Stop the Serbs. Now. For Good.

By Margaret Thatcher, former Prime Minister of Britain
The New York Times, May 4, 1994

We have been here so many times before in the Bosnian saga: acts of barbarism by the Serbs,
the mobilization of a shocked international conscience, threats of air strikes (or actual air strikes,
of the most limited kind), a tactical Serbian withdrawal, more talks aimed at persuading the
warring parties to accept a carving up of territory that rewards aggression. Then the Serbs move
on to yet another Bosnian community, applying the same mixture of violence and intimidation to
secure their aim of an ethnically pure Greater Serbia.

The tragedy of Gorazde may for now at least be over. But there are other towns of equal
strategic interest on which the Serbs are now free to concentrate their forces. Yesterday the U.N.
intervened to head off a Serbian attempt to expand the Brcko corridor in northern Bosnia, but
such interventions merely divert Serbian aggression. It is time to halt it — late, but not too late.
We have the justification, the interest and the means.

A sovereign state, recognized by the world community, is under attack from forces encouraged
and supplied by another power. This is not a civil war but a war of aggression, planned and
launched from outside Bosnia though using the Serbian minority within it. The principle of
self-defense precedes and underlies the United Nations Charter. The legitimate Government of
Bosnia has every right to call upon our assistance in defending its territory. That is ample
justification for helping the victims of aggression.

And both the United States and Europe have real and important strategic interests in Bosnia.
Let me note four of them.

First, after all that the West, NATO and the U.N. have now said, the credibility of our
international stance on every security issue from nuclear nonproliferation to the Middle East is
now at stake.

Second, would-be aggressors are waiting to see how we deal with the Serbs. Our weakness in
the Balkans would have dangerous and unpredictable consequences in the former Soviet Union,
which has Slavic nationalist forces that closely parallel those of Greater Serbianism. And
throughout Eastern and Central Europe there are minorities that aggressive mother-states might
be tempted to manipulate to provoke conflict, if that is allowed to pay in the case of Serbia.

Third, Serbia’s own ambitions are by no means necessarily limited to Croatia and Bosnia.
Kosovo is a powder keg. Macedonia is fragile. Bulgaria, Hungary, Greece, Albania and Turkey all
have strong interests that could drag them into a new Balkan war if Serbian expansion and
oppression continue unchecked.

Fourth, the floods of refugees that would cross Europe — particularly in the event of such a
wider conflict — would further inflame extremist tendencies and undermine the stability of
Western governments.

The West has the means — the technology and the weapons — to change the balance of military
advantage against the aggressor in Bosnia. Since the beginning of the Serbian war of aggression,
which began in the summer of 1991 in Slovenia, intensified in Croatia and is now consuming
Bosnia, I have opposed the sending of ground troops to the former Yugoslavia. But I have said
that humanitarian aid without a military response is a misguided policy. Feeding or evacuating the
victims rather than helping them resist aggression makes us accomplices as much as good
Samaritans.

So I have consistently called for action of two sorts: the launching of air strikes against Serb
forces, communications centers and ammunition dumps; and the lifting of the arms embargo on
Bosnia and Croatia so that the Muslims and Croats can defend themselves on more equal terms
against the Serbs, who inherited the massive armaments of the Yugoslavian Army.

If such a policy had been pursued when I first proposed it on this page in the summer of 1991,
at a time when Sarajevo and Gorazde were under serious assault, thousands of people would now
be alive and in all probability the Milosevic regime in Belgrade would have fallen. Because this
approach was not adopted, we now find ourselves in a far more complex and dangerous situation:
trying to defend almost indefensible safe havens; maintaining a facade of neutrality when all our
decisions are based on the knowledge that the Serbs are the threat, and with a large contingent of
U.N. personnel whom the Serbs may choose to use as hostages.

The new joint effort by Russia and the West to persuade the Serbs to settle for 49 percent of
Bosnian territory (down from the 72 percent they have now occupied) is hardly less rife with
dangers. The Serbs will almost certainly not withdraw, and once the guns are quiet the Russians
may not wish them to do so — nor may the West be prepared to revive the threat of bombing to
force them. Even if they were to withdraw, their 49 percent of Bosnia would still represent a
reward for aggression. And in either event, the ensuing peace would be an unjust and fragile one
requiring a large contingent of Western (including U.S.) ground troops to enforce it on the
victims. If hostilities resume, as is all too likely, these troops would become the target for attack.

So the formula of air strikes and lifting the arms embargo is still the right one to apply. NATO
already has the mandate from the U.N. Security Council not just to defend U.N. personnel but to
deter attacks on the safe havens. This mandate gives full authority for the requisite launching of
repeated large-scale air strikes against Serb military targets wherever these may prove effective. It
is a matter for consideration whether strikes should go into Serbia itself.

Air strikes are effective, as long as they are not on a small scale, hedged with political
hesitations and qualifications. They can inflict severe and ultimately unsustainable damage. But
they have to be part of a clear strategy to shift the advantage against the aggressor. The Serbs
must know that they will be carried out with swiftness and determination. Nor may Russian
objections be allowed to stand in their way. If the Russians are prepared to support such action,
all well and good. But NATO cannot have its policies entirely shaped by Russian sensibilities.

Lifting the arms embargo, as Senators Bob Dole and Joseph Biden have courageously proposed
(the Senate is to take up the resolution tomorrow), is also crucial. That embargo was imposed
before Bosnia and Croatia were internationally recognized, and its legal standing is at least
questionable. The U.S., Britain and France — or if necessary, the U.S. acting alone — should
formally state that they do not intend to continue with it.

Such statements might also be supported by a resolution of the U.N. General Assembly. The
confederation between Bosnia and Croatia, so skillfully brokered by the United States, now means
that supplies of arms will be used against the common aggressor, not against each other, and that
they can easily be shipped in through Croatia. A well-armed Muslim-Croatian alliance would
confront the Serbs with a quite new and unwelcome challenge. It might even prompt the Serbs to
settle.

I do not claim that this approach is without dangers. It would require diplomatic and military
skills of a high order. It is unlikely to bring immediate peace — though it might. Some disruption
of the aid effort is inevitable. But what the people of Bosnia now need is a permanent peace that
allows them to return to their homes and live without fear. What the West needs is to restore its
reputation and secure its interests. This is the only way those aims can be realized.