Sex And Insecurity: Is Clinton's Misconduct Endangering More Than His Presidency?

(Washington, D.C.): The 6 February 1998 editions of the Daily Oklahoman
carried a op.ed.
article by Lisa Dean that deserves national consideration. Ms. Dean, a vice president of the Free
Congress Foundation, wrote in an essay entitled “Sex Scandals Could Pose Threat to Nation’s
Security,” about an issue largely ignored to date in all the analysis of President Clinton’s personal
behavior and its implications: Mr. Clinton’s sexual modus operandi has, at
the very least, left
him susceptible to compromise by others in ways that could prove enormously detrimental
to U.S. interests. As Ms. Dean put it:

Aside from
being immoral, a President’s addiction to sex might actually be a security threat
to our nation

“As a nation, we can’t have a President who is willing to tell secrets to
someone simply because she happens to be in his favor at the moment. As a
nation, we can’t afford to have a president who may be vulnerable to bribes
in order to cover up his ‘nocturnal activities.’ Everything from foreign
espionage to scandal-mongering for profit could take place under those
circumstances.“

Any student of Espionage Tradecraft 101 would immediately appreciate the sorts of
opportunities made possible by Mr. Clinton’s personal conduct. The question is: Did
one or
more of those students seek to exploit them?

How About Chinese Intelligence?

As it happens, today’s Washington Post features yet-another front-page scoop by
Bob Woodward
that makes this question one of very immediate concern. According to Woodward, the
majority
of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee led by Sen. Fred Thompson (R-TN) has
concluded that a handful of people with ties to President Clinton and Vice President Gore —
including several of the President’s oldest friends — have “had a long-term relationship
with a Chinese intelligence agency.”

The Post reports that this finding was “drawn from highly classified intelligence
information
supplied by both the CIA and the FBI that was not revealed during several months of public
committee hearings last year, executive branch sources said yesterday.” Both the FBI and CIA
are said to have agreed to the wording included in the Committee’s final draft concerning the
“Chinese connection.”

An important part of this “connection” was the result of then-Governor Clinton’s friendship
with
Indonesian businessmen Mochtar and James Riady dating
from the 1980s. The Post reported
that:

“James Riady attended a key Oval Office meeting on Sept. 13, 1995, when
Clinton approved the transfer of former Lippo executive John Huang, href=”#N_1_”>⁽¹⁾ who had
been working in a sub-Cabinet Commerce Department position, to a DNC
fund-raising post. In another Oval Office meeting with Clinton in September
1996, Riady lobbied for favorable trade relations with China.”

While the Committee report apparently does not include
evidence that these efforts resulted
in more than improper and/or illegal contributions to the Democratic Party, the question recurs:
Knowing Mr. Clinton as well as the Riadys did, could they have been unaware of his
sexual
appetites? And if they were aware, is there any doubt but that their contacts in Chinese
intelligence were also apprized of this potentially enormously useful information?

It would seem, at a minimum, that the President has been in a compromised position,
one
that was susceptible to exploitation by a foreign intelligence service. Now that the
Thompson
investigations have been concluded, it behooves those in Congress with continuing responsibility
for oversight of American foreign policy to consider whether that vulnerability was, in fact,
exploited to the detriment of U.S. national interests and to the benefit of the People’s
Republic of
China, or others.

The Larger Pattern that Invites Foreign Penetration

Unfortunately, the President’s misconduct is not the only example of his Administration’s
wanton
disregard for even the most basic counter-intelligence concerns. Indeed, the Center for Security
Policy warned as early as March 1994 of “the wholesale collapse of security procedures at the
White House.”⁽²⁾ The following were among the
Administration’s worrisome personnel security
practices evident even then:

“The Clinton Administration admits that, out of a total of 1,044 White House personnel, as
many as 100 do not have security clearances. These include some of those who have routine
access to extremely sensitive national security information, like Dee Myers, the White House
press spokeswoman.

“The White House also has been obliged to confirm reports that, as of this week, fully
one-third of the staff do not have permanent passes to the complex. Instead, they have been
granted access to the White House via ‘temporary’ passes for months at a time, and in some
cases for over a year. Some even are simply using ‘visitors’ badges.

“This Administration’s unique problem with security is that it is aggressively recruiting and
appointing to government positions — at the White House and elsewhere — people who could
not and would not pass muster under any rigorous security screening process.

“Just in case the ominous implications of such a melt-down of security procedures at the
White
House were not self-evident, Ms. Thomasson [then director of the White House Office of
Administration] helpfully clarified them in congressional testimony this week. Referring to an
individual who was recently charged with being a long-time Soviet mole at the CIA: ‘We don’t
think we have any Aldrich Ameses at the White House. But we certainly could.'”

The Center updated this list of troubling activities in October 1996. In a
Decision Brief
entitled Clinton’s National Insecurity Policies Are a Ticking Time-Bomb, href=”#N_3_”>⁽³⁾ it issued a new
warning about the Administration’s: dumbing down of the security clearance process; granting
access to secret information to personnel without clearances; disregard for communications
security; purposefully sharing sensitive intelligence information with foreign nationals; and
declassifying information without adequate regard for its continuing sensitivity.

The Bottom Line

Back in the Spring of 1994, the Center concluded that: “It would be a miracle if the Clinton
Administration’s irresponsible approach to security at the White House had not resulted in the
Executive Office of the President being penetrated by one or more ‘Aldrich Ameses.’ It certainly
would be uncharacteristic of hostile intelligence organizations like the former Soviet KGB and
GRU to permit such an extraordinary opportunity to go unexploited.”

Recent revelations about the President’s own conduct suggest that the odds are, if anything,
even
longer that American interests have gone uncompromised in some way, by somebody as a result
of abysmal Clinton personnel security practices. Damage assessments — starting with the
information that has come to light as a result of the Thompson hearings (albeit largely after they
were concluded) — are urgently needed and, where necessary, corrective actions must be
promptly taken to limit the possibility of even greater damage in the future.

One damage-limitation measure is of special urgency: The American people need to
be
reminded that the world remains a dangerous place, filled with enemies — potential and
actual — only too willing to take advantage of any U.S. vulnerability. In addition to
creating
popular support for reducing such vulnerabilities, this sort of educational effort might serve
another salutary purpose: It could help to disabuse the public of its poll-documented perception
that the substance of governance can long go unaffected by serious private misconduct by the
President of the United States.

– 30 –

1. In this connection, see the Center’s Decision
Brief entitled ‘High Crimes and
Misdemeanors’? The Huang Caper Reinforces Concerns About Clinton Malfeasance on
Security Matters (No. 96-D 109, 1
November 1996).

2. See the Center’s Decision Brief entitled
The Clinton Security Clearance Melt-Down: ‘No-Gate’ Demonstrates ‘It’s the
People, Stupid’ (No. 94-D 32, 25 March
1994).

3. See No. 96-D 103, 25
October 1996.