Putin is weakened, but will China’s Xi push for regime change in Russia?

The weekend’s mutiny in Russia by Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Wagner Group of mercenaries prompted a visit by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Rudenko to Beijing to meet with Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang and Ma Zhaoxu, the vice minister of foreign affairs. This apparently hastily-arranged meeting enabled Russia to convey optimistic messages regarding the future of its war in Ukraine, the standing of Russian President Vladimir Putin, and the overall health of Sino-Russian relations.

Putin’s rule and his war have cast a shadow over China’s relationship with Europe. Last week, Chinese Premier Li Qiang visited France and Germany, reportedly to warn both states against the European Union’s plan to “de-risk” supply chains and alter their economic relationship by reducing dependence on raw materials from China or limiting the export of technologies to Beijing. This was an attempt to assure the Europeans that China’s expressed support for Russia does not come at the expense of its relationship with Europe, including support for climate protections and debt relief for Zambia.

China has dismissed Prigozhin’s attempted coup as Russia’s “internal affair,” but his actions still could damage the “no-limits partnership” Xi and Putin proclaimed last year. Though his march on Moscow was aborted, Prigozhin’s mutiny surely has weakened Putin. Xi might contemplate whether he should support a regime change in Russia, or continue to support Putin.

So far, Xi has benefited from having Putin in power; the Russian dictator is the supplicant in their relationship. Until Prigozhin’s uprising, Putin seemed to be secure and, as Xi might view it, he was keeping the U.S. and NATO occupied with the war in Ukraine. We must not forget that the goal of the Chinese Communist Party is to overthrow the U.S. as leader of the free world and ultimately shackle the world to China’s ambitions.

Putin’s interest perhaps would have been better served by emerging as the tertius gaudens of the conflict between China and the United States. Now that he has tied Russia’s interests to China, he walks the path that Xi requires of him. This means Russia must accept diminished influence when its interests conflict with those of China — such as in Central Asia — and to serve as an instrument of distraction for the West while China continues to expand its military power, strategic ambitions, and perhaps preparations for the invasion of Taiwan.

As a weakened leader, Putin may have served his usefulness to Xi — especially if there is a candidate in the wings who could succeed Putin.

The question for Xi is whether Putin’s rule still advances the Chinese Communist Party’s interests. That Xi is dominant in the relationship will not change whether Putin remains or goes. And at present, Putin serves as a lightning rod, attracting the world’s animus for his acts, allowing the Chinese Communist Party’s crimes against humanity in Xinjiang to remain somewhat in the background.

China’s egregious actions are too often an afterthought of the world’s conscience, as Xi would want. With Putin’s dependence, Xi has secured his northern flank. Russian conventional and nuclear military power could be employed in conjunction with or apart from China’s military — but to serve China’s interests.

Xi has given the U.S. a two-front problem with which it must contend. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s meeting in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, in 2022 demonstrated that China is undoubtedly the dominant force in the region. U.S. influence has been on the wane since the George W. Bush administration left the K-2 (Karshi-Khanabad) air base in Uzbekistan, and the Biden administration abandoned the Afghan government and people to the Taliban.

Russian influence is also weakened because the Central Asian states perceive Russia as a threat, following its invasion of Ukraine, and they likely see Moscow as the junior partner in the relationship with Beijing. For Xi, this is a remarkable occurrence at the same time that China is waging genocide against Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang. As evinced in Samarkand, China’s western flank is as secure as it has been in recent years.

With two flanks secure and the expansion of Xi’s ability to project power, Xi must worry that all this could end if Putin leaves office. A new Russian leader would open the door to uncertainty; he might seek to free Russia from China’s grasp. A new leader might put Russia’s interests first, end the war, and seek to restore balance between the West and China.

Therefore, it is likely that China will try to keep Putin in power as long as possible. With Putin, China is free to center its aggression on its southern and eastern flanks. Xi’s aggression might be kinetic — indeed, at some point it will be so — against India on China’s southern flank or against Taiwan to the east, but China will continue to employ all the tools of statecraft to bring about the change it wants. Thus, the world should expect China to exert diplomatic, ideological and economic pressure against both countries, while working to undermine their governments. The U.S. should also anticipate the continued expansion of China’s domestic influence in those countries.

Soviet dominance of China during the Cold War is now reversed. China calls the shots in the Sino-Russian relationship and Xi does not want to upset this balance. No doubt, his fiery advice to Putin will be that he cannot survive another incident like that with the Wagner Group, but Xi realizes that Putin must remain in power. Still, Xi’s “talent scouts” likely are looking for alternatives, in case something does happen to Putin. As a result, the U.S. and its allies and partners must move beyond anticipating aggression to recognizing its certainty.