The Bush Missile Defense Plan: Good As Far As It Goes — But It Doesn’t Go Far Enough

(Washington, D.C.): Today, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and the Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization Director, Lieutenant General Ronald Kadish, unveiled the Bush Administration’s long-awaited missile defense plan before the Senate Armed Services Committee. The plan is, in short, a comprehensive effort to develop and test the array of promising technologies capable of destroying ballistic missiles of varying ranges in the boost, mid-course and terminal phases.

Deja Vu All Over Again

As such, it is reminiscent of the wide-ranging R&D program launched by President Reagan shortly after he announced the Strategic Defense Initiative in 1983. If fully funded, and unimpeded by the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty’s constraints, this businesslike approach would indubitably produce effective, layered defenses over the next decade or so.

There is, unfortunately, real reason to be concerned about whether the requested funds — over $8.3 billion in Fiscal Year 2002 alone — will be forthcoming. Senate Democrats, led by Majority Leader Tom Daschle, Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin and Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joe Biden, have made clear their determination to impede the development and deployment of missile defenses incompatible with the ABM Treaty, which is to say all effective anti-missile systems. Regrettably, given serious funding shortfalls in other defense areas, they may well be able to cite support from military leaders for shifting funds earmarked for missile defense to other areas.

In addition, the Administration is walking a very fine line with respect to the ABM Treaty. At a Capitol Hill symposium on missile defense convened today by Frontiers of Freedom, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld forcefully declared that “the United States does not violate treaties” and will not do so with respect to the ban on U.S. and Soviet territorial missile defenses. He hastened to add, however, that while the Bush team hoped and expected to arrive at some understanding with the Russians that would dispense with the existing treaty, if that proves impossible, the United States would have to exercise its right to withdraw from that accord.

It remains to be seen whether domestic and foreign opponents of U.S. missile defenses will hear both parts of that statement, or just the promise not to violate the ABM Treaty. The Administration clearly should also expect congressional efforts to deny funding for development and testing activities that constitute possible violations.

The Bottom Line

President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld are to be commended for their efforts to address the threat of ballistic missile attack in the face of non-trivial technical, funding and diplomatic obstacles inherited from their predecessors. The program they have laid out is an important start but one that may well fall short of its goal of defending America, its forces overseas and allies unless augmented in several respects.

Consequently, President Bush should complement his plan with the following additional steps:

• Immediately establish that the Navy’s 60-odd ships equipped with the Aegis fleet air defense system will, henceforth, be part of the Nation’s missile defense infrastructure. While their present capabilities to intercept ballistic missiles are, unfortunately, quite limited, the existing ships, launchers, missiles, sensors, communications systems and people who operate them constitute a huge leg-up on the task of fielding the sort of anti-missile systems we need.
• Messrs. Bush and Rumsfeld should make clear that every effort will be made to evolve the present Aegis cruisers and destroyers as rapidly as possible so as to maximize their effectiveness. For this purpose, a program office should be established at once comparable in scope, authority and priority to that the Navy has used for most of the past five decades to manage its Fleet Ballistic Missile program. This office should then be charged with achieving the most capable possible sea-based systems for performing on an integrated basis boost, mid-course and terminal defense.
• The United States should give notice now that it is exercising its right to withdraw from the treaty. The fact that there will be a fixed end-point to the pre-deployment period for missile defenses (i.e., six-months) will encourage constructive conversations with the Russians. We will know shortly whether a new, mutually satisfactory “strategic framework” is, in fact, an option — or whether we will have to “move beyond” the ABM Treaty on a unilateral basis.