Third Time’s a Charm? Yet Another Blue-Ribbon Group Warns Against Clinton’s ‘Denuclearization’ Agenda
Will Congress Take Heed — and Corrective
Action?
(Washington, D.C.): Today’s Washington Times gives front-page, above-the-fold
treatment to a
report fully deserving of such attention: A task force of the respected Defense Science
Board
(DSB) has expressed serious concerns about the direction and implications of the Clinton
Administration policy the President has called “denuclearization.” As the
Times National
Security Correspondent Bill Gertz put it: “The panel’s findings challenge many of the
arms-control plans and policies of the Clinton Administration, such as its ban on nuclear testing,
its reliance on arms-reduction agreements and the effort to monitor nuclear-warhead reliability
dubbed the Stockpile Stewardship Program.”
A Growing Chorus Opposing Denuclearization
The study authored by the DSB Task Force on Nuclear Deterrence — chaired by former
Air
Force Chief of Staff General Lawrence Welch and including among its members former
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Vessey — is the third blue-ribbon
group to assail
the Administration’s conduct with respect to the U.S. nuclear deterrent in the course of the past
eighteen months.
In July 1997, the Center for Security Policy sponsored a High-Level Roundtable Discussion
on
the future of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, featuring critical remarks by former Secretary of
Defense
and Energy James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense Caspar
Weinberger, Senator
Jon Kyl (R-AZ) and other experts.(1) A year later,
an extraordinarily impressive team of security
policy-practitioners, retired military officers and diplomats convened by the National Defense
University and Lawrence Livermore Laboratory expressed similar concerns that “a nuclear force
that is not backed by the perceived ability and willingness to maintain and when necessary
reconstitute important elements will increasingly be seen as a hollow force.”
The DSB Critique
The Gertz article suggests that the DSB task force arrived at conclusions that track with those
of
these earlier groups. Specifically, the Welch panel is said to have taken strong exception to a
number of initiatives that the Administration has either already embraced or is actively
considering. These include (emphasis added throughout):
- Asymmetric attitudes towards nuclear modernization: The
Times says the report “states that
U.S. nuclear forces are declining, while those of major strategic adversaries are improving.
‘There is a near certainty that, wherever arms control efforts take us, Russia will continue to be
a nuclear superpower and China will continue to evolve to more capable nuclear forces.'” The
paper notes that “Russia and China are both building new nuclear missiles”; by contrast,
the
United States has no meaningful modernization program underway for any of the three
legs of its Strategic “Triad.”
- An ill-advised approach on nuclear testing: “The panel also
questioned the administration’s
program to maintain nuclear weapons without underground blasts, which the report said is
based on the false premise that nuclear warheads last indefinitely. As a result,
‘fundamental uncertainties remain’ about the substitute non-testing program. ‘How will we
know the Stockpile Stewardship Program’s analytical tools give valid answers?’ the report
said.” The article observes that “The report states that nuclear testing ‘could be a hedge’ to
maintain deterrence if the non-testing program suffers a ‘substantial failure.'”
- Preserve the Strategic ‘Triad’: “A key finding in the report is
that the Pentagon lacks a
long-term planning mechanism for nuclear-weapons programs. The report recommended that
the Pentagon should set up a standing body to build and maintain nuclear forces, improve
strategic weapons intelligence efforts, and keep all three arms of the current strategic
‘triad’ — missiles, bombers and missile submarines.” Maintaining such a robust posture
would be problematic — if not, as a practical matter, impossible — at some of the low levels of
strategic forces being contemplated by the Clinton Administration and recently espoused by
Senator Bob Kerrey (D-NE).(3)
- Interestingly, Mr. Gertz quotes unnamed Clinton “Pentagon officials” as saying
privately that “U.S. nuclear forces are in danger of eroding because of neglect
under the current Administration. Large numbers of nuclear weapons experts and
operators are leaving government, production capabilities have been shut down, and
military nuclear exercises needed to maintain readiness have been sharply curtailed.
With no new weapons production, a lack of underground testing and pressure to cut
defense spending, the Defense Department ‘is suffering from a general erosion in
nuclear expertise at multiple levels.'”
