Toward A US Anti-Satellite Capability: Correcting America’s “Most Serious Military Deficiency”

Today, the United States is critically dependent upon satellites for essential intelligence and for communications between, and command of, its nuclear and conventional forces. The Soviet Union has developed an array of systems capable of degrading — and possibly denying — U.S. use of space for these functions. Similarly, the Soviets have invested heavily in space-based systems designed to locate and facilitate attacks against American naval units and other terrestrial targets. Taken together, these Soviet capabilities represent a formidable challenge to Western security interests.

This situation is the more worrisome for the utter absence of a U.S. capability either to deter attacks upon American satellites — by the threat of in-kind retaliation — or to deny the Soviet Union use of space for the purpose of targeting the forces of both the United States and its allies. Indeed, former Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci earlier this year called this "the single most serious deficiency in our military posture."(1) Fortunately, the Bush Administration has requested Congressional funding for a comprehensive U.S. anti-satellite (ASAT) program designed to remedy this dangerous situation.

There are, however, many in the Congress and elsewhere who challenge the need for an American ASAT capability. They have, with the help of Soviet disinformation and disingenuous arms control initiatives, thus far succeeded in preventing the development and deployment of effective U.S. ASAT systems. The United States can no longer afford to tolerate this asymmetric and highly vulnerable posture.

This paper addresses the military and arms control considerations that underpin the ASAT program now before the Congress. In addition to discussing the specifics of the Bush Administration’s proposed program, it addresses:

1. The growing Soviet threat to U.S. satellites and earth-based forces from space — and Soviet efforts to dissemble about such capabilities;

 

2. The military risks should the United States remain unable to counter these threats; and

 

3. The intractable problems that preclude arms control from serving as an effective substitute for a U.S. ASAT capability.

The Multifaceted Soviet ASAT Threat

Admiral William J. Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently gave a succinct description of the breadth and diversity of Soviet ASAT and ASAT-capable systems:

• "It has been confirmed by DIA and the CIA, that the Soviets have not only developed an operational co-orbital ASAT, but also an extensive infrastructure of other potential ASAT-capable lasers, and electronic warfare systems. Advanced technology programs indicate the potential for other lethal ASAT systems as well, such as space-based lasers, neutral particle beams, and spaced-based kinetic kill interceptors.

 

• "In the aggregate, the Soviets have direct ascent, all-weather, day or night, rapid response, multiple kill phenomenology ASAT capable systems to deny, degrade and destroy US satellites. They have prepared themselves and are ready, especially with the co-orbital interceptor, to fight and fight successfully."(2)

Several of these systems warrant further comment.

The Soviet Co-orbital ASAT System

Today, the Soviet Union has an exclusive monopoly on deployed ASAT systems. It has fielded and kept in readiness an anti-satellite weapon that is launched from pads aboard the SL-11 booster. It uses a radar sensor to home in on its targets and a pellet-type warhead to destroy them through kinetic impact.

A Simple but Deadly System: Those who would minimize the strategic significance of this Soviet capability argue that the co-orbital ASAT is an old and technologically rudimentary device.

1. The reality, however, is that despite its lack of sophistication, the Soviet co-orbital ASAT is a potent threat to "all current low-altitude satellites. A target engagement during the first orbit of the intercept leaves little time for a target satellite to take evasive action. The interceptor can reach targets orbiting at an altitude of more than 5,000 kilometers…."(3)

 

2. What is more, by utilizing the extensive launch capabilities of the Tyuratam space complex, "several interceptors could be launched each day."(4)

Ready Despite a Lack of Recent Tests: The Soviets — and others determined to downplay the military significance of the USSR’s deployed co-orbital ASAT system — contend that since Moscow has not tested it for some time, it is not effective and represents no threat.

