‘READ OUR LIPS’: CONGRESS MUST SAY NO TO TROOPS IN BOSNIA, NOW

(Washington, D.C.): On 30 October, the U.S. House of
Representatives — by an overwhelming, bipartisan margin —
served notice on the parties to negotiations concerning the
Bosnia conflict getting underway today in Dayton, Ohio: There
should be no presumption that U.S. troops will be available for
deployment to Bosnia and Congress had better authorize any such
deployment before it occurs. Unfortunately, President Clinton
signaled the following day that he rejects the views expressed in
Monday’s non-binding congressional resolution, even though it was
adopted by a stunning 315-103 margin.

As a result — if Congress is serious about the concerns,
both substantive and procedural, expressed in the resolution
approved by the House on Monday — it has no choice but to
utilize its “power of the purse”: It must adopt
legislation that prohibits the use of appropriated funds for the
purpose of deploying U.S. forces in Bosnia without the Congress’
express approval.

Clinton’s Rebuff

In remarks delivered at the White House on 31 October,
President Clinton responded to the congressional resolution on
Bosnia by making the following points:

• “We have come to a defining moment in Bosnia. This
  is the best chance we’ve had for peace since the war
  began. It may be the last chance we have for a very long
  time.” This statement obscures the fact that there
  were myriad moments since the war began when a similar
  combination of Western air power and resolve to use it
  against the Serbs combined with arms in the hands of the
  Bosnian-Croatian federation would have achieved
  conditions conducive to peace. It also overlooks the fact
  that the continued application of such pressure would
  probably result in a far more stable and durable outcome
  than would a “peace agreement” crafted under
  present circumstances.
• “Only the parties to this terrible conflict can end
  it. The world now looks to them to turn the horror of war
  to the promise of peace. The United States and our
  partners — Russia, Germany, France and the United
  Kingdom — must do everything we can to support
  them.” In fact, the Clinton Administration appears
  to believe that the U.S. and its “partners” can
  end the war by offering an end to sanctions on Serbia,
  the consolidation of a Serbian state in Bosnia to be
  protected and guaranteed by international peacekeeping
  forces, reconstruction aid and, if all else fails,
  coercion on the Bosnian government to go along with
  arrangements that satisfy Belgrade and perhaps Zagreb. This
  is not a formula for “supporting” the parties
  in arriving at a just and lasting peace.
• “The responsibilities of leadership are real, but
  the benefits are greater. We see them all around the
  world: a reduced nuclear threat, democracy in Haiti,
  peace breaking out in the Middle East and in Northern
  Ireland.” The “benefits” alluded to in
  this list are hardly a basis for confidence in President
  Clinton’s prediction that benefits will flow from his
  Bosnian deployment. The nuclear threat is, if
  anything, growing world-wide; democracy in Haiti is, at
  best, perishable if not completely illusory; and it is
  altogether premature to count the chickens expected to be
  hatched by either the Middle East or Northern Ireland
  peace processes.
• “In Bosnia, as elsewhere, when the United States
  leads, we can make progress. And if we don’t, progress
  will be much more problematic.” This statement
  misses the point altogether. At issue is not whether
  the U.S. should lead but the direction in which it
  should lead. Congress can agree that America’s
  global leadership is critical without buying into
  initiatives like a Bosnian peacekeeping deployment that
  can be expected to squander U.S. moral and political
  authority, waste limited military resources and foster
  public antipathy to this country’s engagement in foreign
  affairs.
• “For four years, the people of Bosnia have suffered
  the worst atrocities in Europe since World War II: mass
  executions, ethnic cleansing, concentration camps, rape
  and terror, starvation and disease.” President
  Clinton seems determined to ignore his responsibility for
  standing idly by for three of those four years as these
  atrocities were perpetrated. Worse yet, in response
  to a subsequent question about former Chairman of the
  Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell’s “reluctance to
  use air power to force the parties into
  negotiations,” the President actually defends his
  passivity. He said: “Let me tell you, today
  we’re starting a peace process, and we have done things
  that have brought us to this point. I believe we have
  done the right things.”

The truth, of course, is that neither the Clinton
Administration nor its predecessor did “the right
things” in the face of Serb aggression and genocide.
If anything, however, the past failure of judgment and
will should be a warning to those in Congress who the
President hopes will give him the benefit of the doubt as
he pursues a new, but no less misguided policy towards
Bosnia.

