Summit Watch: Tough Questions For President Bush

As part of its continuing effort to illuminate and inform the national security debate, the Center for Security Policy has prepared the following material, including key questions that should be posed to President George Bush and other Administration figures.

I. ARMS CONTROL

START

In the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks, Secretary James Baker has negotiated a "framework agreement" to be initialed at the summit. He has said the agreement "is shaping up largely on original United States concepts and original United States proposals" and that "in terms of what we have given and what we have taken, we have done very well indeed."

Questions:

• Why is it that just about all of those concepts presented in the last two or three ministerial meetings with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze — especially the last one in Moscow — involve unmistakable, and in a number of cases major, U.S. concessions, departing from long-standing American positions?

 

Ballistic Missiles

 

• Won’t the concession on letting the Soviets flight test some of their SS-18 "heavy" ICBMs permit them to modernize and further improve the most lethal and destabilizing of all the strategic systems of which the Soviets will be permitted to keep 154 each with at least 10 warheads? Won’t that fact alone significantly undercut the importance of the projected START cuts?

 

• Won’t the decision to abandon the ban on all mobile ICBMs (whether single or multiple-warhead) present the United States with an insoluble verification problem in monitoring the large number of mobiles the Soviet Union has produced? Isn’t this accommodation of the Soviet position the more ill-advised now that the budget crisis is likely to ensure that no counterpart U.S. mobiles are ever deployed? Why not continue to insist on a total mobile missile ban, as President Reagan did?

 

• Why have the Soviets thus far refused to permit U.S. inspectors at their strategic missile production facilities? Will this be a replay of the incidents at the Votkinsk missile plant, where the Soviets gave our inspectors a hard time in terms of implementing the INF Treaty?

 

• Doesn’t the failure to resolve the issue of "new types" leave a major loophole and invite future disputes?

 

Bombers & Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs)

 

• Aren’t you concerned that the Soviets have still not agreed to limit the Backfire Bomber, which can readily reach all parts of the United States on a one-way mission and other areas in a two-way mission? In particular, in light of the apparent Soviet difficulties in bringing the Blackjack strategic bomber on line, don’t the 350 or more Backfires already deployed — and 30 some more being added each year — take on greater strategic significance?

 

• Doesn’t the concession on limiting ALCMs down to a range of 600 kilometers (vice the original U.S. cut-off at 1,500 km) take away a major compensatory strategic system — one in which we have a technological advantage and which we need to try to balance the Soviet advantages, e.g. in heavy missiles? Isn’t this particularly true insofar as there are no START limits at all on the Soviet air defenses against which U.S. ALCM-loaded aircraft must operate?

 

• Don’t the agreed bomber counting rules give a further significant advantage to the Soviets by granting them a greater number of permitted aircraft platforms (150 for USSR vice 120 for U.S.), and how can you have any confidence in the verifiability of the ALCM count?

 

• Doesn’t the "side agreement" (i.e., the Baker-to-Shevardnadze letter) committing the United States not to deploy nuclear warheads on TACIT RAINBOW (a new air-to-ground cruise missile with a range of nearly 500 miles) undercut yet another important U.S. deterrent option? Doesn’t it establish a dangerous precedent for limiting non-nuclear cruise missiles in START?

 

Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCM)

 

• Doesn’t the "politically binding" side-deal consisting of statements which place a cap on future U.S. (and Soviet) SLCM production — which are among the most stabilizing and cost effective U.S. defense systems — badly undercut our future options? In particular, do such constraints make sense when there is no way — and, certainly no agreed mechanism, to ensure Soviet compliance?

 

Relationship to SDI, ABM Treaty, and Compliance

 

• The Soviets have not revoked their policy statement of last fall’s Wyoming ministerial that they would, in effect, hold SDI hostage to START by not abiding by START if the U.S. moved to deploy SDI. Won’t U.S. acceptance of this position — either explicitly or implicitly (i.e., by signing a START framework agreement knowing this is a stated Soviet condition) endanger the development and testing of SDI programs we need to enable sound decisions to be made on deployment?