The facts are otherwise:

1. "Contrary to what has been stated by some, this system is reliable and effective, and poses a direct threat to our low-earth orbit satellites. The [U.S.] intelligence community has conclusive evidence that the Soviets maintain their operational co-orbital ASAT capabilities in a constant state of readiness."(5)

 

2. "Despite [a Soviet-]announced testing moratorium, the Soviets have exercised their co-orbital ASAT system, maintaining its operational status. The component parts — tracking radars, launchers and launch systems and on-orbit command techniques are routinely tested or employed in the Soviets’ substantial space program."(6)

 

3. "Over the past several years, the Soviets have routinely launched the SL-11 ASAT booster with other payloads, thereby ensuring the reliability of this system component. Other components can be tested on the ground without actually having to launch the ASAT system itself."(7)

 

4. "Given the complexity of launch, target tracking, and radar-guided intercept, the Soviet ASAT system is far from primitive. Soviet ASAT tests have been largely successful, providing them with an operational system fully capable of performing its mission."(8)

Other Soviet ASAT Capabilities

In addition to its dedicated, operational ASAT weapon, the Soviet Union has developed a variety of other systems with inherent — and increasing — anti-satellite potential:

1. "Soviet Galosh ABM interceptors deployed around Moscow and some of the lasers located at the Sary Shagan Test Center have ASAT potential, as do certain Soviet electronic warfare facilities."(9)

 

2. "During the next decade, the Soviets are expected to move aggressively in developing advanced ASAT systems based on kinetic and directed energy technologies, possibly including radio frequency weapons."(10)

 

3. "These ASAT capabilities provide the Soviets with the capacity to degrade the performance of our satellites and those of our allies in a crisis or conflict and to destroy many of our critical satellites…. With the effectiveness of U.S. and allied terrestrial forces heavily dependent on space systems support, the Soviets will have a great incentive to degrade or destroy our space assets."(11)

The Soviet Union’s ASAT Disinformation Efforts

As with their efforts to dissemble about the readiness of the co-orbital ASAT system as a result of a self-imposed testing moratorium, the Soviets continue to use disinformation in minimizing — if not denying outright — residual Soviet anti-satellite capabilities. Two such Soviet ASAT disinformation efforts were recently much in evidence:

1. At a May 9, 1989 hearing of the House Armed Services Committee, Roal’d Sagdeyev, a top arms control advisor to Mikhail Gorbachev, expressed his doubts that the Soviets have "anything like an operational military (ASAT) system."(12)

 

2. In early July 1989, Soviet officials permitted an unofficial delegation of American congressmen and scientists to visit part of the Sary Shagan research and development complex. On the basis of their exposure to a facility apparently dating from earlier stages of research into lasers — involving low power systems typical of preliminary R&D — the visitors opined that the U.S. government had grossly overestimated Soviet laser ASAT capabilities. Some went so far as to denounce what they called a mythical "laser gap."
   • In fact, the U.S. visitors were unable to visit much more advanced facilities at the complex. As reported by the Department of Defense: "According to intelligence community analyses, the Sary Shagan complex contains other laser facilities which are much more advanced and which do present significant threats, including ASAT capabilities such as have been discussed in Soviet Military Power."(13)

    

   • In any event it is dangerously misleading, scientifically unsound and strategically irresponsible to suggest on the basis of any such casual and selective an exposure to the Soviet laser program what the actual state of the art is — let alone that the USSR enjoys no advantage in this field.

    

   As the Defense Department noted: "There are a number of other Soviet locations (roughly a half-dozen major research and development facilities) involved with [Soviet] laser weapon R&D, and the Soviets’ overall high-energy laser program is believed to be developing several lasers for eventual strategic applications, such as air defense, ballistic missile defense or anti-satellite missions."(14)

 

Soviet Use of Space for Targeting, Controlling Offensive Forces

The Soviets have — in addition to their large inventory of space-based systems designed for navigation, weather, command, control and communication — an array of satellites used for performing reconnaissance functions and for targeting weapons against identified targets. These assets currently pose a significant threat to allied abilities to maintain sea control –an essential element of Western defense strategy.

To appreciate the magnitude of this problem, it is useful to reflect on historical experience. In World War II, a substantially smaller number of vastly less capable submarines than those now in the Soviet arsenal were very nearly able to prevent an armada of naval combatants and merchant ships orders of magnitude larger than today’s Western fleets from maintaining the vital trans-Atlantic "bridge." Moreover, they did so without access to all-weather, real-time reconnaissance data and continuous communications capabilities.

