The Clinton-Gore Team’s Security Violation du jour : New Los Alamos Debacle Demands Top-Down Accountability

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(Washington, D.C.): The revelation that hard drives containing exceedingly sensitive information about the technical and operational details of American, Russian and perhaps other foreign nuclear weapons have “gone missing” from a secure vault at the Los Alamos Nuclear Laboratory helps once again to illuminate a phenomenon the Center for Security Policy has been documenting for most of the past eight years: the Clinton-Gore Administration’s benign neglect, if not outright malfeasance, with respect to physical security, information security and personnel security matters.

Characteristically, the Administration is trying to pooh-pooh this episode, clinging desperately to the line that there is no evidence that espionage accounts for the disappearance of the two hard drives and their highly classified data and hoping that no such evidence will be forthcoming. Even so, the fact that this hardware and the information it contained is currently AWOL gives lie to repeated — and transparently fatuous — assurances made in recent months by Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson about the tight security now in place at the Nation’s nuclear laboratories.

Secretary Richardson defended the DoE on 25 January 1999 saying, “There’s no mission that’s more important to me than taking actions necessary to ensure that America’s nuclear secrets are well guarded.” More recently he claimed that “we have top-notch security right now in our national labs.”

Time for New Management at the Energy Department

It does not matter whether Secretary Richardson’s statements are the product of sheer incompetence, wishful thinking or an actual readiness to deceive the American people in the hopes of protecting his superiors (and his waning prospects to be picked as Al Gore’s running mate later this year). There can simply be no further delay in entrusting the stewardship of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex to more responsible hands.

As it happens, such a steward is waiting in the wings. Thanks to legislation that arose from congressional investigations into an earlier, major security breach at Los Alamos — allegedly involving a physicist at the lab named Wen Ho Lee — a new, semi-autonomous National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has been created. President Clinton has nominated General John Gordon (USAF), who is presently the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, to head it up.

Unfortunately, Gen. Gordon’s nomination has fallen victim to what appears to be an ongoing gambit by Secretary Richardson aimed at thwarting the intent of Congress and the spirit, if not in every case the lette, of the law. Having failed to stop the creation of the NNSA, Richardson announced that he and senior subordinates (several of whom were widely believed to be part of the security problem afflicting the nuclear weapons complex) would be “double-hatted,” (i.e., they would retain day-to-day control over a portfolio reeling from their previous misconduct).

Now, it appears, rather than acquiesce to the appointment, confirmation and installation of someone who knows something about nuclear weapons policy and programs, Secretary Richardson is working with a sympathetic Democratic Senator — Sen. Richard Bryan of Nevada — to keep Gen. Gordon from starting work.

Happily, Sen. Bryan maintains he “has no reservations about” General Gordon, finding him to be eminently qualified for the position. What is more, even the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), which had been charged with conducting a postmortem on the Wen Ho Lee/Los Alamos fiasco, concluded that the Department of Energy is “incapable of reforming itself.” And given the shrill complaints being registered by Mr. Clinton and his allies to the effect that the Senate is not acting swiftly enough on his nominees, there is no compelling reason why Sen. Bryan should persist in preventing more competent management from promptly taking over the National Nuclear Security Administration.

The Bottom Line

Given the deplorable state of affairs with respect to information, personnel and physical security under the Clinton-Gore team, it is not enough to ensure that conscientious, experienced and competent people are entrusted with sensitive U.S. government posts. It is also important to send a signal that those who have demonstrated a disregard for such security considerations are not rewarded with plum positions.

In this connection, Senator Rod Grams (R-MN) is to be commended for blocking Senate action on seven career foreign service officers who have been nominated for ambassadorial posts. According to yesterday’s Washington Post, these seven nominees have a “total of 102 violations of State Department security procedures.” One has even been suspended without pay twice for violations. On 24 May, Sen. Grams publicly — and properly — ridiculed the Administration for its see-no-evil, hear-no- evil and speak-no-evil approach to security:

How can the Administration claim security is important if persistent violators are rewarded with promotions?…I thought leadership was supposed to come from the top. What kind of message does this send to junior officers when the administration’s nominees for ambassador posts have repeat security violations?

Amen.

Center for Security Policy

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