 

• The Soviets have not corrected their violations of the ABM Treaty (e.g., Krasnoyarsk radar) or of a number of other arms control treaties — despite the fact that it is U.S. policy not to undertake a new strategic agreement unless the Soviets tear down the Krasnoyarsk radar. Are you nonetheless going to sign a START framework even though that radar still stands and the Soviets are now saying they will only take it down "when they are ready?"

Chemical Weapons Limitations

At the summit, the United States will reportedly sign a bilateral agreement with the Soviet Union to reduce their respective chemical weapons stocks to equal levels, i.e., at a level equal to 20% of the current U.S. CW inventory while: 1) reasserting the commitment to continue pursuit of a global multinational ban with a binding destruction schedule for U.S. stocks, and 2) committing, with this bilateral agreement, not to produce any new U.S. chemical weapons stocks, including the binary program.

Questions:

• Thus far no effective means of monitoring chemical weapons production has been developed, in part because there are so many commercial chemical facilities that could be utilized for producing chemical weapons precursors. What confidence can the United States have that it can effectively verify the current and residual Soviet reductions base?

 

• Why is the Administration now going to halt production of CW (i.e., binary weapons) when the bilateral agreement is signed? Doesn’t this reversal of the Bush Administration’s prior policy, that the U.S. would halt production of CW only once a multilateral treaty entered into force, greatly undercut the possibility of having a modern CW deterrent and thus also undercut our security and our future negotiating leverage?

 

• Is it true that this deal is so deficient from a verification standpoint that the Administration feels it could not obtain a two-thirds vote if it were submitted to the Senate in the form of a treaty? Is this the reason that it is being offered as an executive agreement, which requires a simple majority vote of both houses of Congress?

 

• How can the U.S. continue to pursue a global CW ban though such a ban cannot be effectively verified and despite the fact that a number of nations, including some who have violated existing CW conventions, have clearly indicated they will not be bound by such an agreement? Why not instead first press on the non-proliferation front and seek strong sanctions against those who have used chemical weapons, who threaten to use them or who are developing them?

Nuclear Testing

At the summit, the United States will sign accords on enhanced verification procedures sought by the Reagan Administration for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of the 1970s as prerequisites to ratification by the U.S. Congress. This is expected to be accompanied by a U.S. commitment to undertake further "intermediate" limitations on nuclear testing, perhaps involving testing quotas and lower thresholds.

Questions:

• Doesn’t this indicate that the United States is willing to undertake new arms control commitments even as the President, in his 23 February arms control compliance report to the Congress has confirmed that the Soviet Union is violating existing nuclear testing agreements including the Limited Test Ban Treaty and, likely, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty?

 

• Doesn’t the commitment to undertake further nuclear testing limitations jeopardize the safety, efficacy, and modernization requirements of U.S. nuclear deterrent forces and won’t such limits involve intractable verification problems?

Conventional Forces in Europe

While no new conventional force agreement will be concluded at the summit, negotiations leading to the rapid reduction and complete elimination of Soviet occupation forces in Central and Eastern Europe will be a high priority. Yet, for some months the Soviets have stalled on major troop withdrawals and are now characterized by the White House as "stonewalling" the Vienna negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE).

Questions:

• Isn’t it likely that — since the Soviets have not yet accepted the latest, reported U.S. concessions on conventional forces — they will, either at or after the summit, both pocket these concessions and demand still others?

 

• Why, after the hopeful beginning of the transitions to democracy and self-determination in Eastern Europe, should the United States and its allies continue to seek essentially equal levels of U.S. and Soviet forces in Europe, when the latter are seen as occupation forces and their "hosts" want them out fast?

 

• Isn’t is obvious by now that the Bush Administration’s decision of last summer to put aircraft on the CFE negotiating table is an arms control and military disaster? Isn’t it time to get these off the table again? After all, isn’t it true that regional aircraft limits cannot be verified and can be readily circumvented? And aren’t the Soviets going after our dual-capable aircraft that (with the withdrawal of INF and the Administration’s decisions on drawing down short-range and nuclear artillery forces) are more essential than ever before for maintaining a modicum of regional deterrence?

