What Ex-Baathists Within IS Do and Don’t Signify

The interwebs are abuzz with discussion over the significance of Der Spiegel’s scoop regarding the role of Former Iraqi military intelligence officer Samir Abd Muhammad al-Khlifawi (AKA Haji Bakr), and what is reported to be pages of documents showing the plan Haji Bakr put together for Islamic State operations in Syria and the establishment of an IS intelligence service which involved both conducting Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) for IS fighters, including infiltrating fighters and gathering intelligence on likely resisters, and establishing a counterintelligence function within the group’s fighters.

This is all good information, and does much to explain how Islamic State operates on a tactical level, and so for that reason the journalists at Der Spiegel should be applauded for their work. It also helps to explain how Islamic State has relied on Ex-Baathists with military and intelligence experience to provide the high degree of technical expertise the Islamic State has generated thus far.

However, the article drastically oversells the importance of the Baathists within the Islamic State’s hierarchy, treating Caliph AbuBakr AlBaghdadi, and the tens of thousands who have flocked to Islamic State’s banner as merely pawns of a clever Iraqi intelligence con game:

But apocalyptic visions alone are not enough to capture cities and take over countries. Terrorists don’t establish countries. And a criminal cartel is unlikely to generate enthusiasm among supporters around the world, who are willing to give up their lives to travel to the “Caliphate” and potentially their deaths.

IS has little in common with predecessors like al-Qaida aside from its jihadist label. There is essentially nothing religious in its actions, its strategic planning, its unscrupulous changing of alliances and its precisely implemented propaganda narratives. Faith, even in its most extreme form, is just one of many means to an end. Islamic State’s only constant maxim is the expansion of power at any price.

As the Center for Security Policy has noted repeatedly, the reality is that much of Islamic State’s behavior IS explained by examining matters of Islamic Law, as they related to jihad violence, relations with non-Muslims, Islamic State’s extortion of Christians and tax collection from Muslims (Jizya and Zakat), it’s treatment of women captives, etc.

Simply put, The “Islamic State as puppet for Ex-Baathists” theory fails to properly explain a whole host of Islamic State behaviors, which CAN be understood within the context of an Islamic terrorist organization, with roots in Al Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood with an end goal of reestablishing the Caliphate globally.

“The Ex-Baathist theory” does not explain, for example, the amount of time and effort expended by the group in its feud with Al Qaeda, including its efforts to “pick off” groups formerly linked to Al-Qaeda. Accepting the oath of loyalty from Boko Haram, and urging jihadists to travel to West Africa to fight, does nothing for Saddam Hussein’s former military commanders whose goals are presumably Iraq-focused. Neither does IS’ efforts to supplant the Taliban in the AF/PAK region with a “Khorasan Province.”

It does not explain the insistence on burning a Jordanian pilot, or beheading Coptic Christians in Libya, when those acts have clearly drawn more support for efforts to defeat them and could easily have been avoided. It doesn’t explain Islamic State’s infighting with Ex-Baathists within the Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi order (JRTN), against which Islamic State conducted a purge in early April. It does not explain how Islamic State’s efforts at establishing the Caliphate with Iraq as the centerpiece actual precedes the supposed Iraqi mastermind.

This new cache of documents is worth considering for all they can tell us about HOW the Islamic State is able to do what it does. It would be a drastic mistake to think that they unlock any clues as to the WHY of Islamic State.