Too Clever By Half: Baker-Clinton Machinations Threaten to Make the ‘New’ NATO Non-viable

(Washington, D.C.): Concerns expressed
by the Center for Security Policy last
week⁽¹⁾
— to the effect that today’s signing
ceremony in Paris for the so-called
NATO-Russia “Founding Act”
could prove to be the Final Act
for the Atlantic Alliance — were given
new impetus by a stunning report in
Sunday’s New York Times.

The Baker Legacy

In an article entitled “Anatomy
of a Misunderstanding,” the paper
described how, in February 1990, then-Secretary
of State James Baker apparently promised
the Kremlin that “there would be no
extension of NATO’s current jurisdiction
eastward” if Moscow acquiesced to
the reunification of Germany. In
practical terms, this pledge translated
into a formula that sounds eerily
reminiscent of the assurances codified in
the “Founding Act”: Baker
promised that, while the territory of the
former German Democratic Republic (GDR)
would be incorporated into NATO, U.S. and
other non-native troops would not be
stationed there.

Mr. Baker has bristled at Russian
charges that NATO’s subsequent plans for
expansion represent a breach of his
pledge not to extend the Alliance’s
“jurisdiction.” Demonstrating
anew his fabled mastery of the art of
“spinning,” the New York
Times reports that the former
Secretary of State said “he never
intended to rule out the admission of new
NATO members. The proposal on NATO
jurisdiction had applied only to
territory of the former East
Germany…and had been speedily
withdrawn. ‘I got off the world
‘jurisdiction’ very quickly. I do not
recall using it with the Soviets. But
let’s assume I did use it once or twice.
We quickly walked away from it.'”

‘Proof in the Pudding’

Secretary Baker went on to assert
that, “What defeats this whole
argument is that we then insisted on the
GDR being in NATO, thereby moving NATO
eastward.” Interestingly, a similar
logic is now being used by the Clinton
Administration to dismiss concerns that
its “Founding Act” will prove
the undoing of Atlantic Alliance. In a 21
May White House press conference,
National Security Advisor Samuel Berger
pointed to NATO’s expansion as
“proof in the pudding” (sic)
that Moscow will not be able to exercise
a veto. After all, he declared, the
Alliance is moving forward with expansion
“even where there may be a
disagreement” with Russia.

Both Messrs. Baker and Berger choose
to overlook an inconvenient fact: Baker
made promises that created certain
expectations in Russia. These have, in
turn, been translated on Berger’s watch
into institutional and other arrangements
in the “Founding Act,”
arrangements that will certainly
complicate the process of expanding NATO
and may well wind up eviscerating the
Alliance. The ephemeral
“successes” that result from
shortsighted, expediency-driven foreign
policies — of the sort that have
characterized both the Bush and Clinton
Administrations — should not be confused
with sound or durable accomplishments
born of a principled strategy.

Russia’s Abiding Agenda:
Emasculate NATO

Two months ago, in an op.ed. published
in the Wall Street Journal Europe,
John Laughland (author of The Tainted
Source: The Undemocratic Origins of the
European Idea) anticipated how
the Kremlin would parlay the Alliance’s
willingness to establish a NATO-Russia
council into a vehicle for mutating NATO
beyond recognition: “…As Russian
officials are often at pains to stress,
their main purpose…is still to
transform NATO from a defense alliance
into an instrument for a broader
conception of collective security. The
difference between the two is that the
clarity and reasonableness of the goals
of the first — defense against attack
from outside — are replaced by vague
notions like ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘conflict
management’ in the second.”

Predictably, Russian President Boris
Yeltsin made much of these themes in his
remarks at the “Founding Act”
signing ceremony today:

“[This Act] will protect
Europe and the world from a new
confrontation and will become the
foundation for a new, fair and
stable partnership, a partnership
which takes into account the
security interests of each and
every signatory to this document,
to the Founding Act. I would like
to especially highlight at this
point the act which will be
signed by heads of states and
governments is a firm and
absolute commitment for all
signatory states. We are
under an obligation to make sure
that it is implemented in as
quickly a time period as
possible.

“Russia and NATO are going
to continue developing their
partnership relationship and make
sure that it is done as quickly
as possible; that the meeting of
the Council stipulated by the Act
is called as quickly as possible.
But for this, we need the efforts
of all member states, and the
efforts deployed by OEC [OSCE]
states to make sure that we end
up with common and
all-embracing security system for
the Europe of the 21st
century.”