 

• Is it true that while the United States previously insisted that no more than 60% of total tanks, artillery pieces and armored troop carriers in the Warsaw Pact could be held by the Soviets, the Administration now appears ready for a "compromise" that would permit the Soviets to hold on to an even larger percentage? Shouldn’t the permitted Soviet percentage be lowered to confirm the end of Soviet military dominance in the area?

 

• Is it true that the Administration has offered other CFE "compromises" to accommodate the Soviets, such as: a slower rate of equipment destruction; new definitions of ground equipment; less extensive verification; and, higher ceilings on permitted aircraft deployments in the treaty zone?

II. ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL AND TECHNOLOGY SECURITY ISSUES:

U.S.-Soviet Trade Agreement

The U.S.-Soviet Trade Agreement could be signed at the Summit, even though present indications are that it will be pulled from the agenda. A bilateral trade agreement with the Soviet Union would be the vehicle for granting most-favored nation status to the Soviet Union, waiving the current Jackson-Vanik constraint. Such an agreement, coupled with a bilateral investment treaty are required prior to granting the Soviet Union access to a number of U.S. government programs such as Eximbank credits and OPIC insurance. President Bush has stated that he would sign the trade agreement once the Soviet Union had codified emigration laws. While the Supreme Soviet was scheduled to undertake a second reading of that law on 31 May, it has now reportedly been removed from that body’s legislative calendar.

Questions:

• Will the U.S.-Soviet Trade Agreement cover trade with the Baltic states? If yes, doesn’t that violate the wishes of the Baltic states expressed in a joint statement by the heads of Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia? If no, does the President intend to negotiate a separate trade agreement with the Baltic states?

 

• Is the Soviet decision to postpone consideration of the required emigration legislation in the Supreme Soviet in order to avoid the potential for U.S. rejection of the Trade Agreement arising from Moscow’s economic repression in Lithuania?

 

• The Soviet Union is now in arrears in its payments to many of its major suppliers from the West and Japan? Estimates of late payments — in some cases over six months — owed to Western companies by the Soviets range from $2-3 billion. If this is the case, is it advisable for the Bush Administration to be encouraging American companies to export to the Soviet Union? Or, does the President intend to ask the American taxpayer to back-up those trade deals with U.S. government guarantees?

 

• Last year, President Bush said to the American people that he would not consider waiving the Jackson-Vanik amendment and granting most-favored nation status to the Soviet Union until that country had both codified liberal emigration laws and demonstrated a track-record under such codification? When does the Administration expect the Soviet Union to codify its emigration laws and what does the President consider to be an appropriate watch period? Does it concern the Administration that under new Soviet laws passed last week, Soviet citizens can be imprisoned for speaking ill of the Soviet president? Is the President confident this law will not be used against dissidents?

 

• Most economists regard the new Soviet economic reform program as excessively cautious half-steps that have little prospect of reversing the precipitous decline in the USSR’s economic and financial fortunes. Does the President take issue with this assessment?

 

• U.S. negotiators to the U.S.-Soviet Trade Agreement were reportedly unable to obtain assurances from the Soviets on two key items of concern to the American business community: (1) profit repatriation, and (2) protection of intellectual property rights. If U.S. companies cannot be assured that they will be able to repatriate their profits or protect their technology, why should they trade with the Soviet Union?

 

• It has been reported that there are a number of side-letters to the U.S.-Soviet Trade Agreement. Will these side-letters be shared with Congress? If not, isn’t the Bush Administration at risk of stirring up a congressional furor like that witnessed over the FSX negotiations where key items where omitted from the agreement between the U.S. and Japan and left to "understandings" between the two countries?

U.S.-Soviet Energy Cooperation

In April, the Soviet Union halted all shipments of oil and natural gas to Lithuania. The Administration has yet to initiate any sanctions or costs for the Soviet action. Instead, it is pursuing an aggressive policy of actually assisting the Soviet Union in its oil and natural gas production capabilities. For example:

1. U.S. and Soviet government delegations are meeting regularly to identify U.S. technologies and skills needed by the Soviet Union in the energy sector (U.S.-Soviet Energy Working Group — Lead agency: DOE);

 

2. DOE is exploring the possibility of a U.S. government-sponsored oil and gas mission to the Soviet Union in October; and

 

3. DOE is weighing an offer to buy uranium-enrichment services ($200 mn/yr) from the Soviet Union.

Questions:

• Deputy Energy Secretary Henson Moore is leading an Administration effort to help the Soviet Union exploit its energy resources. Does the President believe that Soviet repression in Lithuania through the use of energy leverage should be rewarded by U.S. efforts to enhance the Soviets’ capacity to use energy as a weapon?

