The good news: DoD has an “electromagnetic spectrum superiority strategy” | The bad news: It depends on electricity and ignores EMP

On 29 October 2020, the Department of Defense released its Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority Strategy, which it describes as “a critical step forward in implementing the 2018 National Defense Strategy.”  The document’s summary explains that “The NDS directs the Department to ‘determine an approach to enhancing the lethality of the joint force against high end competitors and the effectiveness of our military against a broad spectrum of potential threats.’”

The DoD should be applauded for its efforts in recognizing this “approach” requires electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) superiority, but also heavily cautioned on what appears to be too a narrow focus on “spectrum” alone, an incomplete definition of “electromagnetic attack” and a dangerous assumption: that its forces, at home and abroad, will have access to combat power sustaining (and life sustaining) electricity.

With regard to “spectrum,” the strategy demonstrates three major areas where the DoD has made progress in its awareness of the operating environment:

“The Department recognizes the importance of U.S. wireless leadership to the nation’s economic prosperity, and 5G technologies mark a critical pivot for spectrum policy, technology innovation, and national security.” (p. 6)

“DoD will also participate in national, international, and industry-specific standards bodies associated with spectrum innovation to collaborate on emerging technologies and their adoption, including national security preemption and priority mechanisms for commercial systems.” (p. 9)

“The Department continues to view spectrum sharing as critical to reaching DoD and national goals. To that end, DoD must continue to reform regulatory proposals, remain active in regulatory and policy fora, and take proactive measures to implement regulatory and policy changes.” (p. 15)

The Department’s recognition that it must be involved in the policy, regulatory, and standards-setting fora is extremely important. These are areas that America’s adversaries, especially Communist China, have worked hard to exploit in an effort to disadvantage the United States.  For DoD to state that it recognizes the importance of U.S. leadership in areas such as 5G is extremely important since that is a physical technology being built and fielded now which must not enable our adversaries to gain EMS superiority.

In the context of the current 5G buildout, this statement from the new strategy is of prominent importance:

“EMS-dependent systems must be designed to be functionally and physically survivable while accomplishing their intended functions.… They must be resilient against the effects of RF-enabled cyberspace attack.”  (p. 7)

However, the DoD cannot expect “electromagnetic spectrum superiority” or “functionally and physically survivable” systems if it relies on an incomplete definition of “electromagnetic attack.”  The DoD’s new strategy relies on the definition articulated in the May 22, 2020 Joint Publication 3-85 – Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations, which provides the following definition of electromagnetic attack:

Electromagnetic Attack.  Division of electromagnetic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic energy, directed energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability and is considered a form of fires. Also called EA.   (P. GL-6 of JP 3-85)

What the strategy ignores as a vector of electromagnetic attack is “electromagnetic pulse” which is also defined in JP 3-85:

Electromagnetic Pulse. A strong burst of electromagnetic radiation caused by a nuclear explosion, energy weapon, or by natural phenomenon, that may couple with electrical or electronic systems to produce damaging current and voltage surges. Also called EMP. (P. GL-8 of JP 3-85)

That the DoD failed to include EMP in its most recent EMS Superiority Strategy should be extremely worrisome for a number of reasons.

First, it demonstrates a lack of awareness of the most significant “Achilles heel” of the nation – the vulnerabilities of our critical infrastructure to EMP.  President Trump’s 2017 National Security Strategy stated:

“Critical infrastructure keeps our food fresh, our houses warm, our trade flowing, and our citizens productive and safe. The vulnerability of U.S. critical infrastructure to cyber, physical, and electromagnetic attacks means that adversaries could disrupt military command and control, banking and financial operations, the electrical grid, and means of communication.”

( P. 12 of the 2017 National Security Strategy)

The DoD should understand that the 2017 NSS considers EMP as a form of “electromagnetic attack” and that national EMP preparedness is a top priority of the Trump administration, hence its Executive Order on Coordinating National Resilience to Electromagnetic Pulses issued on March 26, 2019.

Second, for the DoD to overlook the nuclear and natural solar EMP threat scenarios in its EMS Superiority Strategy begs the question as to whether the Department assumes that these hazards won’t preclude America’s warfighters from performing their mission.

Well over 90% of the DoD’s installations and the entire defense industrial base (not to mention the civilian critical infrastructure “outside the wire”) depend nearly exclusively on the civilian electric utility industry for their electricity. This electric grid is catastrophically vulnerable to both natural and manmade EMP, despite a concerted effort of the industry to argue otherwise.

For the DoD to realize the goals it set forth in its most recent EMS Superiority Strategy, it must be ready to involve itself in the very same functional areas that are required in the category of spectrum management:  the policy environment, regulatory environment, and standards-setting environment for the electric utility industry.

Thus far, the DoD has left it up to the Department of Energy to concern itself with these areas and how they relate to the EMP threat.  The results have been extraordinarily damaging to the security posture of the United States, mostly because of the incredible influence of the electric utility industry over personnel in DOE, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), and the Congress.

According to the Center for Responsive Politics, the electric utility industry spent $24,725,200 in political contributions and spent $122,281,276 on lobbying in 2018. With respect to EMP, the industry’s Edison Electric Institute (EEI) and Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) have successfully tag-teamed an effort to misinform and influence DOE, FERC, Congress and the American people on the potential effects of EMP on the bulk power electric system.  At least one entity within DoD, the short-lived “Electromagnetic Defense Task Force” (ETDTF), pushed back against this industry misinformation campaign.

In its report titled “Electromagnetic Pulse Threats to America’s Electric Grid: Counterpoints to Electric Power Research Institute Positions” published on August 27, 2019, the EDTF concluded “that the methodology and findings of the EPRI report are inconsistent with the 60+ years of DOD research and experience in understanding EMP environments, system effects, and protection requirements and that the report dangerously and inadequately characterizes impacts on the US electric grid for an EMP event.”

If DoD wants to truly realize the goals established in its most recent EMS Spectrum Superiority Strategy, it must overcome the assumption that it can depend on the unprotected civilian electric utility industry for electricity. It must take its six decades of EMP-related research and use that as ammunition to fight for EMP resilience in the policy environment, regulatory environment, and standards-setting environment of the electric utility industry.  Failure to take these actions – and to secure our electric infrastructure against EMP – could result in a failure of the EMS Superiority Strategy.

Ambassador Henry F. Cooper was President Reagan’s Chief Defense and Space Negotiator with the Russia and led the Strategic Defense Initiative under President George H.W. Bush.