The Big Picture Is Bad

EVALUATING the Israel-PLO agreement requires weighing hopes against risks,
for Israel’s concessions could someday endanger its security.

The hopeful argument runs along the following lines: The concessions may actually
pacify old enemies, removing the motive for attacks on Israel. A serious military
or terrorist threat can develop in relinquished territories only if the specified
security arrangements are violated, in which case Israel will promptly take
remedial action. The agreement provides that Israel will remain responsible
for defense against external threats and for the overall security of Israelis.
And in all events, whatever the PLO’s good faith or lack thereof, Israel is
strong and can handle any threat from those territories.

One finds intense desire among Israelis that this first proposition will eventuate.
But in a risk assessment, the essential question is not whether Israel would
be safe if its enemies are appeased, but: What are the dangers if those enemies
remain ambitious and hostile?

It is natural for the government to pledge rigorous enforcement of the security
provisions of any peace agreement. Every party to a peace or arms control agreement
makes such a pledge. But the record of such agreements between democratic and
non-democratic countries calls for a discounting.

The World War I Allies said they would enforce the Versailles Treaty on demilitarizing
the Rhineland. They didn’t. Though the US government promised to enforce its
arms-control agreements with the Soviet Union, Soviet violations were numerous,
and the US did nothing but complain (and little of that). The Israeli government
said it would insist on compliance with the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, but
important problems have remained unresolved for years.

The pattern in such cases is that when the non-democratic party to the treaty
violates the agreement, the democratic party – ever reluctant to provoke a confrontation
– tends at first to ignore or belittle the evidence. Then it occasionally makes
excuses for the other side, then says that the violations are unclear or, if
clear, are not enormously important.

Those advocating a response to the violations are ridiculed as legalistic.
Even if the violations are clear and important, the government of the democratic
party will lament that its options are limited and unsatisfactory, for it certainly
does not want to overreact. To be sure, it does not want to risk a war over
an action by the other side that falls short of immediate preparation for war.
The upshot is that the violation often stands.

This is not to say that Israel will necessarily remain passive in the face
of treaty violations. But, when the time comes, Israel will find that it is
no easy matter to reverse such violations simply because it has the right to
do so.

As for the proposition that Israeli strength ensures its ability to handle
such threats, it is hard to contradict the point so long as current circumstances
prevail: Egypt maintains peace with Israel; Iraq remains a stricken pariah;
Syria lacks a powerful sponsor; Jordan is weak and cautious; the Palestinian
Arabs are politically divided and financially strapped.

IN light of these favorable realities, it is likely that the IDF could secure
the state against existential threats even if withdrawn from most of the territories
and even if the new authorities there remain hostile to Israel. But this begs
the question: Are the current circumstances permanent? If not, are they likely
to change in desirable or undesirable ways?

Unfortunately, the big picture in the Middle East is deteriorating. The trends
are not toward peaceful politics, liberal democracy, tolerance and prosperity.
On the contrary, Islamist movements espousing medieval, anti-democratic enmity
and jihad are gaining popularity.

Witness the electoral successes of Islamist parties in Jordan and Algeria,
and the bloodbath underway in Egypt as "fundamentalist" groups murder
officials, foreign tourists and Copts and the government responds with mass
executions. Witness the Islamists’ accession to power in Sudan, the power of
Hizbullah in Lebanon, the rise of Hamas to rival the PLO for leadership among
Palestinian Arabs, and the large-scale flight of Christians from many countries
of the region. All these warn against assuming that the Middle East will be
stable in coming years, or that Israel’s concessions in the West Bank and Gaza
can turn the tide of radical Islam.

The risks inherent in Israel’s concessions must be assessed in light of the
possibility, grim though realistic, that within five to 10 years, Khomeini-style
Islamist regimes may be running Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and whatever
new state is created for the Palestinian Arabs.

If this worst-case scenario materializes, the benefits adduced by proponents
of territorial concessions may look downright meager against the resulting security
threats. Israelis may find that the strains of occupation have been replaced
by the greater strains of living within once-again-insecure boundaries.

Less territory, for example, means less mobilization time, which may necessitate
a larger standing army and less reliance on reserves. And the increased danger
of getting cut in half may require increased reliance on destabilizing preemption
strategies.

National security analysts have to evaluate the risks of the Israel-PLO deal
on the conservative assumption of continued hostility and increasing Islamist
political power. From that point of view, the risks are grave, for they may
affect the state’s ability to protect its existence in war. And the legal safeguards
intended to mitigate those risks can be expected to prove far less effective
than hoped.

Copyright 1993 The Jerusalem Post