Rage, doubts and expectations: Unilateral withdrawals

by Douglas Feith
The Washington Times, 11 March 1996

After the recent bombings, Israeli officials denounced
Yasser Arafat for having failed to dismantle the
terrorist infrastructure under his control. Mr. Arafat
did make anti-terrorism promises that he has failed to
honor. The Israeli government, however, since signing the
Oslo accords, has implemented its withdrawal plans
despite Mr. Arafat’s broken promises. Israeli officials
declare they expect PLO compliance with the accords. But
they transfer land and authority to the PLO whether or
not there is compliance.

Is there logic behind this perplexing policy? There
is: the logic of unilateral withdrawal. Though official
Israeli pronouncements emphasize peace and mutuality,
unilateralism actually drives the government’s actions.
In other words, there is an important gap between
declared and actual policy. Public outrage over the
latest terrorist attacks may compel Israel’s leaders to
close this gap and halt the withdrawals.

When Israeli officials talk of separation rather than
peace, they signal that the “peace process” is
more in the nature of a unilateral Israeli withdrawal
than a two-sided bargain. In late 1993, government
officials promised that, if the PLO could not prevent
terrorism, Israel would halt or reverse its withdrawal
from the territories. At the end of 1994, following
several terrorist bombings in the heart of Israel, Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin did not do this but established
government committees to look into methods to separate
Israel from the territories with fences, walls, bypass
roadways, and the like. If the PLO could not prevent
terrorism, he made clear, Israel would withdraw anyway,
while experimenting with new ways to divorce itself from
the Arabs.

Peace, of course, is different from divorce. Indeed,
in essential respects, divorce is the opposite of peace.
Yet Israeli officials switch back and forth between talk
of conciliation and talk of constructing walls, as though
it were all the same idea.

It matters that the word “peace” is
misapplied because treating the PLO as a partner in peace
implies a different assessment of risks than does an
essentially unilateral withdrawal premised on continued
hostility and conflict. Withdrawals that may resolve the
conflict require different analysis from those that
simply change the lines from which Israel will have to
continue to fight against hostile neighbors.

When reminded of his 1992 campaign promises not to
negotiate with the PLO or facilitate creation of a
Palestinian state, Mr. Rabin replied that Israel had
“no alternative,” explaining: “We had to
choose between the Greater Land of Israel, which means a
binational state and whose populations would comprise, as
of today, 4.5 million Jews and more than 3 million
Palestinians … and a state smaller in area, but which
would be a Jewish state. We chose to be a Jewish
state.” Mr. Rabin implied Israel had only two
choices, his negotiations with the PLO or annexation of
the territories with citizenship for the Arab inhabitants
(i.e., a binational state). But no Israeli political
party, certainly not Likud, proposed a binational state.
None advocated annexation of the territories with
citizenship for the Arab inhabitants. Government leaders
distorted the picture to make those who opposed their
dealings with the PLO appear fanatical and, of all
things, un-Zionist.

Nor did Israel have to choose between Mr. Rabin’s two
options. It had at least one more. In the years between
1967 and 1993, Israel neither relinquished the
territories nor annexed them – neither embraced the PLO
nor granted the Arab inhabitants citizenship. Rather, it
controlled the territories pending agreement with an
appropriate Arab party. That policy was compatible both
with Labor’s wish to trade the territory for peace and
with Likud’s wish to grant autonomy but not sovereign to
the Arabs there. Labeling those against handing over the
territories to the PLO as enemies of peace and diluters
of Israel’s Jewish character showed just how swiftly and
completely government officials had broken with the past.
They thereby condemned not only Likud supporters, but
also all those faithful to Labor’s own 1992 election
platform.

The resonant slogan that “Israel has no
alternative to peace” deserves attention.
“Peace” in its customary meaning requires two
sides. Israel’s having no alternative to peace implies
Israel cannot survive without peace. This means Israel
cannot survive without Arab consent, which means that,
should Israel’s neighbors withhold or revoke that
consent, Israel will eventually cease to exist. Israelis
who repeat this idealistic-sounding slogan probably do
not intend to say this, but that is the logic of their
words. The slogan signals to Israel’s antagonists that
they can, if steadfast, wear down the Jewish state. And
if they draw this conclusion, the slogan of “no
alternative” actually diminishes the chances for
mutual accommodation. In short, Israel is less likely to
win peace if its leaders proclaim that the country has no
alternative to peace.

In debates about peace policies, Labor government
supporters invariably ask critics: If you oppose the
present course, what, then, is your solution? But this
challenge begs the question. Israel cannot have peace
simply because its citizens desire it. Peace not being
within Israelis’ sole control, they cannot identify a
solution irrespective of circumstances on the Arab side.
Before peace is possible, Palestinian Arabs must develop
both peaceable intentions and political institutions that
have credibility and authority. If these factors are
missing, peace with the Palestinian Arabs will not be
available, no matter how forthcoming Israeli policy might
be. Israel cannot compel good faith on the Arab side, nor
can it ensure mature political leadership there. wp=”br1″>

Relying on Mr. Arafat creates a problem for Israel, as
illustrated by a riddle Abraham Lincoln liked to pose: If
you call a dog’s tail a leg, how many legs does a dog
have? If the answer came back, “Five,” Lincoln
would say, “No, four, because calling a tail a leg
doesn’t make it a leg.” Day after day, as terrorist
bombs explode and PLO violations of the peace accords
accumulate, it becomes increasingly evident that Mr.
Arafat is not an authoritative and credible peace partner
just because Israeli officials call him one.