Soviet Crackdown Watch (Part 6): It Begins...Repression With a 'Human Face'?

(Washington, D.C.): After
weeks of documenting evidence that the
central authorities were preparing a
crackdown in the Soviet Union, the Center
for Security Policy today notes with
profound regret that the crackdown
has now begun. Henceforth,
the Center will be monitoring the
dimensions and character of Soviet
repression against the genuinely
pro-democratic forces inside the USSR.

Evidence of the crackdown now underway
includes the following:

On 7 January 1991, Defense
Minister Yazov ordered tens of
thousands of Soviet paratroopers
into Lithuania, Latvia, and
Estonia to “round up draft
dodgers.” The Lithuanian
Borders Defense Department
reported two columns of tanks had
crossed into Lithuania. The order
to enforce conscription was also
delivered to Georgia, the
Ukraine, Albania, and Moldavia.

Colonel General Fyodor Kuzmin,
Commander of the Baltic Military
District, informed the three
Baltic presidents by phone of the
order and warned that the
round-up would begin on 13
January. In fact, Soviet
troops have already begun
apprehending persons according to
a Radio Riga report on 10
January.
Lithuanian President Landsbergis
called the action “a huge
provocation” in a New
York Times interview on 7
January.
On 7 January, Polish officials
prevented a Soviet military train
carrying 200 troops, 9 tanks and
other military equipment bound
for the Ukraine from exiting
Polish territory.

On 8 January, the first U.S.
official reaction was registered
in a statement issued at the
White House and the State
Department. It indicated that the
United States was “especially
concerned” over
actions by the Gorbachev regime
which were characterized as
“provocative and
counterproductive.” The
White House press secretary urged
the Kremlin “to cease
attempts at intimidation and turn
back to negotiations” in
dealing with the republics. In
Moscow, U.S. Ambassador Matlock
contacted Foreign Minister Eduard
Shevardnadze about the reports
and in Washington, Deputy
Secretary of State Larry
Eagleberger summoned Soviet
Ambassador Bessmertnykh.

On the same day, however,
the Administration announced an
allocation of $900 million of the
$1 billion in agricultural credit
guarantees extended to Moscow
center on 12 December 1990. In
addition, $300 million in U.S.
Export-Import Bank insurance and
credit guarantees are expected to
be drawn down by American
companies over the next few
weeks.

As such agricultural credit
subsidies begin to flow to the
Soviet Union, it is noteworthy
that reports reaching the Center
for Security Policy indicate that
Moscow has threatened
republics that U.S. grain would
be withheld from areas not
cooperating with the Kremlin.
On 9 January, TASS denounced
Marlin Fitzwater’s statements as
“a manifestation of
old-style thinking, which members
of the world community have
already begun moving away
from.”

When asked on 9 January whether
any further communications or
warnings had been issued to the
Soviet Union, White House
spokesman Marlin Fitzwater
replied, “We don’t
have anything to add at this
point. We continue to monitor the
situation.”
In an interview on 9 January with
the Christian Science Monitor,
Foreign Minister Eduard
Shevardnadze said that he did not
consider the deployments in the
Baltic states as evidence of the
dictatorship he was warning of in
his resignation speech.
“I can’t say this is the
display of some kind of
dictatorship. This is a simple
desire to introduce order,
because it’s impossible to live
under conditions of chaos and
anarchy. It’s chaos and anarchy
that can lead to
dictatorship.”

Such a statement casts
substantial doubt on hopeful
Western predictions that
Shevardnadze might emerge in the
future as a champion of the
reformist republics. Moreover, coming
as it does against the backdrop
of reports that he may remain in
the Gorbachev cabinet, this
astonishing pronouncement raises
anew fears that Shevardnadze
might revert to form and serve as
an instrument of the repressive
central authorities.
On 10 January, President
Gorbachev declared that the
situation in Lithuania had
reached “a dead end”
and threatened to impose direct
presidential rule from the
Kremlin. He accused Lithuanian
leaders of “gross
violations” of the Soviet
constitution and of attempting
“to restore a bourgeois
regime…under slogans of
democracy.”

