The Nation Needs More B-2s

(Washington, D.C.): An imminent vote
in the House of Representatives may do
much to determine whether the United
States has the kind of combat capability
and power projection assets it will
clearly require in the decades ahead. An
amendment by Rep. Ronald Dellums (D-CA)
would eliminate the $331.2 million
approved by the House National Security
Committee to permit the procurement of
nine additional B-2s.

The B-2 is arguably the most
advanced weapon in the U.S. arsenal
today. It has the ability to fly
anywhere in the world within a few hours,
to penetrate modern air-defense systems
and destroy up to 16 separate targets
with a little collateral damage and while
putting as few as two Americans in harm’s
way.

For these reasons, in an unprecedented
display of bipartisan consensus on a
controversial weapons program, seven
former Secretaries of Defense representing
every Democratic and Republican
Administration since Richard Nixon have
endorsed the acquisition of more than 21
B-2s. In a joint letter to President
Clinton dated 4 January 1995, Secretaries
Melvin Laird, James Schlesinger, Donald
Rumsfeld, Harold Brown, Caspar
Weinberger, Frank Carlucci and Dick
Cheney wrote:

“…[The B-2]
remains the most cost-effective
means of rapidly projecting force
over great distances.
Its range will enable it to reach
any point on earth within hours
after launch while being deployed
at only three secure bases around
the world. Its payload and array
of munitions will permit it to
destroy numerous time-sensitive
targets in a single sortie. And
perhaps most importantly, its
low-observable characteristics
will allow it to reach intended
targets without fear of
interception.” href=”97-D85.html#N_1_”>⁽¹⁾

The Secretaries appreciate — as do other
knowledgeable experts — that
significantly more B-2s are required by
current and foreseeable strategic
conditions and that to stop production
now would foreclose critical options and
fail to capitalize fully on the years and
billions of dollars invested in
developing and validating this formidable
fighting machine.

The
Requirement: B-2s will be
critical in the “halting phase”
of an operation aimed at countering an
aggressors’ predations — a period in
which U.S. tactical forces may not be
available. Such a capability can only
become more indispensable as the number
of forward bases to which American units
have access continues to shrink in
peacetime and is drawn down in wartime.
Indeed, a stealthy intercontinental-range
bomber like the B-2 could well be the
only means available to the United States
to prevent enemy advances during the
early days of a conflict.

These facts have been validated by any
number of analyses, including Clinton’s
Bottom-Up-Review (BUR). Even the recently
released Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
has concluded that:

“…In a majority of the
cases examined, additional B-2s
deployed quickly to a conflict
could improve our ability to halt
an adversary’s advance during the
opening days of a major theater
war. This was especially
true in cases where there would
be little or no warning of the
conflict or where our tactical
aircraft would be restricted in
their access or the
theater.” (Emphasis
added)

Unfortunately, the current B-2
force of only 20 aircraft is unlikely to
be able to provide the sortie rate that
would hold a major regional enemy at bay,
to say nothing of providing support to
the two nearly simultaneous Major
Regional Conflicts anticipated by both
the BUR and QDR.

The
Most Cost-Effective Option: The
alternative often suggested to the B-2 is
to refit older bombers with long-range
cruise missiles. Although superficially
attractive, this option would provide
neither the mission flexibility,
lethality nor greatest value per tax
dollar. Penetrating aircraft remain the
weapon of choice when dealing with
heavily defended, hardened, mobile or
concealed targets — in other words, just
about all the targets that the United
States will be obliged to neutralize in
future conflicts.

As the dangers associated with
attacking such targets increases in a
world awash with ever-more advanced
anti-aircraft systems, the cost of
assigning those missions to non-stealthy
manned aircraft may become prohibitive
for a nation like the United States,
whose most precious currency is the
safety of its military personnel. It
takes 132 crewmen on 75 standard
non-stealthy aircraft to do what two B-2s
with a total of four crewmen can
accomplish.

Charles Krauthammer put this point
elegantly on 18 July 1995 in his
nationally syndicated column:

“…The dollar cost of a
weapon is too narrow a
calculation of its utility. The
more important calculation is
cost in American lives. The
reasons are not sentimental but
practical. Weapons cheap in
dollars but costly in lives are,
in the current and coming
environment, literally useless:
We will not use them. A country
that so values the life of every
Capt. O’Grady is a country that
cannot keep blindly relying on
non-stealthy aircraft over enemy
territory.”

The Bottom Line

The
Center for Security Policy urges the
House to heed the wisdom of their
colleagues who have championed the B-2
program in previous congressional fights.
These include, in addition to
key members of the House leadership like Speaker
Newt Gingrich, Majority
Leader Rep. Dick Armey (R-TX), Majority
Whip Rep. Tom DeLay (R-TX), Appropriations
Committee Chairman Robert Livingston (R-LA)
and National Security Committee
Chairman Floyd Spence (R-SC) and
several influential Democrats.
Among the latter are: Reps. Norm
Dicks (D-WA), Ike
Skelton (D-MO), Martin
Frost (D-TX) and Jane
Harman (D-CA).

It is inconceivable that any other
nation on earth blessed with the
resources of the United States, charged
with the global responsibilities of this
Nation and facing the world-wide
challenges that lie ahead would
voluntarily decide to liquidate its
capacity to produce B-2 bombers.
America should not do so either.

– 30 –

1. See the Center’s
Decision Brief entitled When
Seven SecDefs Speak, Will Congress
Listen? New Voices Join Center’s Call for
More B-2 Bombers ( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=95-D_01″>No. 95-D 01,
6 January 1995).