Today, the Soviet navy is not only equipped with large numbers of nuclear-powered submarines — with the inherent capability to stay on station for much longer periods than Hitler’s diesel-powered U-boats; it also has space-based sensors that provide a wealth of information the Wolfpack commanders could only dream of. A large, robust and redundant infrastructure and space-launch system is dedicated to supporting these reconnaissance assets which amount to a significant portion of the roughly 100 Soviet payloads lifted into space each year — some ten or more times greater the U.S. average.

Unless neutralized, these sensors, when combined with long-range anti-ship cruise missiles and other Soviet weapons, have the potential of allowing the Soviet Union to do what Nazi Germany proved unable to achieve: denial of the Western maritime powers’ ability to operate and transit the oceans at will. Unfortunately — in the absence of a U.S. ASAT capability — the United States has no ability to neutralize such Soviet space-based reconnaissance and targeting systems. As a result, they enjoy a sanctuary; they can operate with complete impunity and with devastating effect against naval and even some land-based assets, military and civilian, American and allied.

The Risks of Leaving These Dangerous Asymmetries Uncorrected

The Soviets fully understand the importance of space-based systems to American military might and, therefore, to this country’s deterrent capabilities. Indeed, the U.S. Defense Department has made no effort to conceal the obvious:

• "Space systems…greatly enhance our terrestrial forces combat effectiveness by providing communications, navigation and real-time surveillance, tracking and assessment support. These force enhancement capabilities (or ‘force multipliers’) will provide effective operational support to military forces in peacetime, crisis and in conflict.

 

"In a theater conventional conflict…military space systems are also of great importance. This is especially the case in theaters such as the Persian Gulf, or Europe, where we must project our forces over great distances. In these situations, advanced technologies can increase our conventional forces’ combat effectiveness by enhancing the accuracy of long-range precision munitions and by providing precise target acquisition and real time surveillance information."(15)

What is more, the United States’ reliance upon space-based capabilities for these purposes will, if anything, grow in the future:

• "The [U.S.] requirements for flexible, multi-purpose and survivable satellite systems will increase over the next five to ten years. Arms control verification, strategic surveillance, space surveillance, and attack warning missions will all require increasingly sophisticated and survivable systems.(16)

Since the Soviet Union well appreciates the decisive importance of space-based assets to U.S. military operations, the current two-part asymmetry — between American and Soviet ASAT capabilities that results in a unique Soviet ability to threaten vital U.S. satellites on the one hand, and the United States inability to deny the USSR satellite "gun-sights" in space, on the other — could prove extremely destabilizing in time of war.

Ironically, some critics of American efforts to rectify these asymmetries argue that a U.S. ASAT program will be destabilizing. In fact, the opposite is true. As General John L. Piotrowski, the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Space Command recently put it:

• "The real destabilizing factor is that today’s situation leaves the United States with no response ‘in-kind’ to a Soviet attack on our space systems. Without the capability to first deter and then respond, the United States would have only limited and desperate responses to a Soviet attack on our space systems. The best way to restore stability is to deploy an anti-satellite system."(17)

 

"Lacking the capability to nullify combat support space systems, we relinquish a staggering advantage to the Soviets. Their doctrine says that they will employ anti-satellite weapons in conflict, and their systems give them that capability. To leave our space systems hostage to Soviet philanthropy is untenable."(18)

Adm. Crowe goes even further:

• "Based upon years of military experience and current intelligence assessments I do not believe the Soviets would do anything visibly different now if we were to build our own ASAT capability (kinetic or directed energy). History indicates that the Soviets plan for the long term and do not rush headlong into weapon development activity in response to external threats, like a U.S. ASAT weapon development program.

 

"The Soviets currently have an extensive space program that is dedicated to support of its terrestrial military forces. They are already making massive investments in space-based force enhancement capabilities and several developmental systems with potential for ASAT capability. They will most likely continue to pursue a well-orchestrated, methodical ASAT development program, regardless of what we do, leading to reliable and effective ASAT systems geared to warfighting throughout the spectrum of conflict."(19)

ASAT Arms Control: A Black Hole for U.S. Security

There are those who disagree with this assessment, however. They tend to believe that a preferable alternative to that of the United States acquiring a competent ASAT system would be for it to negotiate with the USSR a ban (or some other set of limitations) on such systems. They reason — with considerable encouragement from the Soviets — that, given the strategic value of America’s space assets, both sides would be better off if neither had the capability to attack the other’s satellites. Typically, the proposition is wrapped in rhetoric about the need to prevent the militarization of space, to stop another "arms race" before it starts, and the like.

