Removing ‘special’ from the U.S.-U.K. relationship

Decision Brief     No. 05-D 48                                         2005-09-22

(Washington, D.C.): For nearly a century, the United States has had no more militarily potent and reliable ally than the United Kingdom. From the First World War to the current conflict in Iraq, the U.S. and U.K. have operated intimately and with unprecedented success in numerous theaters under diverse conditions.

Over these past nine decades, much more than the security of both nations has been assured by this closest of ties, known as the “special relationship.” It is no exaggeration to say that the world has been a far freer and safer place because of it.

In all likelihood, moreover, the future safety of these two democratic allies, and a great many besides, will be determined by the viability of their partnership at the strategic and military levels. Just as British participation in American-led campaigns has been indispensable in the past, so it will surely be in the future.

Trouble Ahead

Citizens on both sides of the “pond,” therefore must view with the greatest of concern what is, arguably, the most significant development in the history of the special relationship: a largely stealthy, or at least unpublicized, yet systematic move by the United Kingdom to integrate its armed forces with those of the European Union.

The cumulative effect of this endeavor, if brought to fruition, cannot be overstated. In the future, it will become extraordinarily difficult – if not, as a practical matter impossible – for the UK to fight without permission from the EU. Even then, it will be problematic whether British forces will be able ever again to fight effectively alongside the US.

Given the enormity of these stakes, it is astounding that this development has proceeded with virtually no public notice, let alone serious debate, on either side of the Atlantic. It would appear this may be due to an understandable expectation on the part of the EU and members of the British Government that they would be thwarted from taking such steps were word of this seismic geo-strategic shift to get out.

Fortunately for admirers and supporters of the U.S.-U.K. special relationship, the true magnitude and import of this shift has now been brought to light in a recently-published study by Dr. Richard North, former research director at the European Parliament for the group of European Democracies and Diversities, entitled The Wrong Side of the Hill: The ‘Secret’ Realignment of UK Defence Policy.

Enforced Europeanization

In 1999, Britain and other European nations reached an agreement to establish a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF). The stated purpose was to build a military component independent of NATO that would be capable of deploying 60,000 personnel within 60 days and sustaining for at least a year.

Many analysts continue blithely to dismiss the significance of the ERRF, an attitude generally encouraged by the British government of Tony Blair. They claim it constitutes not a standing army that is, in fact, separate and apart from NATO. Rather, the participating states emphasize their commitment to NATO and offer assurances that contributions of units to the ERRF would be “voluntarily,” so as not to diminish the capabilities of the Atlantic Alliance.

Even if that were true (and it likely is not), for such a force to be effective, whatever units are assigned to it by the various European nations would require a great deal of interoperability. In the name of such integration, the EU has used the requirements of the ERRF to promulgate and impose common standards in the procurement of military hardware by member states, including Britain.

By so doing, the European Union has revealed its true intentions. As Mark Leonard of the pro-EU think-tank Center for European Reform has explained: “By creating common standards that are implemented through national institutions, Europe can take over countries without necessarily becoming a target for hostility.” (Emphasis added.)

In other words, the European Union has found a way to exercise control over national armies from the inside. The most consequential and worrying of Brussels’ targets is the most independent of those militaries: Her Majesty’s armed forces.

Whose ‘Next Generation’?

Despite the absence of any formal acknowledgment that such a move is afoot, and notwithstanding official assurances to the contrary, proof that Europe is effectively creating – via the ERRF – a competitor to NATO can be found in its recent military procurement decisions. The most important of these relate to systems designed for what is called “next generation warfare.”

At the core of such capabilities is a concept generically known as “net-centric warfare.” It is predicated on the melding of the power of military hardware with advanced information and communications technology to gain enhanced battlefield situational awareness and combat lethality.

Thanks largely to French and German ambitions to create an alternative to the U.S.-dominated NATO alliance and compete with America’s military-industrial capabilities, two competitive and largely incompatible systems aimed at implementing net-centric warfare have emerged from the United States and Europe.

The key to net-centric warfare is a satellite-based system generically known as GPS for “global positioning system.” The location, navigation and timing signals sent by multiple GPS satellites makes possible sophisticated, real-time command and control of warfighting units.

Currently, effective GPS technology is provided only by the United States through its Navstar program to – among others – NATO. Europe, however, is well advanced in its plans to launch a rival system called Galileo, which the EU intends to use for military as well as civilian purposes. Galileo is currently projected to be fully operational by 2008.

Importantly, equipment designed to work solely with Navstar will not be compatible for use with Galileo, and vice versa. Some in Europe have actually wanted Galileo’s signals to be set in such a way as to jam those of the American rival. At the very least, as Europe builds its future military force to be Galileo-enabled, it will severely complicate interoperations with militaries that are Navstar-enabled.

