line of settlements that have purported to “solve” the North Korean problem, but have brought only failure.   Podhoretz details two telling examples:

• In 1985, the Soviet Union offered Kim Il-Sung a civilian nuclear reactor if he would but obey the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.   Kim accepted the reactor, and then thumbed his nose at both the treaty requirements and the leaders in Moscow.




• Undaunted by Soviet failures, in 1994 the Clinton Administration upped the ante and offered Pyongyang not one, but two reactors in return for pledges of good behavior.   Kim signaled his thanks by test-firing nuclear-capable ballistic missiles in 1998.

This admittedly brief history should be discouraging those who believe that last week’s deal is, to quote Secretary Rice, “the first quarter” of a game that will bring about the denuclearization of North Korea.  

The Ripples of Failure

The ramifications of this deal extend beyond the state of the North’s nuclear reactors.  By signing with Pyongyang, The Bush Administration has negotiated away its leverage over Kim’s regime.  What’s more, it has weakened the foundations of its strategic posture in the Pacific:

• This new deal undermines Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who seeks to revitalize Japan’s defense establishment to hedge against both North Korea and China.   American acceptance of putative North Korean disarmament will likely spur leftist Japanese politicians to call for a cessation of the Abe’s rearmament plan.




• In South Korea, President Roh Myu-hoon and his leftist Uri Party seemed to be heading toward electoral defeat. The nuclear deal serves to put wind into Roh’s flagging sails and makes it more likely that South Korea will continue to draw closer to both China and North Korea.




• The Chinese have reaped a diplomatic bonanza from this new deal, which was negotiated in Beijing under the auspices of the Six-Party Talks.   Last week’s agreement has absolved them of responsibility for their facilitation of the North’s intransigence, and strengthens their position in any future crises in Northeast Asia.

The Administration’s new policy stance also serves to further acclimatize U.S. citizens to this sort of strategic frivolity, and makes it that much hard for future administrations to right the ship and set America on an effective policy path.

“Madman” Kim Playing Us for Fools

For years, Kim has labored to convince the West that he is an irrational maniac, a man with whom one ought not to trifle.  In doing creating this image of unpredictability, he inculcates in us a fear of provoking him, which in turn leads us to make concession after concession in the vain hope of appeasing the unappeasable.  

In reality, Kim is a cold, ruthless political strategist, cut from the mold of Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin.   His bluster and bombast are part of a grand extortion racket, and we fall for it every time.   Indeed, we can expect him obfuscate and dissimulate about his nuclear program, delaying and diverting inspectors while he uses his new-found financial resources to shore up his rule and prepare for yet another episode of nuclear blackmail.

There is, to be sure, no easy fix to the North Korean nuclear conundrum.   If it is unwilling to take the risky step of collapsing Kim’s government, the Bush Administration would have been well advised to maintain its policy of multilateral pressure on the North, coupled with a campaign to spotlight the destabilizing effects of China’s support for Kim.

Unfortunately, the President’s team has committed America to walk the well-trodden path of rash Clintonian conciliation.   As a result, Kim’s regime has a fresh transfusion of vital cash and resources, and we have only the promises of a lying regime to show for it.