Of course, such arguments ignore the foregoing facts. Space has been militarized — not the least by the Soviets — for decades. If there is an arms competition in space, the Soviets are winning it.

The theory that arms control is a panacea, nevertheless, has given rise to considerable pressure for arms negotiations in this area. It has also precipitated congressional limitations on ASAT testing intended to keep an incipient U.S. program from jeopardizing the possibilities for an arms control accord governing anti-satellite weapons.

These pressures and congressional directives have caused the United States government repeatedly to explore the potential for an arms control regime that would be effective, verifiable and in the United States’ interests. To date, no such regime has been identified.(20) in response to legislation authored by then-Senator Paul Tsongas. This interagency-prepared document remains the most thorough treatment of the issue; its findings are as valid today as when the study was first released. This conclusion was most thoroughly documented in a 1984 presidential report to the Congress

The Report to the Congress on ASAT arms control identified three main concerns:

Definitional conundrums: The report pointed to insoluble definitional problems in devising any ASAT arms control, noting that:

• "…Many activities related to space give rise to capabilities inherently useful for ASAT purposes, for example, the rendezvous and docking operations routinely conducted by the Soviets could be used to attempt to conceal development of one or more types of ASAT techniques. Restricting the definition…could make an agreement easier to verify, but ineffective in achieving its purpose of protecting satellites."(21)

Verification concerns: Even if a way could be found to define dedicated ASATs, the reality is that a wide number of systems would retain the inherent capability to perform anti-satellite functions even if such dedicated systems were banned or sharply constrained.

• "In keeping with…[congressional] satellite survivability concerns, we need to recognize that ‘ASAT capability’ relates to all systems capable of damaging, destroying or otherwise interrupting the functioning of satellites. These would include:
  • maneuvering spacecraft…into the path of, or to detonate next to, another nation’s spacecraft;

   

  • direct ascent interceptors such as exo-atmospheric ABM missiles;

   

  • ballistic missiles with modified guidance logic;

   

  • space boosters;

   

  • homing vehicles;

   

  • directed energy weapons such as lasers and particle beams (either ground-based or space-based);

   

  • electronic countermeasures of sufficient power to damage or interrupt satellite functions; and

   

  • weapons which could be carried by manned space planes or orbital complexes."(22)

 

 

• "Furthermore, problems of weapon definition are compounded because some non-weapon space systems, including civil and commercial systems could have haracteristics which would make it difficult to frame a definition to distinguish them."(23)

The Need to Defend U.S. Terrestrial Assets from Soviet Space Systems: Even if such intractable definitional and verification issues did not arise, ASAT arms control would be of absolutely no value — indeed, it would be utterly counterproductive — in addressing the second requirement for a U.S. anti-satellite capability, i.e., the need to deny Soviet reconnaissance and targeting satellites a sanctuary in space.

In its essence, the President’s report concluded that other potential ASAT arms control limitations (e.g., "rules-of-the-road" constraints, confidence-building measures, etc.) suffer from comparable intrinsic definitional, verification and defense problems. Consequently, none was judged to meet the test of being effective, verifiable and in the United States’ national security interests.

Correcting the Critical Deficiency in U.S. ASAT Capabilities

It is against this backdrop that the United States is mounting a major effort to develop and deploy ASAT capabilities. This effort actually dates back to the 1950’s. It has produced kinetic energy systems (notably five successful tests of F-15 air-launched miniature vehicle, the ALMV, including one live intercept) — and directed energy systems (including ground-based lasers with ASAT potential now reaching maturity).

In recent years, however, development of effective ASAT weapon systems has been substantially restricted by Congress through the imposition of limitations on the testing of the ALMV. Such limitations so handicapped the R&D effort as to lead finally to the outright cancellation of the F-15/ALMV program last year.

