One Treaty Doesn't Fit All By Robert M. GatesNew York Times, 13 October 1999

The poisonously partisan debate over the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty this week should
prompt a re-evaluation of the American approach to arms control. The difficulties in monitoring
compliance that have been emphasized in the debate are present not just with low-yield nuclear
testing, but with other threats to our national security — for example, development of chemical
and biological weapons and proliferation of missiles. The surprise North Korean launch of a
three-stage ballistic missile last year simply highlights how hard it is even with our remarkable
intelligence capabilities to track these diverse emerging threats accurately.

No agreements pertaining to these threats can be monitored with the same confidence as the
bilateral strategic arms agreements signed with the Soviet Union years ago. Indeed, global
agreements with 140 to 150 countries — or even a few dozen — and necessarily involving the
most broadly acceptable monitoring provisions, pose a very different and much harder challenge
than those earlier strategic nuclear agreements.

Today’s security threats too often leave us with two kinds of likely arms control. First, these
are
“feel-good” treaties or agreements that pretend to accomplish what they cannot realistically
deliver. Second, we are burdened by older treaties — like the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty — that
no longer fully serve our security interests because they have been overtaken by political and
technological developments.

It is ironic that the one area of national security policy still dominated by a cold war
mentality is
arms control. In recent years there has been significant pressure on the Department of Defense to
rethink both military strategy and the structure of the armed forces, and on the intelligence
community to restructure and change its priorities — in both cases to adapt to a new security
environment. Little has been said, however, about the need for a fresh look at arms control and
its place in our national security strategy.

Multinational cooperation is absolutely essential to slowing or containing such threats as
chemical, biological and nuclear weapons proliferation and the spread of ballistic missile
technology. But I question whether formal, ratified treaties are the most effective way to deal
diplomatically with such threats. Multilateral treaties often offer only a pretense of effective
monitoring. Furthermore, treaties “in perpetuity” are nearly impossible to adjust to today’s
rapidly changing technological and security realities. And to ratify a treaty when we can
confidently predict that key governments either will not sign it or, if they sign will not observe its
terms, undermines the legitimacy and value of the arms control process itself.

The debate over the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ought to compel us to consider what
kinds
of international agreements — and of what duration — will best protect and advance our national
security interests in the future. Both advocates and opponents of the treaty must answer the
question: if not this kind of treaty to protect us against the multiple threats of weapons
proliferation, then what are the alternatives? The old approach to arms control treaties, familiar to
so many of us who helped negotiate them and win their ratification, clearly no longer works.

Arms control experts inside and outside of government should be called upon to devise
alternatives. But I would offer two considerations. First, nations whose behavior or intentions
most concern us perhaps ought not be party to a negotiation or agreement aimed at thwarting
them. Without their involvement, more aggressive, multilateral measures might be possible to
contain the threat they pose. Second, perhaps more flexible kinds of agreements can be devised
that allow for revisions, updating or their own termination.

When the United States refuses to ratify a multinational treaty, even if it is because the
agreement cannot deliver what it promises, our international leadership and prestige nonetheless
suffer a real blow. We must not put ourselves in this corner again. It is time to rethink our
approach to arms control.

Robert M. Gates served on the National Security Council staff under four Presidents
and was
Director of Central Intelligence under President George Bush.