There Must be No ‘Grand Compromise’ of U.S. National Security

(Washington, D.C.): In recent days, President Clinton has received a double
broadside against
the “Grand Compromise” he hopes to negotiate with Vladimir Putin’s Russia. First, on 17 April,
twenty-five of the most influential members of the U.S. Senate — including Majority
Leader
Trent Lott, Majority Whip Don Nickles, and the chairmen of the
Foreign Relations, Armed
Services, Appropriations and Intelligence Committees (Senators Jesse Helms, John
Warner,
Ted Stevens and Richard Shelby, respectively) — wrote Mr. Clinton
warning that “in our
judgement, any agreement along the lines you have proposed to Russia would have little
hope of
gaining Senate consent to ratification.” (Emphasis added.)

Among other important objections, they declared: “The single-site, 100 interceptor
system
deployed in Alaska…cannot effectively protect the United States. More than a single site is
necessary to defend against anticipated threats.” In other words, the only thing that
would be
compromised by President Clinton’s “Grand Compromise” would be U.S. national security.

This point was powerfully reinforced by syndicated columnist Charles Krauthammer in
today’s
Washington Post (see the attached). In the words of
one of the Nation’s most highly regarded
commentators: “The deal Clinton is angling for would both decimate our offensive nuclear
deterrent and cripple any future President’s ability to build an effective missile defense.
It
promises to be the worst arms control agreement in American history.”

For the President to proceed in the face of such criticism invites the question: Will he stop at
nothing to secure a “legacy” — no matter how vacuous, costly and/or dangerous for the American
people?

United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

April 17, 2000

The Honorable William Jefferson Clinton
President of the United States
The White House

Dear Mr. President:

Administration officials have recently briefed us on the ongoing discussions with Russia to
reach
a new agreement, based n the terms of the 1972 ABM Treaty, that would accommodate a limited
National Missile Defense (NMD) system for the United States. We have serious concerns about
the proposals advances by the U.S. side, and respectfully urge you to consult seriously and in
detail with the U.S. Senate before you engage in further discussions with Russia. We must
advise you that in our judgement any agreement along the lines you have proposed to Russia
would have little hope of gaining Senate consent to ratification.

While we support diplomacy to explain our plans to Russian officials and to assure them that
such defenses reflect no intention whatever to threaten Russia or Russian interests, we have
compelling incentives to deploy such defenses based on the growing missile threat from rogue
nations. Therefore, we oppose in the strongest terms the effort to conclude an agreement that
would purchase Russian consent to the U.S. NMD system in exchange for U.S. reaffirmation of a
new, very limiting, legally binding accord. The U.S. Senate has not consented to such a
reaffirmation since the Soviet Union’s extinction in December 1991 and you should not expect
that it will do so in the future.

Last July, when you signed the National Missile Defense Act of 1999 (Public Law 106-38),
making it the policy of the United States to deploy an effective national missile defense system
capable against limited threats as soon as the technology to do so is ready, you committed the
United States in law to deploying a national missile defense system that would meet emerging
threats. The threat is dynamic, and the U.S. response must be dynamic as well.

Among other flaws in your Administrations’ policy and arm control approach to a U.S.
national
missile defense deployment are the following:

o The reluctance of your administration to acknowledge that the most fundamental tenet of
the
ABM Treaty would have to change to accommodate a national missile defense capable of
defending the territory of the United States. Even the Russians have acknowledged that Article
1, which prohibits such defense, would have to be repudiated. But your tabled position does not
directly confront this central prohibition.

o The “initial NMD architecture” chosen by your Administration – a single-site, 100
interceptor system deployment in Alaska beginning not sooner that 2005 – cannot effectively
protect the United States. More than a single site is necessary to defend against anticipated
threats.

o The “phased approach” to negotiating changes to a new, revised ABM Treaty, apparently
adopted out of concern for “negotiability,” establishes a permanent cycle of confrontation with
Russia. Even assuming a near-term agreement in the ongoing discussions with Russia over an
initial NMD system deployment, you Administration concedes that a new set of negotiations on a
“second phase” agreement would need to begin in early 2001 in order to facilitate deployment of
an expanded NMD system architecture capable of meeting the projected threat.

o The proposal to make any new agreement on NMD of unlimited duration — when
combined
with the Agreed Statements on Demarcation and the Memorandum of Understanding on ABM
Treaty Succession, signed in 1997 but still not submitted for Senate consideration — will make it
extraordinarily difficult to negotiate future Treaty changes we already know will be necessary to
expand upon the “initial” system.

o The approach fails to permit the deployment of other promising missile defense
technologies
– including space-based sensors, sufficient numbers of ground-based radars, and additional
interceptors basing modes, like Navy systems and the Airborne Laser – that we believe are
necessary to achieve a fully-effective defense against the full range of possible threats. For
example, you chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Johnson, recently recommended “most
strongly…that a sea-based Navy Adjunct be included in any policy and/or architectural design for
a NMD system.”

Given the desirability of discussing these issues with Russia in a way that accurately reflects
the
views of both the Senate and your Administration, our advice is that you reconsider you
Administration’s current approach to NMD policy and arms control and consult further with us.
Without significant changes to your approach, we do not believe an agreement submitted to the
Senate for consideration should be ratified.

We would also urge you to continue the efforts begun by Secretary of Defense Cohen
recently to
consult with our allies in Europe and Asia about national missile defense options in order to
prevent a fracturing of our alliance relationships. In particular, we hope you Administration will
explore joint programs and will examine options for sharing missile defense technology with our
allies to help them address the missile threats which they also face.

We appreciate your consideration of our views on this important topic, and stand ready to
work
with you in crafting a more effective, sustainable NMD policy and arms control approach.

Respectfully,

Sen. Trent Lott
Sen. Thad Cochran
Sen. John Warner
Sen. Jesse Helms
Sen. Jon Kyl
Sen. Bob Smith
Sen. Ted Stevens
Sen Tim Hutchinson
Sen. Fred Thompson
Sen. James Inhofe
Sen. Jim Bunning
Sen. Jeff Sessions
Sen. Orin Hatch
Sen. Phil Gramm
Sen. Richard Shelby
Sen. John McCain
Sen. Wayne Allard
Sen. Strom Thurmond
Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchinson
Sen. Larry Craig
Sen. Mike Enzi
Sen. Don Nickles
Sen. John Ashcroft
Sen. Rod Grams
Sen. Sam Brownback