On 10 January, the Estonian
Popular Front called on citizens
to “make ready for
siege-like conditions.”

After weeks of postponing the
broadcast of a Shevardnadze
interview — conducted
immediately following and
focusing on his resignation — by
the popular TV program, Vzglyad,
the Deputy Chairman of the USSR
State Committee for Radio and
Television has banned
this popular television program
(estimated to have an audience of
up to 100 million Soviets) from
the airwaves entirely and
indefinitely.

Today, Soviet troops occupied
several official buildings,
including the National Defense
Department and the National Press
Building in Vilnius. Military
units sprayed the Press Building
with machine gun fire, reportedly
seriously wounding a number of
people inside. When
surrounded by civilians, Soviet
tanks fired deafening blank
rounds to intimidate the crowds.
According to the Deputy Chairman
of the Lithuanian Supreme
Council, at least one foreign
correspondent filming Soviet
tanks on Putnios Street was
beaten up.

In its report on the Baltics,
London’s Financial Times
concluded today that, “The
question now is just how
and when the Soviet
leader will attempt to enforce
his authority — and the military
conscription — with the open use
of force.” (Emphasis added.)

In a striking indication
of Gorbachev’s confidence that he
can defuse any possible U.S.
sanctions in response to his
crackdown by highlighting the
USSR’s “cooperative”
role in the Persian Gulf crisis,
the Soviet leader called
President Bush to talk about next
steps towards Iraq.

Reporting to the press on this
phone conversation, President
Bush went out of his way to
praise Gorbachev yet again for
his stand on the Gulf. Subsequent
to a discussion of the Gulf
crisis — and clearly as a
subordinate issue — Bush raised
the Baltic issue with Gorbachev.
He told reporters:

“The United States feels that the
use of force, particularly in the Baltics
would be counterproductive. There was
some discussion of the internal affairs
in the Soviet Union when I talked to Mr.
Gorbachev. He knows of my position that
we view the Baltics differently….They
have a very different standing than other
republics….I am very hopeful that they
can find a way to resolve these extraordinarily
complex problems without
resorting to force.”

Interestingly, Soviet Foreign
Ministry spokesman Vitaly Churkin
chose a similar formulation in
commenting on the domestic Soviet
situation today. He said:
“Without observance of law
and without discipline, I don’t
see how it might be possible to
continue with the immensely
complex and difficult
reform program and program of
perestroika in our country.”

Interfax, the only
non-state-controlled news service
in the Soviet Union was
jettisoned from its offices in
Moscow today.

Importantly, the timing
of Gorbachev’s crackdown in the
Baltics — coming at the moment
when all eyes are focused on the
Persian Gulf and the United
States hopes for a benign Soviet
attitude — is eerily reminiscent
of the Soviet 1956 invasion of
Hungary at the height of the Suez
crisis.

The Bush Administration was
legitimately criticized for sending mixed
signals — if not a green light
— to Saddam Hussein prior to his
invasion of Kuwait. It seems now to be in
danger of encouraging Mikhail Gorbachev
to further repression by its minimalist
and largely perfunctory reaction to his
crackdown to date. The Center for
Security Policy believes that President
Bush’s willingness to extend $1.3 billion
in U.S. taxpayer credit guarantees to
Gorbachev and the ruling Communist Party
speaks far louder than the mild rebukes
and “serious concern” expressed
by the White House.

The Center called on the
Administration and the Congress to: halt
immediately the disbursement of any
Commodity Credit Corporation grain loan
guarantees; freeze U.S. Eximbank
insurance coverage and credit guarantees;
shelve all U.S. technical assistance to
the strategic Soviet energy sector; and
suspend any forward movement on Soviet
associate membership status in the
International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank. It goes without saying that
new concessions under active
consideration — notably the removal of
Soviet borrowing restrictions at the
European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development and technology transfer
liberalizations — be suspended
indefinitely.

Such firm U.S. actions — not mere
words — will be required if the
escalating spiral of violence and
repression by Moscow central authorities
against innocent civilians is to be
reversed. To do otherwise will only lead
down the same road of dismal policy
miscalculation and ensuing fiascoes
evident in China and Iraq.