With Friends Like the
French…

Not surprisingly, French President Jacques
Chirac’s remarks were of a similar
character. After all, his country has
long sought to weaken a NATO it perceived
to be an unwelcome instrument of American
power in Europe. First, M. Chirac offered
a bit of revisionist history, laced with
moral equivalence:

“Built on the ruins of World
War II, the order that came out
of Yalta led to a peace that was
unfair, preserved by the balance
of terror. At the outset, France,
through the voice of General
DeGaulle, had refused this
unnatural division. Eight years
ago, the fall of the Berlin Wall
kindled the hope of a Europe at
last reconciled with
itself.”

Then, Chirac declared that both Russia
and NATO have undertaken profound
transformations. Suggesting that
“Russia had confirmed its choice of
democracy and reform,” NATO could
now safely be mutated into “a
lighter, more flexible organization
adapted to its new crisis management and
peacekeeping missions. This alliance that
is renovating itself is no longer that of
the Cold War. Europeans will have to be
able fully to exercise their
responsibilities within it.” The
French President further illuminated his
agenda by announcing:

“The Founding Act
[establishes] a permanent
dialogue, transparency and
cooperation at all levels between
the allies and Russia will help
to banish old reflexes. They will
build into habits and mentalities
the mutual trust which will be
the foundation of our
partnership. They must give a new
impetus to the disarmament
negotiations. The strengthening
of the role and the means of the
OSCE will make it possible to set
the enlargement of the Atlantic
Alliance in a wider framework,
bringing together with equal
rights and obligations all the
countries of greater
Europe.”

Clinton’s Agenda

President
Clinton’s embrace of such sentiments,
however, should be deeply alarming to all
those who regard a security-minded
Atlantic Alliance as a bulwark against
renewed aggression — whether from Russia
or other quarters:

“…We are building
a new NATO. It will
remain the strongest alliance in
history, with smaller, more
flexible forces, prepared to
provide for our defense, but also
trained for peacekeeping. It will
work closely with other nations
that share our hopes and values
and interests through the
Partnership For Peace. It
will be an alliance directed no
longer against a hostile bloc of
nations, but instead designed to
advance the security of every
democracy in Europe —
NATO’s old members, new members,
and non-members alike.

“I know that some still see
NATO through the prism of the
Cold War, and that especially in
NATO’s decision to open its doors
to Central Europe’s new
democracies, they see a Europe
still divided, only differently
divided. But I ask them to look
again. For this new NATO
will work with Russia, not
against it. We
establish this partnership
because we are determined to
create a future in which European
security is not a zero-sum game
— where NATO’s gain is Russia’s
loss, and Russia’s strength is
our alliance’s weakness. That
is old thinking; these are new
times. Together, we
must build a new Europe in which
every nation is free and every
free nations joins in
strengthening the peace and
stability for all.”

Not to be outdone by Chirac, President
Clinton capped his address with a bit of
Talbottesque moral equivalence and
revisionism:

“Half a century ago, on a
continent darkened by the shadow
of evil, brave men and women in
Russia and the world’s free
nations fought a common enemy
with uncommon valor. Their
partnership forged in battle,
strengthened by sacrifice,
cemented by blood, gave hope to
millions in the West and in
Russia that the grand alliance
would be extended in peace. But in
victory’s afterglow, the freedom
the Russian people deserved was
denied them. The
dream of peace gave way to the
hard reality of Cold War, and our
predecessors lost an opportunity
to shape a new Europe whole and
free.”

‘Watch on the Rhine’

It is particularly worrisome that the
German government has been a prime-mover
behind both the Baker gambit on
reunification and the
“compromise” that gave rise to
a “New NATO” built on the
dubious foundation of a NATO-Russian
Permanent Joint Council. Germany’s
reflexive inclination to accommodate the
Kremlin’s demands makes it all the more
likely that this Council will operate not
simply as a consultative mechanism — as
Berger and Company claim — but as a
vehicle for Moscow to exercise a de
facto veto in NATO.

NATO would do well to heed the recent
warning of a German parliamentarian from
Prime Minister Helmut Kohl’s ruling
Christian Democratic Party, Friedbert
Pflüger. In an op.ed. entitled
“NATO’s Bad Bargain” which
appeared in the 16 May edition of the New
York Times, Mr. Pflüger wrote:
“Even though Russia will formally
lack the power to block any NATO action,
the Alliance’s independence and
flexibility could be hampered if members
feel obligated to consult the Kremlin
first. The pressure for reaching
consensus with Russia will be
great.”

