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BY: A. M. ROSENTHAL
The New York Times, May 21, 1991

When I was about 17 years old, I used to daydream about earning some money beyond what I
needed for carfare and lunches in the college cafeteria. I mean real money, something like thirty or
forty dollars.

In my reverie, I would go straight down to Macy’s book department, whose stock I knew by
heart from hours of wandering cashless along the shelves.

There I would spend my dream money, selecting Poe and O’Neill in the satisfyingly hefty
Modern Library Giants edition, that three-volume Shakespeare for $4.95, or a book of India
travels for a dollar, careful not to go over my lavish budget, enjoying every moment while I
strolled, enjoying it even in retrospect when I shook myself into reality and got off at the City
College subway stop.

Now, somewhat older, I daydream in larger terms, about what I would do if the Government
showed up at my office one day and asked me how to spend bigger money — say $2.5 billion for
foreign aid, or even $150 billion.

We are told that the United States must lend at least $2.5 billion to the Soviet Union this year
for agricultural products — $1 billion already provided and an additional $1.5 billion the Bush
Administration seems determined to give to Moscow. Various governments and economists say it
would cost the West about $30 billion a year for at least five years to bolster the Soviet economy,
and they tell us it is a bargain.

I don’t know about that. Loans guaranteed by the U.S. — low rate, long term and
non-collateralized — to a bankrupt country with hidden assets are tax-paid foreign aid. So part of
that money is mine and yours, which should concentrate our minds on how it is spent. Let’s start
small, with a dream stake of that $2.5 billion in agricultural credits.

Nobody wants Soviet citizens to go hungry. But if hunger-relief is the goal, the Soviet Union
does not seem in worse condition than Ethiopia, the Sudan or Bangladesh.

If the goal is economic assistance to shore up countries emerging from the disaster of
Communism I would pick from the shelf those that have already emerged. How about more for
Poland? The Poles are not only jumping fully into the rough currents of free enterprise but were
the victims of the Soviet Union, where Mr. Gorbachev still has not dipped a toe into the water.
And though the Soviet Parliament passed a law allowing free emigration, it won’t take effect until
1993.

If the goal is to help countries that have overthrown dictatorship, here’s an idea. How about
Haiti, Nicaragua and Panama? It would certainly be nice if for once the U.S. devoted enough
money and continuous attention to making economic showcases out of impoverished neighbors
who fought for political freedom.

The heart of the issue, of course, is whether money spent now for Mr. Gorbachev’s Government
will solve or perpetuate the Soviet crisis. The problem is that Mr. Gorbachev’s Government
cannot get food from the Soviet field to the Soviet stomach any better than could Stalin’s. It is not
just money credit but political credit Mr. Gorbachev wants — economic help now against
economic change tomorrow.

Senator Bill Bradley of New Jersey has asked the President to look into the realities of the
Soviet system that cause the problem. How much is lost to waste, corruption, and policies that
make the black markets and shortages inevitable? Is the centralized system being used to coerce
the republics, by holding back food from certain maverick regions? (Yes.) Here’s a question from
Soviet dissidents: How many officials and ex-officials of the Communist bureaucracy are selling
contracts to the West and battening on food profits?

And what about collateral? If the Gorbachev Government needs food supplies, it has plenty of
resources it could put up — billions in gold bullion and diamonds, for instance. It could avoid need
for credits if it just stopped spending billions for arms to the Afghan Government and for
Castro-propping.

Answers received, Americans can decide on the urgency of additional Soviet agricultural
credits.

But after that we should wait until Mr. Gorbachev or his successor make fundamental changes
in the Soviet economic system, which of course would make it totally un-Soviet. Until then, we
should take that $150 billion in hand and spend a little time strolling in our minds, dreaming of
how it could be spent, and for whom.

Center for Security Policy

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