 

• Without costs imposed by the United States, the Soviet Union is apt to continue to withhold oil and natural gas shipments to Lithuania — if not other republics. Shouldn’t we also be concerned that the East European countries have an inordinate dependence on the Soviet Union for its energy resources? Shouldn’t costs be imposed now on the Soviet Union’s actions in Lithuania to discourage Moscow’s consideration of using its energy leverage or coercion in any other country?

 

• Will the United States suspend the U.S.-Soviet Energy Working Group in light of Soviet withholding of energy supplies from Lithuania?

 

• Will the United States work with our allies to include Eastern Europe and the Baltic states in the protective safety net embodied in the May 1983 International Energy Agency Agreement, designed to keep its signatories from developing inordinate dependency on Soviet natural gas supplies?

 

• Does not Moscow’s use of natural gas and oil weapons to coerce Lithuania into submission constitute a total vindication of the Reagan Administration’s position on the huge Siberian gas pipeline project in 1982?

The Baltics

Questions:

• When the Bush Administration welcomed the Soviet Union into the GATT on May 16 as observers, the President said it was important that they be admitted so that they can learn the lessons of free markets and free trade. Does the President believe that Soviet observers at the GATT will supply the Baltic states with those trade lessons learned? If not, would the United States support a bid by the Baltic states to obtain observer status at the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)? Is the Soviet economic blockade of Lithuania legal under GATT?

 

• Would the President support a bid for Baltic membership or even observer status at the United Nations? If not, is it the President’s view that the Soviet Union will represent Baltic interests at the U.N.?

 

• Would the President support a bid for Baltic membership in the newly-created European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, designed to assist Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union? If not, does the President believe that the Soviet Union will direct any EBRD loans to the Baltics?

 

• Will U.S. emergency assistance, such as medical supplies, be provided to Lithuania if they are needed?

Settlement of Soviet Defaulted Debts

The United States is currently negotiating with the Soviet Union to settle some $1.54 billion in defaulted payments owed to American bondholders (dating back to pre-1917) and the U.S. government (Lend-Lease). Unless these debts are settled, the Soviet Union is barred from offering bonds in the U.S. market under the 1934 Johnson Debt Default Act. Principal concerns include (1) whether the negotiated settlement will adequately compensate bondholders and U.S. taxpayers, and (2) whether enabling the Soviets to enter the U.S. bond market is worth the pennies on the dollar the United States is likely to obtain in such a settlement.

Questions:

• The Soviet Union has been barred from offering bonds in the U.S. market under the Johnson Debt Default Act because, after the 1917 revolution, the Soviet Union refused to honor its outstanding debts. Later in this century, the Soviet Union refused to repay debts incurred under Lend-Lease. Now the Soviet Union is woefully late in paying back its creditors and suppliers. What are the terms and conditions now being negotiated (or agreed to) in settling these outstanding debts? For those Americans still holding pre-WWI Russian bonds, what will be the return on their investment negotiated under this settlement?

 

• Does this Administration see any downside risks for the American people should the Soviet Union be allowed to offer Soviet bonds on the U.S. market? Will the United States, under any circumstances, waive requirements that the Soviet Union supply full disclosure of economic and financial data prior to offering bonds in the U.S. market?

U.S.-Soviet Maritime Agreement

The United States and the Soviet Union are expected to sign a U.S.-Soviet Maritime Agreement at the Summit which will establish a boundary-line between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Bering Straits. The proposed settlement will recognize the boundaries established in 1867 with the sale of Alaska.

Question:

• What are the implications of this new boundary line for U.S. fishing rights, resource exploitation, such as oil drilling, and naval/submarine access routes?