The Gazprom Gambit

That pressure will only grow as Russia
acquires unprecedented tools for
exercising influence over German and
other European economies. Yesterday, the Washington
Post quoted a Russian
executive of Gazprom — the immense
Russia natural gas monopoly —
as saying “Why are you guys [Russian
policy-makers] so concerned about the
enlargement of NATO to the East? I
can assure you that [it] will be more
than compensated for by the enlargement
of Gazprom to the West.”
(Emphasis added.)

Indeed, the Financial Times
reports that Gazprom intends to raise $5
billion per year over the next few years
to finance construction of a new pipeline
into Europe. In this manner, Western
Europe would pay for the privilege of
becoming largely dependent upon the
Kremlin’s natural gas supplies — a
strategic vulnerability that Moscow will
surely exploit in the unlikely event that
countries like Germany prove
insufficiently sensitive to Russia
interests.

That Moscow is capable of
engaging in this sort of energy extortion
is indisputable — just ask the Baltic
States, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and the
countries of the Balkans, all of whom
have experienced Soviet/Russian
politically motivated energy cutoffs or
cutbacks.⁽²⁾
Even the prospect of such a possibility
befalling U.S. allies in Western Europe
prompted President Reagan in the early
1980s to derail a planned “second
strand” for the original Siberian
gas pipeline. The result was an
extraordinary decision taken by the
International Energy Agency in May 1983.
It limited gas supplies from the Kremlin
to roughly 30% of total Western European
requirements and called for accelerated
development of the Troll gas field in
Norway as a secure alternative to
Soviet/Russian supplies.

If the Clinton Administration
is half as committed as it professes to
be about avoiding Russian vetoes in NATO,
it should mount no less an effort to
stymie Gazprom’s new plan for enlarged
economic penetration of and political
influence in the Atlantic Alliance.

The Bottom Line

The portentous ambiguities initially
spawned by James Baker and then codified
by the Clinton Administration — coupled
with the ominous uses Russia evidently
intends to make of its new
“partnership” with NATO —
demand a ratification debate on
the “Founding Act.”
Such a debate occurred when the
“old” NATO was formed nearly
fifty years ago. It is anticipated that
there will be one when the new members of
NATO are added to the rolls many months
from now — a step that will do much
less to change the character of the
Atlantic Alliance than does this new
“Act.” Why should the
Clinton Administration’s creation of a
“New NATO” not trigger such a
process, as well?

The Center for Security Policy finds
unpersuasive the Clinton Administration’s
argument that Senate approval is
unnecessary on the grounds that the
“Founding Act” is only a
“politically binding” agreement
— as opposed to a “legally binding
one.” The Russian government is
taking the opposite view and will obtain
its Duma’s approval, in part to make the
point that the “Act” is a
binding international legal document. In
any event, for a nation like the United
States that submits to the rule of law,
this is a distinction between legally and
politically binding accords is one
without a difference.

The Center notes that in a breakfast
meeting last Thursday with the Washington
Bureau of the Los Angeles Times,
Senator Richard Lugar —
a prominent legislator on foreign policy
matters — urged, according to an article
which appeared in the paper on 23 May,
that “important, but so far little
noted, aspects of [NATO] enlargement…be
debated before Clinton meets with other
alliance leaders in Madrid in July to
extend the first formal invitations to
prospective NATO members.” The
implications of the “Founding
Act” would seem to fit that bill.

Even if this “Act” had less
than the effect of create a
“new” and emasculated
NATO, it would still be incumbent
on the United States Senate to insist
that the Clinton Administration respect
its constitutional obligation to advise
and consent to major international
undertakings. There is all the
more reason to do so since the Senate’s
alteration — or even its rejection — of
this flawed “Founding Act”
would not preclude extension of an
invitation to additional nations to join
the Alliance in July.

– 30 –

1. See the Center’s
Decision Brief entitled ‘Founding
Act’ or ‘Final Act’ for NATO?
(No. 97-D 69,
19 May 1997).

2. See the Center’s
Decision Briefs entitled
Harbinger of Things to Come?
Russian Energy Sector Imposes Boycott on
Estonia After Getting U.S. Aid
(No. 93-D
55, 28 June 1993) and Restoration
Watch #6: With ‘Partners’ Like These, Who
Needs Enemies? ( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=94-D_89″>No. 94-D 89,
30 August 1994).