Goodbye, Union Jack

Prior to 1998, the United Kingdom was working in partnership with the United States on a host of major military development projects, including many that involved the use of net-centric warfare. This took an abrupt turn, however, after an Anglo-French summit meeting in December 1998 at St. Malo, France. On that occasion, Prime Minister Blair – hoping to bolster his claim to leadership in Europe – offered to integrate Britain’s armed forces with those of the EU.

For Britain to become an effective member of the ERRF, it will be necessary to make its equipment – which currently uses Navstar – Galileo-enabled. Since the costs of allowing such gear to be capable of utilizing both U.S. and European GPS systems are considered prohibitive, the procurement decisions that have flowed from the St. Malo summit have decisively begun to move the British military into the European camp.

Dr. North’s paper enumerates a myriad of examples of one-time Anglo-American military development and/or procurement programs that have been scaled back or, more often, abandoned altogether. To cite but one: Prior to St. Malo, the U.K. had partnered with the United States to develop a vital common system for “intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance.” It was to be delivered by a new generation of battlefield reconnaissance vehicles through the bi-national U.S. Future Scout and Cavalry System (FSCS)/U.K. Tactical Reconnaissance Armoured Combat Equipment Requirement (TRACER) program.

In 2000, Congress directed a reconfiguration of the program and shifted funding from the FSCS to a more ambitious concept known as Future Combat System (FCS). The British Government, in the post-St. Malo environment, decided no longer to participate in the restructured project.

The flip-side, of course, of Britain’s decisions not to team with the United States is the rapidly expanding number of development and procurement deals London is striking with the Europeans. Examples include:

• replacing its fleet of U.S.-built C-130 and C-17 airlifters with the A400M ‘Eurolifter’

• rejecting U.S. bids to supply its support vehicles in favor of those from a German firm

• abandoning a U.S.-U.K. joint project to develop a 155mm howitzer in favor of a French gun that will fire German-designed shells

• determining that its main strike aircraft will be the Eurofighter

• sharing, in the future, three giant aircraft carriers with France, with a French firm playing a central role in their design and construction

• ensuring that development of its UAV wing will be led by France

• receiving its battlefield radar systems from Germany and Sweden

These decisions are not taking place in a vacuum or willy-nilly. They reflect, in fact, commitments made in what has come to be called “the secret treaty,” a document signed by Britain and five other European countries in 2000. It calls explicitly for “harmonized force development and equipment acquisition planning” and commits the signatories to its realization.

While the treaty was concluded outside of the EU, its intention could not have been clearer. In fact, in 2004, EU members agreed to the creation of the European Defense Agency that was then charged with implementing this agreement.

The political, as opposed to the practical, impetus for these procurement decisions is made even more evident by the fact that Britain is building a force inferior to that which could mesh with America’s – and doing so at a far greater cost than would be required for the more capable force. It is estimated that the UK has squandered some 10 billion pounds on projects aimed at Europeanization.

Bad for Everybody

The likelihood of a complete breakdown in common standards between the U.S. military and those of EU member states is very real. Should Britain continue to realign its defense apparatus with that of the European Union through a procurement policy that excludes and is incompatible with America’s, the implications for the United States, Great Britain and perhaps even the EU would be nothing less than devastating:

• The United States will lose a formidable ally and partner in the British military. This would be the case even if Brussels were to permit Britain to fight alongside the United States – something that the recent unpleasantness over U.K. support for the liberation of Iraq demonstrates cannot be assumed. Britain would be unable to offer anything more than token support, as Anglo-American interoperability will inexorably be eliminated.

• Britain ‘s security interests will not be well served, either. After all, the Franco-German aspiration to create a European army – which cannot, as a practical matter, amount to much without Britain’s highly professional military personnel and resources, is not really aimed at producing a formidable fighting force. Rather, it is but an instrument for furthering European integration and bringing the British, whose independence has long been a thorn in the side of continentals, under discipline.

• It is predictable, moreover, that – having created this Rapid Reaction Force – the Europeans will feel obliged to use it, albeit in what Brussels (read, the French and Germans) view as politically correct ways. These will, at best, fritter away precious British and other European defense resources. At worse, the EU may well become embroiled in conflicts from which it is ill-equipped to emerge victorious. Having done so, it may even require American help – which will be hard to provide given the incompatibility with U.S. systems deliberately designed into EU forces.

The Bottom Line

The temptation is to believe that, since the full effect of these long-term procurement decisions will only be felt many years from now, supporters of the special U.S.-U.K. relationship need not be unduly concerned. There will, after all, theoretically be ample time to reverse policy and its programmatic effects.

Unfortunately, the inertia such procurements take on – involving everything from the investment of vast sums to the staking of political and military careers to the ripple effects throughout the armed forces’ inventory and logistical systems of innumerable decisions, many of which have very long lead-times – there is no time to waste if we are to preserve an Anglo-American relationship that is not only special, but indispensable.