Remarks by Frank J. Gaffney, Jr. before the Policy Forum on Defense Spending

The Cato Institute
Washington, D.C.
24 November 1997

“THE U.S. CAN NO LONGER AFFORD RECKLESS ‘PEACE DIVIDENDS'”

Today’s debate is particularly timely and welcome in light of the reminder Saddam Hussein is
once again providing that threats to vital U.S. interests persist even in the post-Cold War era. I
commend the Cato Institute for facilitating this discussion and am pleased to be able to bring to it
the perspective of one who believes American defense spending must urgently be increased.

Can We Know ‘How Much is Enough’?

In gauging our military requirements, inevitably the question is posed: How much is enough?
The unsaid assumptions are that you don’t want to have too much defense and that the right
amount can be precisely calibrated.

I don’t happen to agree with either of those assumptions.

First, experience tells us that overwhelming power — combined with a credible perception that it
can and will be used — generally translates into deterrence of aggression, obviating the need to
use that power.

Second, trying to assure that you don’t have more defense than you actually need has historically
proven to be a formula for having less than is required. The result all-too- often has been war on
a scale and at a cost that easily exceeds whatever savings might have been realized by the “green
eye-shade” approach.

Having said that, I recognize that one of the realities of a democracy is that, in the absence of a
direct and immediate threat — in fact, on occasion even in the presence of one — the popular
preference for spending on non-defense priorities creates pressure to reduce funding for the
military.

After World War I, World War II, Korea, Vietnam and now the Cold War/Desert Storm, we have
seen this tendency translate into extraordinary declines in the force structure, readiness, morale
and modernization of the U.S. armed forces.

I firmly believe that such declines have, in the past, not only made us less ready to fight the wars
that followed such “bust cycles”; I am convinced — as are many others — that the perceived
weakness of this and other democracies actually contributed to the creation of conditions
that gave rise to those wars.

The ‘Operation Desert Storm’ Standard

If we require a measure of merit for evaluating defense requirements, we could do worse than use
the kinds of capabilities we brought to bear — and had in reserve, if needed — to fight Operation
Desert Storm.

This may not be a perfect guide to the future of post-Cold War wars. In fact, I would argue that
it is likely an overly optimistic one. In the future, for example, it would be foolish to count on
having, as we did in the Persian Gulf war: the command of the air and space; dominant
intelligence capabilities; secure and optimized bases, port facilities and petrol sources; time to
build up; and/or the non-use of weapons of mass destruction.

That said, the Desert Storm standard has the advantage of providing a reasonable baseline for
judging minimum defense requirements — and assessing how far short of the mark we are today.
Professor Fred Kagan at West Point published a valuable short treatment of the subject in an
important op.ed. article in last Friday’s Wall Street Journal.⁽¹⁾ It found among other things that:

• The United States has cut its armed forces by one-third since 1991.
• In 1990, the U.S. had 11 heavy divisions; 3 heavy armored cavalry regiments. The United
  States deployed five-and-a-third divisions in the Persian Gulf for Desert Storm.

Of those eleven, today there are only six heavy divisions and one heavy armored
cavalry regiment. One of those remaining is committed to Korea and another one is
not deployable (one brigade serves as a test-bed for the Army’s experimental Force
XXI, and the other two brigades are committed to Guard and Reserve training).

Of the three heavy armored cavalry, one is no longer heavy and another is now
part of a permanent training force.

• Of the seven divisions the allies contributed — with varying degrees of utility — only four
  remain.
• The readiness of the residual U.S. forces is “suffering” as a result of reduced training,
  undermanning, excessive deployments and declining morale.
• The reductions made in the U.S. force structure ensures that even if the United States decided
  to deploy its remaining four heavy divisions and one armored cavalry regiment, there would
  be no reserve comparable to that it enjoyed during Desert Storm — four heavy divisions (two
  each in the United States and in Germany) and two armored cavalry regiments.

As Professor Kagan points out, the cumulative effect of these many deleterious changes in
the posture of America’s military subsequent to Operation Desert Storm is to leave the United
States with “two bad options: facing an enemy without overwhelming force or abandoning
our national interests around the world.”

I agree wholeheartedly with Speaker Gingrich who observed that we have been living for
too long off the Reagan build-up. In a number of areas, we are seeing a dangerous “hollowing-out” of the U.S. military. Of particular concern to me are:

• A force structure clearly inadequate to contend with anything like two wars “nearly
  simultaneously” or, as the Quadrennial Defense Review puts it, “in close succession.”
• A declining power projection capability — notably, far too few stealthy, long-range strategic
  bombers, too few carriers with totally inadequate strike capabilities.
• An inability to assure dominance of space as a theater of military operations vital to U.S.
  success in terrestrial combat and minimal capabilities to reconstitute vital capabilities if
  someone else asserts space control.⁽²⁾
• A totally reckless attitude toward active and passive defenses of the American people
  against weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. Especially worrisome are the
  lack of global missile defenses, any civil defense of consequence or even an ability to assure the
  continuity of our constitutional, representational form of government in the face of WMD
  attacks..
• A disregard bordering on contemptuous indifference concerning the need to maintain over the
  long-haul a credible nuclear deterrent. The fact that President Clinton’s systematic
  “denuclearization” of the U.S. military has gotten so far advanced — and will likely continue
  to do so — without any appreciable public debate or congressional second-guessing is one of
  the most extraordinary and dangerous scandals of this presidency.

The Bottom Line

Corrective actions in these areas will take more than just increased resources. It will take vision
and will. My unshakeable conviction is that the American people have sufficient common sense to
be willing to pay the price for a robust defense posture on the scale available at the time of Desert
Storm. All they require to make such a sacrifice is to be told coherently, consistently and credibly
that the world in which we now live is not one free — as President Clinton persists in saying — of
missile threats and is one in which vital American interests and even our people are at risk.

Most especially, they require from their elected leaders and above all from their military
commanders the truth. It’s time to start telling it.

— End of Remarks —

1. See “The Cost of Military Downsizing” by Fred Kagan, The Wall Street Journal, 21
November 1997.

2. For more on the issue of space control, see the following Center products entitled: Wall
Street Journal, Center’s Gaffney Urge Debate About Clinton’s ‘Foolhardy’ Vetoes of Space
Control Programs (No. 97-P 172, 20 November 1997); Clinton Legacy Watch # 8: Denying
U.S. Military the Ability to Dominate the Next, Critical Theater of Operations — Space (No.
97-D 153, 15 October 1997); and Test the MIRACL Laser Against A Satellite: The Outcome of
the Next War May Turn On A Proven American A.S.A.T. Capability (No. 97-D 122, 2
September 1997).