The Islamic Emirate of Waziristan and the Bajaur Tribal Region: The Strategic Threat of Terrorist Sanctuaries

Policy Options and Recommendations

            Options for addressing the Pakistan sanctuaries are limited at this current juncture. It must be recognized that the worst possible outcome is for the situation within the tribal regions to continue to “stabilize” as al-Qaeda consolidates its power. Therefore, the United States and NATO must aim to, as was recommended in the 9/11 Report, “keep possible terrorists insecure and on the run.” To let al-Qaeda remain in the region, unfettered from both the Pakistan military and NATO forces, will only result in the further destabilization of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al-Qaeda will also be left to organize large-scale attacks on the scale of 9/11 and similar to the foiled British Airways plot.

In the short-term this strategy can be met in a number of ways. First, the U.S. must continue to target al-Qaeda camps and high-level officials using Predator drones. The attacks in Bajaur in January and October of 2006 were effective in killing important al-Qaeda lieutenants – including al-Qaeda weapons expert Abu Khabab al-Masri.[xxxvi] Attacks such as these not only produce important results, but they ensure a continue level of instability within the territories that guarantees al-Qaeda and Taliban militants will be forced to remain in hiding or on the run. Second, Pakistan and NATO must continue to share intelligence and work together whenever possible. Although tensions between NATO countries and Pakistan have become strained at times, there are signs that cooperation is still occurring at a reasonable level. Finally, future agreements similar to the Waziristan Accord must be blocked. Pakistan cannot be allowed to continually sign so-called peace treaties with the different tribal regions because it will only embolden the militants in Pakistan, and serve to further destabilize Musharraf, while simultaneously increasing violence in Afghanistan. Musharraf must be forewarned that appeasement of al-Qaeda and Taliban militants in the short-term will only weaken his power in the future. Any current options available in these areas should be carried out with extreme caution due to the potential backlash they may cause Musharraf. Whatever the consequences of the sanctuaries, the worst possible outcome over the next several years would be for Musharraf to fall from power and a radical Islamist group to take control.

Long-term options to deal with the Pakistan sanctuaries remain limited. It is clear that the U.S. must maintain its relationship with Musharraf. There must be an effective balance, however, between doing what it can to secure Afghanistan by limiting the effects of the Pakistan sanctuaries, while also ensuring the continued rule of Musharraf. In addition to the financial and military aid being sent to Pakistan, U.S. forces could also provide both counterinsurgency and intelligence training to the Pakistan military to improve its effectiveness in the future. Such efforts would be similar to the foreign military training programs that the U.S. is currently conducting in coordination with the Philippines, Indonesia, Tajikistan, Ethiopia, Yemen, Uzbekistan, Georgia and Colombia.[xxxvii] An effort to control the key entry points along the Afghan-Pakistan border using a series of fences, forts, and surveillance technology could also serve to control the unwanted flow of militants into Afghanistan.