• “We continue to learn more and more even in the
  present days about the slaughters in Srebrenica. The best
  way, the only way to stop these horrors is to make
  peace.” These sentences are manifestly misleading.
  Recent press reports have simply informed the public of what
  the Clinton Administration has known for some time:
  As recently as last July, the Bosnian Serb forces with
  the vital assistance of the Milosevic regime engaged in
  mass executions, torture, rape and other atrocities
  against the population of the Muslim community of
  Srebrenica. And a “peace” that allows such
  crimes to go unpunished — for example, by forging it
  with someone like Milosevic who largely bears
  responsibility for them — would not necessarily put a
  permanent end to such “horrors.” It may,
  instead, appear to legitimate them, assuring they will be
  repeated or avenged in the future.
• “Making peace will advance our goal of a peaceful,
  democratic and undivided Europe, a Europe at peace with
  extraordinary benefits to our long-term security and
  prosperity, a Europe at peace with partners to meet the
  challenges of the new century…” This statement is
  clearly intended to respond to the criticism that the
  President has yet to persuade the American people that
  their equities are at stake in the Bosnia conflict.

If only Mr. Clinton’s strategy for “making
peace” were remotely likely to produce peace, the
rest of the sentence would be indisputable.
Unfortunately, since it is not, the chances are that the
repercussions will be instead a Europe that is once more
traumatized by ethnic conflict — and the refugees and
economic dislocation it causes.

• “After so many years of violence and bloodshed, a
  credible international military presence in Bosnia is
  needed to give the parties confidence to live up to their
  own agreements, and to give them time to begin the long
  hard work of rebuilding and living together again.”
  Here again, the President is confusing assumptions with
  facts. Hard experience has shown that what the Serbs
  need to “live up to their own agreements” is
  not a credible international military presence in
  Bosnia, but decisive military reverses. And, as the
  Bosnian Serbs have yet to indicate any willingness
  to “live together” with Bosnians of other
  ethnic groups, it is an unwarranted leap of faith to say
  that the presence of U.S. or other peacekeepers is
  necessary to “give them time” to do so.
• “If we don’t participate in the implementation
  force, our NATO partners, understandably, would
  reconsider their own commitments. We would undermine
  American leadership of the alliance. We would weaken the
  alliance itself, and the hard-won peace in Bosnia could
  be lost.” In the face of strenuous congressional
  objections to a U.S. deployment in Bosnia, such rhetoric
  amounts to a game of chicken — with the United
  States’ most important military alliance at stake.

Regrettably, President Clinton is greatly
exacerbating the risks that the Atlantic Alliance will
not survive his diplomacy — whether he fails or succeeds
in deploying U.S. forces in Bosnia. On the one hand,
by refusing to make arrangements in the negotiations for
the possibility that there will be no American ground
troops in Bosnia, he is creating a self-fulfilling
prophecy of calamitous repercussions for NATO if Congress
ultimately balks. On the other, if the U.S. deployment in
Bosnia winds up, as seems inevitable (presidential
assurances to the contrary notwithstanding), with
American casualties, an ill-defined mission, poor command
and control arrangements and no end in sight, the one
multilateral organization that has traditionally enjoyed
public and Congressional support — NATO — may become an
object of the same ridicule and loathing generally
directed at the United Nations and other international
institutions.

The Bottom Line

In Bosnia, as elsewhere, the Clinton Administration is
confusing peace agreements with peace and confusing a peace
process with a willingness to effect real peace. If the only
impediment to the President placing U.S. forces in Bosnia is the
completion of some sort of “peace agreement,” it is a
safe bet that they will wind up in harm’s way on the ground in
the Balkans.

And while President Clinton’s rhetoric is characteristically
mutating with each public appearance, his formula of yesterday
concerning congressional authorization of such a deployment is
worrisome: “If a peace agreement is reached, I will request
an expression of support in Congress for committing United States
troops to a NATO implementation force.” It appears that
the President has in mind an “expression of support”
for forces already deployed — when the natural inclination is to
rally around the troops — rather than an a priori
congressional approval of such a deployment.

If Congress wishes to avoid being hornswoggled in this
manner, it must act now. In the face of a President
clearly indifferent to legislative prerogatives concerning the
non-emergency deployment of American military personnel and a
Secretary of Defense who has said that he will use funds from
other defense accounts to pay the $1.5-2 billion costs associated
with a U.S. deployment in Bosnia, Congress has no choice: It
must prevent any appropriated funds from being spent in the
absence of legislation explicitly authorizing such expenditures.
By doing so quickly, the impact of not having American troops
serve as targets/peacekeepers in Bosnia — on both the
negotiations now underway and on NATO — can be minimized.