In the aftermath of the termination of the ALMV program and in recognition of the need urgently to satisfy the critical U.S. ASAT requirement, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) and the Secretary of Defense have validated a comprehensive U.S. ASAT program for which President Bush and his Administration have sought appropriate funding from the U.S. Congress.

The proposed program is a multifaceted effort taking full advantage of SDI-funded interceptor and laser research. Its most important features are as follows:

Kinetic Energy (KE)

• A DoD "Milestone I" (system definition and demonstration/validation) review is scheduled to occur by December 1989. It is to review ground-, sea- and air-based KE ASAT options.

 

• A Joint Program Office has been established for surface-based ASAT efforts with: 1) the Army to be Program Manager, given its responsibilities and experience in the SDI program with ground-based interceptors technology and 2) the Navy to provide the Deputy Program Manager.

Directed Energy (DE)

 

• A DoD "Milestone I" review is to take place during 1991 leading to a decision on selection of a single DE ASAT concept.

 

• The Army is to begin development of ASAT capability as spin-off within existing SDI Free Electron Laser (FEL) program through 1991.

 

• The Air Force is to continue its DE ASAT weapon technology efforts (including excimer and chemical lasers) through 1991.

 

• The Navy’s promising MIRACL/Sea Lite System (a high energy laser initiated to develop ship defense weaponry) will receive a $20 million funding upgrade (from Army and Air Force monies) to provide initial, near-term DE ASAT capability for the U.S.

Surveillance and Battle Management

 

• The Air Force will be lead service for: 1) a single comprehensive space surveillance and battle management system to control all ASAT capabilities and 2) coordinating the integration of those elements with the KE and DE efforts.

Budget Requests

 

• In addition to being designed to benefit from related technology development in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) — whose Ground-based Interceptor and Free Electron Lasers (FEL) programs have particular relevance — the following specific funding for ASAT has been requested under this program.

Conclusion

Then-Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci summarized the situation the United States currently faces in the ASAT arena eloquently:

• "As the President, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I have stated repeatedly, the development and deployment of a comprehensive ASAT capability is an absolute necessity to prevent the Soviets from using hostile space systems to the detriment of our forces. The intelligence community has repeatedly informed the Department of Defense and the Congress of the present and projected Soviet threat in this area. We ignore it at our peril, and we are inviting potential tragedy if this threat is not countered."(24)

The Center for Security Policy strongly supports the Administration’s ASAT program requests. It believes that U.S. ASAT programs must not be restricted in their testing (as they have been in recent years). Neither must they be sacrificed to naive illusions that arms control limitations can replace an ASAT capability in effectively safeguarding American security interests.

– 30 –

1. Frank C. Carlucci, "Our Unfinished Business: An Anti-Satellite Capability," The Los Angeles Times, 1 March 1989, p. II-7.

2. Testimony before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, 17 March 1989.

3. U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, April 1988, p. 65.

4. Ibid.

5. Report of the Secretary of Defense to Congress for the FY 1990/91 Budget, January 1989, p. 19.

6. From a Department of Defense briefing concerning the anti-satellite threat and U.S. ASAT program, May 1989.

7. Soviet Military Power, op.cit., p. 65.

8. Ibid.

9. Secretary of Defense Report to Congress, op.cit., p. 19.

10. Ibid., p. 19.

11. Ibid.

12. Warren Strobel, "Possible ASAT Talks with Soviets Reach the Whisper Stage," The Washington Times, 11 May 1989, p. A5.

13. Department of Defense press guidance, 26 July 1989 (emphasis added).

14. Ibid.

15. Report of the Secretary of Defense, op.cit., p. 212.

16. Ibid.

17. Prepared testimony of General John L. Piotrowski to the Senate Appropriations Committee, 18 May 1989.

18. Ibid.

19. Testimony of Adm. Crowe, op.cit.

20. Report to the Congress on U.S. Policy on ASAT Arms Control submitted by President Ronald Reagan, 31 March 1984.

21. Report by the President, op.cit., pp.6-7.

22. Ibid., p. 6.

23. Ibid., p. 6.

24. Secretary of Defense Report, op.cit., p. 212.