SUMMARY OF THE CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY HIGH-LEVEL ROUNDTABLE ON THE FUTURE OF U.S. STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL UNDERSEA FORCES

INTRODUCTION

Within the next few weeks, the Congress is expected
to make decisions that will bear upon the viability of
the United States’ undersea warfare capabilities for the
foreseeable future. This will be the likely effect of
pending legislative initiatives that will determine what
sorts of advanced nuclear-powered submarines are
manufactured in this country — and by whom.

To answer these questions thoughtfully, a larger set
of issues must be considered: What is the importance of
undersea assets to deterrence and U.S. security in the
post-Cold War world? What are the implications of the
Clinton Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) for
the Nation’s sea-based deterrent? What are the
technological threats — both present and future — to
U.S. undersea forces? What impact will arms control have
on future U.S. force structure options? And what, in
turn, are the consequences of the responses to these
questions for the U.S. submarine-building industrial base
and for the costs of its products?

Anticipating the need for careful consideration of
these critical issues, the Center for Security Policy on
20 October 1994 convened a day-long “High-Level
Roundtable Discussion on the Future of U.S. Strategic and
Tactical Undersea Forces” involving over fifty
senior past and present government officials and others
with considerable expertise in this field. (This
Roundtable was the second in a series of such symposiums
conducted by the Center on major national security issues
of the day. The first, held in June 1994, dealt with the
future of the manned bomber force.)

Among the participants were: former Secretaries of
Defense James Schlesinger and Caspar Weinberger;
the former Director of Naval Nuclear Reactors, Admiral
Kinnaird McKee; former Deputy Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, Vice Admiral Al Burkhalter;
former Under Secretary of Defense Don Hicks; and
former chief strategic arms negotiator, Ambassador Linton
Brooks. (A full list
of participants is attached.)

This paper briefly summarizes the key points that
emerged in the course of the Center’s latest Roundtable
Discussion. While much of the discussion dealt with the
status of the sea-based ballistic missile force, most of
the observations noted below bear on the future need for
competent tactical underwater capabilities, as well.

No effort was made to define or formally approve
consensus positions on these topics; nor were specific
recommendations adopted by the group. Nevertheless, this
summary sets forth a number of points that appeared to be
generally agreed upon — and which apply directly to
pending decisions concerning the viability of U.S.
submarine forces and America’s capacity to maintain a
credible sea-based deterrent in the future.

I. FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE IMPORTANCE OF UNDERSEA
ASSETS TO DETERRENCE IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD

The lead discussant for the first part of the day’s
program was Admiral Kinnaird McKee (USN, Ret.),
former director of Naval Nuclear Reactors and a career
submarine officer. His remarks, and the discussion that
followed, focused in particular on the Clinton
Administration’s planned cutbacks in U.S. undersea assets
in response to the recommendations contained in the
Nuclear Posture Review. Highlights of the discussion
included the following observations:

• The U.S. deterrent posture has relied heavily on
  the undersea leg of the nuclear triad (land-based
  missiles, manned bombers and ballistic missile
  submarines) because it is difficult — if not
  impossible — for potential adversaries to detect
  submarines that can swiftly and without fanfare
  be brought to bear on trouble-spots around the
  world. The NPR proposes to shrink America’s fleet
  ballistic missile submarine fleet through a
  program of budgetary constraints and a slow
  strangulation of the industrial base.
• The submarine fleet’s inherent characteristics of
  stealth, mobility and firepower impose a
  “terrible burden” of both certainty and
  uncertainty on potential adversaries: They are
  certain of the awesome destructive capability of
  our submarine force, but they are completely
  uncertain of exactly where that force is located.
  It provides the U.S. a great amount of tactical
  and strategic leverage in a variety of
  situations.
• The Clinton Administration proposes to retire
  four ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) by
  2004, ostensibly in compliance with START Treaty
  limits. Yet the START treaties require mutual and
  balanced reductions — and Russia has yet to
  begin comparable reductions under START I.
  Neither has it ratified START II. Helping the
  Russians become a democracy by setting an example
  through unilateral restraint is not sound defense
  policy. In any event, the START treaties require
  the reduction of warheads — not
  submarines.
• Retired nuclear submarines cannot safely be
  “put into mothballs” as can surface
  ships or diesel submarines. The cost to man and
  maintain a nuclear submarine in storage is
  virtually comparable to maintaining it on active
  duty. As a practical matter, therefore, if
  budgetary constraints are not relaxed,
  “retired” submarines will have to be
  dismantled (“turned into razor
  blades”). There will be no way to call them
  back into service if the need arises at a later
  date.
• The Administration is attempting to reduce the
  defense budget for its own reasons and blames it
  on treaties — such as START II — that are not
  in force yet and that may never be. The treaties
  are being used as a smoke screen to hide the
  Administration’s real strategy — cut the defense
  budget to conform to an illusory “deficit
  reduction plan,” then define the threats in
  the rest of the world in such a way as to justify
  this smaller defense budget. Sound national
  security policy dictates that defense budgets
  react to the international threat environment.
  The Clinton Administration is attempting to
  conjure up a world with no threats to justify its
  decision to decrease defense spending.
• Higher defense levels cannot be reconstituted
  quickly. If relations with Russia turn sour and
  we have made the cuts suggested by the NPR, it
  will take at least five years for the United
  States to regain an adequate ballistic missile
  submarine force structure.
• Paying the Russians to reduce their arsenal — as
  provided for in the Nunn-Lugar amendment — has
  proven to be largely self-defeating: Moscow is
  using at least some of the funds to develop new
  military technology. The United States may soon
  be in the absurd position of are paying both for
  the weapons systems against which it must defend
  as well as bearing increased costs in order to
  redress the effects of U.S.-funded improvements
  to Russian military capabilities.

II. THE NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW AND THE SEA-BASED
DETERRENT

The discussion then turned to a more general
examination of the Nuclear Posture Review and the
assumptions about current and future Russian behavior
contained therein. The lead discussant for this topic was
Dr. Daniel Goure, Deputy Director,
Political-Military Studies, Center for Strategic and
International Studies. Key points made in the course of
this portion of the Roundtable included:

• The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) reflects a
  benign view of a world in which there are
  “problem areas,” but no strategic
  threats to the United States. In fact,
  the NPR’s central premise is that the U.S. and
  Russia currently are partners and will remain
  partners for the foreseeable future. The notion
  of using military force for strategic purposes is
  totally absent from the Clinton Administration’s
  view of the world.
• If this unrealistic view of the world is
  accepted, it follows that the Clinton
  Administration can then attempt to: stop the
  production of essential elements of the U.S.
  nuclear weapons program; curtail nuclear research
  and development funding; reduce the submarine
  industrial base to a sole-source situation; and
  cut the number of undersea platforms to a
  minimum.
• The NPR anticipates that START Treaty compliance
  will require the retirement of four SSBNs and
  begins the budgetary strangulation that will
  ensure that the boats will be cut up by 2004,
  even if Russia is not in compliance (assuming
  that both START Treaties have come fully into
  force). If, on the other hand, the Russians do
  not reduce their armaments to treaty levels, the
  U.S. will not be able to reconstitute its
  submarine fleet. There is no planning or
  provision in the NPR for a situation in which
  Russia’s interests diverge from our own.
• The main problem with the NPR is that it leads
  irrevocably to a significant erosion of the U.S.
  nuclear deterrent at a time when it is not merely
  unclear, but unlikely, that Russia will
  remain a friendly, non-competitive power. The
  NPR provides no “hedge” against a
  renewed strategic threat — whether from Russia
  or some other source. There needs to be a point
  at which the NPR’s course can be reversed upon a
  showing that its premise of a rosy future is
  incorrect.
• Russia’s current program of aggressive military
  development is not seen by the Administration as
  the strategic problem — the potential threat to
  the nation’s security — that it is. Rather, it
  is regarded merely as an inconvenience, something
  that gets in the way of the supposed U.S.-Russian
  “partnership.” The fact that the
  Russian defense industry is building new, better
  weapons is seen as a problem of “inadequate
  defense conversion” rather than as
  deliberate, not to say threatening,
  Russian military planning.
• Moreover, the NPR cripples deterrence by setting
  building and reduction priorities that ensure
  degradation of U.S. capabilities: The United
  States is continuing vigorous production in areas
  where it has the capability to surge production
  in the event of crisis (e.g., aircraft) and
  reducing — if not destroying — production
  capability in the one area where protracted
  lead-times require steady, long-term commitment
  (e.g., nuclear submarines).
• Before the U.S. embarks on the cutbacks
  envisioned in the NPR, the Clinton Administration
  needs to ask the following questions: What
  evidence do we have that Russia is currently
  engaged in or is planning to implement
  substantial reductions in its nuclear
  capabilities? Does the NPR really permit the U.S.
  to reverse its course of nuclear reductions and
  reconstitute its capabilities if Russia does not
  reduce? Is the United States realistically going
  to be in a position to reconstitute its nuclear
  forces if Russia fails to ratify START II?