Relaxation of Export Controls on High-Technology

The United States is proposing to decontrol to the Soviet Union at least one-third of the dual-use militarily critical technologies and items at the COCOM meeting in Paris scheduled for next week. Special emphasis in this decontrol proposal is on computers, machine tools, and telecommunications equipment. The proposal coincides with a similar effort in the U.S. House of Representatives which is scheduled to consider the matter on the House floor following the Memorial Day recess. Dual-use technology experts have indicated that perhaps as many as half of the proposed items can be decontrolled without national security consequences. The remaining half of the list of technologies and items to be decontrolled, however, pose serious problems for U.S. efforts to maintain qualitative lead-times over the Soviet military.

Questions:

• The Bush Administration is proposing to COCOM that we decontrol entirely 30 of the 120 categories of goods and technology which we currently safeguard because of the military utility of those items to the Soviet Union. Another 13 categories are slated for substantial decontrol. Why do you believe the United States should reward the Soviet Union with higher levels of militarily relevant technology while they are engaged in economic warfare against Lithuania?

 

• Why isn’t the United States and West Germany holding out technology decontrols in exchange for Soviet troop withdrawals from East Germany? Shouldn’t Soviet troop withdrawals be a precondition for technology transfer liberalization?

 

• One of the items the Administration has proposed to decontrol includes extremely accurate precision machine tools (+/- 2 microns accuracy). What is the strategic justification for decontrolling this technology to the Soviet Union?

 

• What is the estimated loss to taxpayers of previous investments made for superior weapons capabilities by these decontrol proposals? What are the long-term defense budget consequences of enabling the Soviet Union to gain lead-times in key technology areas, such as microelectronics?

 

• Do diversion risks, including in-place diversions, remain in East Europe? According to CIA Director William Webster, Soviet technology acquisition efforts have been stepped up in recent months. In fact, the KGB’s chief Vladimir Kryuchkov publicly stated that his intelligence assets would be used to assist Soviet enterprises to compete. If this is true, why is it in the U.S. interest to supply higher levels of technology to the Soviet Union?

III. GERMAN REUNIFICATION AND THE FUTURE OF NATO

Questions:

• While the Bush Administration firmly asserted that a reunified Germany must be able to remain a full NATO member, the Soviet Union has been opposed. Is there any chance that the Administration will be led to accept either the Soviet proposal for membership in both alliances (NATO and the Warsaw Pact) or the latest Soviet proposal to leave the Alliance issue for a stage after unification (which the Kohl government rejects as an infringement on the sovereignty of a reunified Germany)?

 

• Under the emerging Genscher-Baker plan, NATO’s U.S. and West German troops will be excluded from formerly East German territory, even after German unification. And yet, for a protracted period, large numbers of Soviet troops (currently 19 divisions of 387,000 men) will be permitted to remain; worse yet, their continued presence will apparently be subsidized by the West German taxpayers, perhaps to the tune of $500 million per year. In light of this anomalous situation, how can the President support the Genscher-Baker plan? Wouldn’t it be far better for Germany’s and NATO’s security to get all the Soviet occupation troops out of East Germany quickly and to let the Germans become fully sovereign — with their own regular forces, and Allied troops, permitted to enter any part of their national territory?

IV. REGIONAL ISSUES:

Afghanistan

Question:

• Although most Soviet combat troops withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, Moscow has mounted a massive military resupply effort (estimated at more than 5,800 flights, $300 million per month), hit the anti-communist resistance forces with high-level bombers from Soviet territory and sought to coerce Pakistan into ending all aid to the resistance. How would the Administration respond to any potential repetition at the summit of Gorbachev’s recent offers to have "positive symmetry," i.e., both sides ostensibly cut-off their military supplies to the respective allies and for a negotiated internal settlement deriving from some form of coalition with the existing Kabul regime?

South Africa

Question:

• At the June 1988 U.S.-Soviet Summit, both countries announced a joint effort to mediate intensive negotiations on Angola and Namibia. If the Soviet Union proposed a similar mediation effort with respect to the ending of apartheid in South Africa, would the Administration agree?

Cuba

Question:

• If Soviet foreign policy has indeed changed fundamentally, why does the USSR continue to send $4-6 billion in military and economic aid to sustain the Castro dictatorship in Cuba? Have we asked for, and received, a Soviet commitment to reduce military shipments to Cuba?