Open Letter

United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-3603

February 4, 1998

Hon. William S. Cohen
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

It was good to see you again in the course of your appearance yesterday with General Shelton
before the Senate Armed Services Committee. I appreciated in particular the opportunity that
hearing afforded to alert you to the concerns that I and other Senators have about the
Administration’s apparent policy approach to the issue of space dominance.

As you indicated that you had not seen an article that appeared in the Washington Times on
Monday, I am taking the liberty of enclosing it for your urgent review. It summarizes a recent
symposium sponsored by the Center for Security Policy in which
some of our Nation’s most
eminent civilian and military experts on national security matters warned of the danger of ceding
space control to hostile powers.

Unfortunately, your response to my question — about how we will maintain space superiority
in
the absence of the three programs relevant to space control that were line-item vetoed last
October — left me more uneasy than ever about the President’s policy in this area. You remarked
that: “We still…are proceeding with the airborne laser program. We are also proceeding with
developing [the] space-based laser capability. Dominating space is not just a question of having a
[kinetic kill] anti-satellite (ASAT) capability. That may be part of it. But we believe in terms of
the assets and the technology that’s being developed, that we can still dominate space, given some
of the programs under way.”

The problem is that the vetoes of the Clementine II and Kinetic-Kill ASAT programs were
explicitly based on policy. While the Military Space Plane was terminated on other grounds, its
inherent capabilities would almost certainly fall afoul of such policies as well.

As you may recall, on October 14^th, the NSC’s Robert Bell justified termination
of the Clementine
II experiment — involving hardware developed under the space-based Brilliant Pebbles interceptor
program — with the following explanation: “Our own development program within the
Department of Defense for a possible national missile defense deployment option, an option which
we believe could be exercised as soon as 2003, does not include space-based weapons in its
architecture. Now, the Ballistic Missile Defense Office is carrying out some advanced R&D
on
possible space-based interceptor technologies involving both lasers and rockets. But that is the
kind of very advanced research that is permitted under the ABM Treaty.”

It would certainly appear from this comment that the Administration’s policy will eventually
foreclose the space-based laser program, as well. I gather that your national missile defense
program still does not contemplate space-based weapons. And the SBL would surely fall afoul of
the ABM treaty once it is ready to move beyond “advanced research.”

As for the Kinetic-Kill ASAT, Mr. Bell declared: “We simply do not believe that this ASAT
capability is required, at least based on the threat as it now exists and is projected to evolve over
the next decade or two. To be sure, there are potential adversaries such as North Korea or Iraq
which could try to employ space-based assets against our forces in a possible war, including for
communications, navigation, targeting or surveillance missions. But we are confident that
alternatives exist to negate or disrupt such efforts, including destroying ground stations linked to
the satellite or jamming the links themselves.”

The suggestions that the United States has no need for a kinetic-kill ASAT capability for “the
next
decade or two” and that there are alternatives that already exist for negating or disrupting enemy
space activities, such as destroying ground stations or jamming links, would also appear to rule
out the use of the Airborne Laser program for anti-satellite purposes. This is particularly true if,
as has been reported in the press, the Administration is actively engaged in negotiations with the
Russians aimed at producing limitations on anti-satellite weapon systems.

In view of the enormous stakes that have been described by 43 of our Nation’s preeminent
retired
flag officers (see the attached Open Letter to the President), by the
National Defense Panel and by
former Secretaries of Defense James Schlesinger and Caspar Weinberger, among other respected
experts, I believe it imperative that you promptly clarify the Administration’s policy on space
dominance. Specifically:

1) Do you agree that the United States must be able to exercise control of outer space,
including,
as the NDP put it, having the capability to “deny enemies the use of space”?

2) Do you believe that the space-based laser and airborne laser technology development
programs
can be brought to fruition and deployed without violating Administration policy? If so, how?

3) Is the Administration, in fact, engaged in discussion of new limitations on anti-satellite
weapons
with Russia? In light of the emphasis placed by Mr. Bell on means of neutralizing hostile satellites
such as attacking ground stations and jamming, do you expect these discussions to lead to
arrangements that would create further impediments to the fielding of other space control
technologies?

4) Have you calculated what the impact would be on our force structure requirements and
warfighting capabilities if a hostile power were able to deny us use of space for communications,
intelligence, navigational or other purposes, to say nothing of his being able to exploit space
against us? I would be grateful if you would provide me with the findings of such an assessment.

As I expect to address this subject with other witnesses who will shortly be appearing before
our
Committee, I would very much appreciate having your responses to the foregoing questions at the
earliest possible moment.

Sincerely,

/signed/

James M. Inhofe
United States Senator