III. THE FUTURE THREAT TO U.S. UNDERSEA FORCES

The lead discussants in the third segment of the
Roundtable were Vice Admiral Al Burkhalter, former
Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Anthony
Battista, a former, long-time Professional Staff
Member of the House Armed Services Committee. They led an
animated discussion of current and future developments in
Russia and around the world that may give rise to serious
challenges to U.S. undersea forces. Among the highlights
of this segment’s discussion were the following points:

• There are two direct threats to the
  U.S. undersea force: (1) an undiminished — and
  improving — Russian submarine development
  program; and (2) the proliferation of
  state-of-the-art diesel submarines, most often
  sold by Russia to dangerous countries in regions
  of strategic interest to the U.S. (e.g.,
  Northeast Asia, the Persian Gulf, Latin America,
  etc.)
• The Russian “bear” might be sleeping,
  but it is certainly not dead. A fourth generation
  Russian submarine with capabilities that may
  outshine the best American subs is expected to be
  launched shortly. This indicates that, in spite
  of the chaotic state of the Russian economy,
  Russian military technological development has
  not ceased. Indeed, as the U.S. reduces its
  submarine building schedule to, at best, one sub
  every one-and-a-half years, Russia continues to
  build at a rate of two-to-three submarines per
  year. Evidently, their nuclear shipbuilding base
  retains a high priority both within the military
  sector and vis a vis the domestic economy.
• By contrast, the vulnerability of the U.S.
  submarine fleet is growing as its numbers
  diminish. Moreover, Russian anti-submarine
  warfare (ASW) capabilities — particularly in the
  field of synthetic aperture radar — are
  increasing at the same time that U.S. ASW
  capabilities are being severely constrained by
  shrinking R&D and procurement budgets.
• While the U.S. submarine fleet remains overall
  better, quieter and faster than its Russian
  counterpart, the gap is closing rapidly. Russia
  will shortly have — if it does not already have
  — comparable capabilities in a large number of
  submarines and a significantly larger fleet.
• There seems to be a state of denial in the
  Administration concerning Russian submarine
  developments — as the Russians continue to
  advance, we are cutting submarine research and
  development funds. The Administration wishes the
  Russian threat away because of budget concerns.
• Although diesel submarines can be used to fight
  so-called “brown water navies” such as
  those found in the Third World, and are
  substantially cheaper than nuclear subs, they are
  no substitute for nuclear submarines because they
  cannot rapidly travel long distances from port
  submerged and cannot remain on station for long
  periods of time, ready to exploit an opportunity
  indefinitely.

IV. ARMS CONTROL AND FUTURE U.S. FORCE STRUCTURE
OPTIONS

This segment of the Roundtable featured a
presentation by Sven Kraemer, former Director for
Arms Control on the National Security Council, and
remarks by Ambassador Linton Brooks, chief U.S.
negotiator for the START II Treaty. Among the key points
made in the course of this part of the discussion were
the following:

• The NPR does not identify Russia as an arena of
  potential conflict to which U.S. forces must be
  able to respond. NPR advocates conclude that if
  Russia is no longer a threat, then the defense
  platforms, built during the Cold War to counter
  that threat must no longer be essential to our
  defense. The trouble with this analysis is
  that the assumptions about the diminished Russian
  threat are not being borne out by Russia’s stated
  intentions or U.S. intelligence evidence. The
  Administration is neither listening to the
  intelligence community nor crediting Russian
  statements as reflecting their intentions.
• The bottom line is that the Russian threat is
  real and largely undiminished. It is being
  ignored by the Clinton Administration. The U.S.
  is eroding its security posture in a period when
  it faces more instability, not less.
• A prime example of failing to make provision for
  the future in the face of a continued threat is
  the Clinton Administration’s policy concerning an
  essential element for the safety and reliability
  of nuclear weapons — tritium. The Energy
  Department has closed the only tritium-source
  reactor for safety reasons without making
  provision to build a substitute. It will take ten
  years to build a new tritium reactor. The U.S.
  will run out of usable tritium in about that
  time. Thereafter, a significant portion of
  America’s most modern nuclear weapons will become
  unreliable and/or unusable.
• As the United States continues to denuclearize,
  it is losing valuable nuclear expertise,
  expertise which will be necessary — but,
  unfortunately, nonexistent — should it have to
  meet a nuclear threat in the future.
• The Clinton Administration is basing defense
  budget decisions on the assumption that START II
  is going to be implemented in Russia. What has
  not been discussed candidly is the fact that the
  United States may not be able to turn back if
  START II is never fully implemented.

V. INDUSTRIAL BASE AND AFFORDABILITY ISSUES

The lead discussant for the final segment concerning
the condition of and prospects for America’s nuclear
submarine production base and the options for building
affordable nuclear subs was Bob Gillcash,
Legislative Assistant for National Security Affairs to
Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT). Among the noteworthy
points made in the course of this segment were the
following:

• The Administration is allowing the budgeteers to
  define force structure. That is, rather than
  beginning by defining the threats and the mission
  requirements to meet those threats followed by
  budgeting to fulfill the missions, the
  Administration is designing the missions to suit
  the budget.
• In the absence of sound strategic planning,
  the Navy is losing the ability to produce
  submarines. Vendors and contractors are taking
  themselves out — or are being forced out — of
  competition for government contracts. The
  industrial base is being ignored in
  decision-making about the needs of the submarine
  fleet. Because of the budgetary restraints being
  imposed by the Clinton Administration, the Navy
  is no longer making long-term investment
  decisions essential to preserve an effective
  underwater fleet and the industrial
  infrastructure needed to support it.
• The industrial base is not simply a system to
  build submarines. To be viable, it must also be a
  system for repairing and maintaining them and for
  developing the next generation of undersea
  combatants.
• In the period 1982-1991, the United States
  produced 37 submarines; in the period 1992-2001,
  only four U.S. submarines are planned, and that
  could fall to three. This represents a
  90% drop in production. As a result, skilled
  welders, nuclear engineers, naval architects and
  other specialists in submarine production are
  moving into the civilian sector. Many of them
  will be unavailable to build the next generation
  of nuclear submarines when they are needed. The
  fall-off in capability in the submarine sector is
  faster than in other military/industrial sectors
  because of the drastic reduction in construction.
• Moreover, low production rates mean higher
  per-unit costs. A prime example of this
  phenomenon is the UK submarine construction
  program, which is so slow — one ship every two
  years — that there is no competition for
  component supply: Each component has only one
  supplier, creating a monopoly allowing the
  supplier to charge the government the highest
  price possible.
• By 2010, even if the United States manages to
  produce between one and two nuclear submarines
  per year, the number of decommissioned ships will
  overtake the number of those in production. The
  U.S. will not be able to meet the final force
  structure numbers contained in the
  Administration’s own Bottom-up Review.

CONCLUSION

Taken as a whole, the Center’s Roundtable Discussion
on the future of the submarine force made a powerful case
for an immediate course correction concerning U.S.
sea-based deterrent and associated industrial
capabilities. As the American submarine fleet includes
the most survivable leg of the Nuclear Triad and many of
the Nation’s most flexible and potent war-fighting
instruments, the size and condition of this force must
not be allowed to deteriorate to the point where its
credibility, utility and/or survivability are imperilled.

It follows from this discussion that the United
States cannot afford to disregard the need for a robust
and highly competitive industrial base to support its
future undersea war fighting needs. In the face of
available information about the present and emerging
threat, there can be little doubt that further erosion of
U.S. capability to design, develop and manufacture
advanced nuclear-powered submarines would be
unacceptable.