Off-ramps for China? Sorry, that ship has sailed

The US in particular has got itself into a difficult position because politicians and military leaders continually appeased China and the burgeoning PLA.

Speaking to Democratic Party donors in early October, President Joe Biden said, ‘I’m trying to figure out what is Putin’s off-ramp. Where does he find a way out? Where does he find himself in a position that he does not – not only lose face but lose significant power within Russia?’

Is Biden suggesting the US is supposed to come up with an exit strategy for Vladimir Putin that does not involve loss of power or a way for Putin to wipe the massive amount of egg off his face? And why?

The Geobukseon has no idea.

However, the US government at the highest levels sometimes seems to lack the ‘killer instinct’ – though, in modern terms, this might be described as ‘showing excess empathy’.

The Americans gave Saddam Hussein an ‘off-ramp’ in the 1991 Gulf War when he was on the ropes. It gave Osama bin Laden an off-ramp out of Afghanistan in 2001 when he was cornered in Tora Bora. In both cases, the off-ramp was gladly taken.

An anthropologist might be able to explain this American trait, one that has been on display in the Indo-Pacific for decades.

You see, Americans have been offering China off-ramps for years, but Beijing keeps tooling right along at 80 miles an hour as it streaks past Washington DC’s latest off-ramp.

And you cannot blame it all on the politicians and bureaucrats. The US military’s senior leaders have also been all in for off-ramps.

In 2015, the Geobukseon spoke with a senior officer at the US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) about things involving China. He spoke of giving China off-ramps and not about fighting them.

This was when China was carrying out the biggest, fastest military build-up in history. It had already taken Scarborough Shoal from US ally the Philippines and was building and militarising islands in the South China Sea. Beijing had also moved in on Vietnam’s maritime territory and had just about got de facto control of the entire South China Sea.

China was also giving Washington DC’s Japanese ally a rough time around the Senkaku Islands, threatening Taiwan, and even harassing USN ships in the South China Sea.

It was as if the US military’s ruling class thought the Chinese were infantile and did not know what they were doing. You saw this in US flag officer, and courtier-class justifications for inviting the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to RIMPAC exercises – i.e. the Chinese just needed to see what proper behaviour looked like, and then they would behave like Canadians. And if not, they would be so awed by American military might that they would not dare try anything.

Back then, the Geobukseon suggested that the Chinese might have no interest in off-ramps. Why would they?

They were doing very well behaving as they were – and there had been no punishment. Quite the opposite, for the Americans were accommodating them at every step. The US military was keen to engage in exercises, exchange visits and key leader engagements. Too many top officers wanted to add ‘visited China and met my counterparts’ to their resume.

Gen Ray Odierno, then Chief of Staff of the US Army, said while visiting China in 2014, he welcomed a strong Chinese military. This was not an unusual sentiment at the top levels – although the lance corporals and sailors who would do most of the dying in a war perhaps thought differently.

Adm Samuel Locklear, former USINDOPACOM commander, said that ‘climate change’ was his main worry. The PLA was not even on the list of his concerns.

Another four-star whined privately about Chinese island-building activities, but speak publicly and put his stars at risk? No, thank you!

And few people listened when the Japanese military tried to warn of what was coming.

Retired generals and admirals also wanted to cash in on ‘Track II’ meetings with retired Chinese brass or, even better, snag an invite to the Sanya Dialogue in Hainan and enjoy five-star living and first-class air travel while hobnobbing with Chinese intelligence operatives.

It is small wonder that China was not interested in off-ramps.

The Geobukseon heard another idea at USINDOPACOM for getting the Chinese to take an off-ramp: ‘cost imposition’. The idea was that if the US imposed just enough costs, then China would change its behaviour to America’s liking.

The Chinese leadership probably laughed at the idea that there was some amount of cost they – or rather their subjects – cannot bear. History suggests this is a high bar when it comes to the Chinese absorbing misery.

You would think the leaders in Honolulu had not heard of the Vietnam War. Indeed, it sounded a lot like Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s strategy for Vietnam: apply calibrated pressure on the North Vietnamese so they stopped attacking South Vietnam. In other words, ‘impose costs’ so they take the off-ramp and negotiate.

The North Vietnamese (and Chinese) did eventually take an off-ramp of sorts – but it was as much a case of giving the US an off-ramp. After reaching a peace deal and waiting a ‘decent interval’ of two years, North Vietnam conquered South Vietnam by force.

The other watchword back then was ‘de-escalate’. It may have been Obama’s White House driving things, but the senior staff at USINDOPACOM went along more enthusiastically than they should have.

De-escalate? Put simply, if China did anything the US wished it not to, the US de-escalated. This only encouraged the Chinese – not least to avoid any off-ramps, and to demoralise US friends and put the US at a disadvantage.

The Geobukseon even asked a USMC general why USINDOPACOM was appeasing China? His answer: ‘What else can we do? Go to war?’

So while the US was primly offering vague off-ramps, China, presumably scarcely able to believe its luck, built up its military and improved its position to the point that it is a match for US forces in any fight close to the Chinese mainland.

In fairness, there were plenty of US officers – and senior ones such as Adm Robert Willard, USINDOPACOM commander from 2009-12 – who understood the threat and were not interested in off-ramps. The others know who they are. But the prevailing thinking, even in the military, was that China was not a threat, or at least not enough to worry about.

This was a delusion, and in no small part owing to American condescension.

Starting with the Trump administration, the US military has by and large woken up to the Chinese threat. The services, each in their own way, are trying to acquire the necessary hardware, capabilities, doctrine, allies and ‘force postures’ to fight a war with China.

One notes the exercises that the US military (and particularly with allies Japan and Australia) have been conducting in the Indo-Pacific in recent years that are serious and focused on warfighting – and although unspoken, intended for China scenarios.

But here is a problem as the Geobukseon sees it.

The Chinese military capability improved during the ‘off-ramp/de-escalate era’ to the point that it (or better said, Xi Jinping) just might think he can take on America – and even want to do so.

Twenty years ago, this would have been a joke. Ten years ago, not so funny. These days, it is not funny at all.

If you want to deter an enemy or to encourage him to take an off-ramp, he has to know that to do otherwise will be his ruin.

You also want him to know that if using the off-ramp as a respite before coming back on the attack, he will still lose miserably.

The US squandered that chance. Back when the US had enough of a military advantage over China to play the off-ramp game, it was not serious about it. And the Chinese knew it.

These days, it is not clear that China is concerned enough about US military capability that it will hold back on a fight close to the Chinese mainland… say, for Taiwan. And even discounting the theatrics in Xi’s recent speech at the 20th Party Congress, it suggested that Chinese communists are not interested in off-ramps.

Xi perhaps noted that after China bracketed Taiwan with missiles and imposed no-entry zones last August – and also fired into Japanese territory – the US expressed concern and ‘de-escalated’. In other words, it de-escalated hoping China would take an off-ramp.

Good luck!

It is as likely that, if and when China moves on Taiwan, it will be Beijing offering Washington the off-ramp. ‘Stand clear, or it is World War Three.’

That might look like a reasonable offer to the US administration, and you can bet that Wall Street, the US-China Business Council and others will be nagging from the back seat: ‘Pull off, do not miss the off-ramp.’

America and its friends could have avoided all this.

Now the choice is to get ready for a fight, or for Washington DC to look for its own off-ramp.