- Rejection of ‘De-Alerting’: “The task force was critical of
proposals to ‘de-alert’ U.S.
nuclear forces further from a higher state of readiness, which would undermine deterrence.
Proponents of de-alerting point to ‘potential weaknesses in the Russian command and control
system as a source of danger of unauthorized or accidental use,’ the report said. However,
U.S. nuclear command-and-control is much more secure and reliable, so de-alerting U.S.
forces would not solve the problem. ‘Hence to do violence to the stability of the
force over
a perceived danger not addressed by de-alerting U.S. systems seems unwise in the
extreme,’ the report said.”
Re-enter Rose Gottemoeller
Interestingly, the DSB report seems to take a direct, and lethal, shot at a study published last
year
by a panel of the National Academy of Sciences (which appears, among other things, to have been
the blueprint for Sen. Kerrey’s unilateral disarmament initiative). One of the co-authors of this
study is Rose Gottemoeller, a woman President Clinton nominated during the
105th Congress to
become an Assistant Secretary of Energy for Non-proliferation and National Security.
A member of the Welch task force, Dr. Michael Pillsbury, described his panel’s views to the
Washington Times with the following words: “Our task force concluded that there
are major
uncertainties that require a new planning structure to maintain a robust nuclear stockpile for the
long term, and thus to strengthen deterrence against attack. Gen. Welch and Gen.
Vessey
concluded that any nuclear strategy relying on bluff is foolish.”
The paper went on to note that:
- “The task force dismissed the ‘bluff’ argument, [finding that] ‘while there is a certain
strained logic to this position, it violates the long-standing basic underpinning of
robust, reliable deterrence. Deterrence is based on known capability, not on
bluff,
and certainly not on planned ignorance of capabilities.’ The statement
appeared
aimed at a 1997 National Academy of Science report that said the United States should
‘de-alert’ nuclear forces and ultimately disarm unilaterally.”
The Bottom Line
If any further proof were needed of the insidious character of President Clinton’s stewardship
of
the U.S. nuclear deterrent, it can be found in the fact that he has chosen to make someone who
holds the sorts of views so properly critiqued by Generals Welch and Vessey, et.al., to be the
DoE’s senior official for arms control and other nuclear weapons-related policies.
Assuming Mr. Clinton persists in seeking Ms. Gottemoeller’s confirmation by the
Senate
during the 106th Congress,(5) the Senate
Armed Services Committee will have both an
opportunity — and an obligation — to consider with great care not only this nominee
but the
policies she and the Clinton Administration are pursuing. A roadmap for such an
scrutiny
can be found in the wise counsel offered by the Defense Science Board’s Task Force on Nuclear
Deterrence, the NDU-Lawrence Livermore study and by participants in the Center for Security
Policy’s High Level Roundtable.
– 30 –
1. For a summary of this Roundtable Discussion, see
High-Level Roundtable Discussion Warns
of Dangers Arising from Clinton Denuclearization Policies (
2. See U.S. Nuclear Policy in the 21st Century: A
Fresh Look at National Strategy and
Requirements, Executive Report, the Center for Counter-proliferation Research, National
Defense University and the Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory, July 1998.
3. See Center Decision Brief
entitled Senator Kerrey’s Trial Balloon: Clinton Next to Offer
More Denuclearization in Exchange for Limited Missile Defense? (
November 1998).
4. Ms. Gottemoeller’s portfolio includes such troubled areas as: the
indiscriminate declassification
of sensitive DoE documents relating to the design and manufacture of nuclear weapons; the
woefully inadequate physical security of U.S. nuclear sites; and various dubious initiatives aimed
at curbing international proliferation — notably the hugely expensive, and increasingly
controversial, Nunn-Lugar program in the former Soviet Union.
5. Thanks, in part, to concerns expressed by the Center about Ms.
Gottemoeller’s policy views,
her nomination was not rammed through the Senate during the closing days of the
105th Congress.
See Center Decision Briefs entitled Clinton’s Reckless Nuclear
Agenda Revealed, Study Co-Authored by Candidate for Top Pentagon Job is
Alarming (No. 97-D 96, 12 July 1997); and
Senate Given Another Chance to Reject Clinton’s Policy of Denuclearization: The
Gottemoeller Nomination (No. 98-D 166, 29
September 1998).