Ridley’s Believe It Or Not: What Are The Secret Protocols To The New German-Soviet Agreement?

The Center for Security Policy today called on the West German and Soviet governments to disclose all the terms and conditions agreed to in the course of the recent Kohl-Gorbachev meetings in the Caucasus on German reunification. While some aspects of the arrangements — notably those involving the continued presence of Soviet forces in the eastern portion of Germany; the repudiation by Germany of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons; and the Soviet Union’s reluctant acquiescence in a reunified Germany’s participation in NATO — have been announced, the details of the accompanying deals involving energy, trade, financial and technology ties have not.

If serious misunderstandings and suspicions among the Western allies are to be avoided, it is vital that Germany make a full disclosure of all the agreements it has reached with Moscow. This is especially true in light of the unfortunate consequences of previous secret German-Soviet accords — notably those attached to the Rappallo Treaty between the democratic Weimar government and Lenin signed in 1922 and the notorious Hitler-Stalin Trade and Non-Aggression pacts of 1939 which followed.

Indeed, there are cautionary lessons to be learned from the economic and commercial ties between the USSR and those of the German government of 1939. To illustrate this point, the Center released today excerpts of an August 1989 paper entitled Fifty Years of Tyranny: The Intolerable Legacy of the Nazi-Soviet Agreements of August 1939 (No. 89-50, 28 August 1989). A copy of these unsettling excerpts is attached.

"It has been obvious for months that Bonn’s all-consuming preoccupation with German reunification and Gorbachev’s desperate economic situation had the potential to produce yet another, dangerous marriage of convenience between Germany and the USSR," noted Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., the Center’s director. "Instead of attempting to manage the risks inherent in such a prospect, the United States government and its allies have looked the other way on — if not actively encouraged — the sort ofnon-transparent, largely untied and undisciplined German economic and traderelations with Moscow that have brought the West considerable grief in the past."

Gaffney added, "Secretary of State James Baker professed surprise yesterday at the speed with which Kohl and Gorbachev sealed their deal. Far from surprising, such a precipitous pace was entirely predictable given the strong encouragement the West Germans had been receiving from allied capitals — especially the United States — for their bilateral entente with the USSR."

Nowhere was the Administration’s policy of encouraging Germany to pursue its interests unilaterally more in evidence than at the recent NATO meeting in London and the Economic Summit in Houston. For example, in response to questions about the obvious disconnect between U.S. efforts to deny the USSR access to American taxpayer resources and the Bush Administration’s acquiescence to Bonn’s decision to increase German citizens’ exposure to billions of dollars worth of new liabilities in the USSR — the President simply said, "If the Germans decide they want to do that, that’s their business."

Gaffney observed, "Instead of leading the alliance, President Bush and Mr. Baker are trying to put the best face on following Germany’s lead. Despite their defensive efforts at self-congratulatory ‘spin-control,’ this episode is but the latest example of the diminution of U.S. power and influence in foreign affairs during the Bush Administration’s tenure."

Roger W. Robinson, former chief economist at the National Security Council and a member of the Center’s Board of Advisors, said, "First, the Bush Administration invites a ‘go-your-own-way’ German policy toward the USSR on an issue as sensitive as an untied $3 billion dollar guaranteed credit to Moscow, then is startled when Bonn, in effect, bolts from the ‘Two Plus Four’ talks and cuts a separate deal with Gorbachev."

Robinson added, "Now, what was supposed to have been a carefully crafted and relatively protracted multilateral negotiation involving the United States, Britain, France, as well as the Soviet Union and the East and West Germans, has become largely irrelevant — and with it, German attentiveness to U.S. preferences and Western security concerns."

Gaffney concluded, "Germany’s Western allies would do well to remember the significant risks to collective security that have ensued in the past from secret economic and commercial understandings between Germany and the USSR. They should now insist, among other things, upon receiving a full accounting of the as-yet-undisclosed terms of the German-Soviet deal. Should such a stocktaking not occur, they could find that the latest ‘One Plus One’ German-Soviet deal has ensured a new equation in Europe: 2 + 4 = 0 for Western interests."

Copies of Fifty Years of Tyranny and other materials relating to the need for greater transparency and discipline in East-West economic, financial and technology relations may be obtained by contacting the Center.