WHAT IRAQ’S BIOLOGICAL WARFARE REVELATIONS REALLY MEAN: THERE CAN BE NO ACCOMMODATION WITH SADDAM

(Washington, D.C.): Saddam Hussein’s decision to make a less-than-full
disclosure about the nature, size and status of his illegal
biological weapons (BW) program represents the latest — and
perhaps a final — warning to the West: The criminal
malevolence of which Saddam’s regime is capable dictates that it
be brought to an end before he makes use of whatever
biological or other weapons of mass destruction are still at his
disposal.

Last weekend, Baghdad disclosed to Rolf Ekeus, the chairman
of the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), that it had a
secret facility in the desert at Al Hakam utilizing technical
know-how obtained from German companies in the mid-1980s.
According to Iraqi scientists, this facility was used to produce
some 5,500 gallons of the most deadly viruses ever contemplated
for biological warfare purposes: botulism and anthrax. The
toxicity of these substances is such that lethal doses are
described in terms of pinhead-sized quantities. If efficiently
delivered, such an arsenal could conservatively be expected to
kill millions of people.

Iraq claims, however, to have destroyed all its biological
warfare stocks in October 1990 in anticipation that the coming
Operation Desert Storm could cause BW agents to be dispersed in
the Iraqi countryside. Like Baghdad’s earlier, insistent
representations to the UN that it never had any offensive
biological weapons program, the Iraqi assertion that its BW
arsenal was unilaterally and preemptively eliminated — at what
was, after all, the moment of Saddam’s greatest need — have been
generally and properly seen to be implausible.

Extortion — Not Evidence of A Change of Heart

As such international skepticism was predictable, Saddam’s
revelation may not have been motivated by the expectation that
his supposed transparency would be rewarded by a lifting of
international sanctions. Instead, his purpose in finally
acknowledging that Iraq at least has the technology to conduct
biological warfare — and may yet have the weapons with which to
do so — probably was calculated to intimidate the UN into
ending its crippling embargo.

Such a strategy fits a pattern of recent threatening
Iraqi statements and actions. For example on 15 June 1995, Al
Quds Al Arabi — a paper believed to be funded by Baghdad as
an unofficial, plausibly deniable vehicle for its views —
published an editorial entitled “Iraq and Sampson’s Only
Option.” It said, in part:

“Iraq, to put it very concisely, still has options
— destructive options. Continuing to press it into a corner,
a corner of hunger, disease, humiliation and internal
subversion…could lead them to resort to the option of
bringing down the temple on everyone. No one would blame
Iraq for that. It has done all it was asked to do by the UN,
cleared its conscience in this regard and exhausted all means
of flexibility.”

Then on 4 July, the second-ranking official in the Iraqi
information ministry wrote in Al Iraq: “The last few
days of the embargo may be full of events and conflict because
the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys will not accept defeat as
easily as some people think.” The character of the
“events” contemplated by Iraq was alluded to in a
comment published last fall by Salaih Al-Mukhtar and attributed
to Saddam Hussein himself at the time a second invasion of Kuwait
was being threatened: “There is nothing strange about [Iraq]
using all the weapons in its possession — banned or unbanned
— to defend itself and inflict the heaviest losses on its
enemies.” (Emphasis added.)

Iraqi threats have also been directed at UNSCOM personnel. In
recent weeks, Saddam’s regime has warned that it may
“withdraw its cooperation” from the inspection teams
operating in Iraq to monitor and dismantle its weapons of mass
destruction programs. Such statements have been interpreted by
Ekeus & Co. as they were intended, namely, as an effort to
intimidate the inspectors with the prospect of physical violence.
The Center for Security Policy was appalled to learn that, when
UNSCOM sought U.S. diplomatic support for the issuance of strong
protests about such abuse, it was not forthcoming.

The Bottom Line

On 11 April 1995 — the occasion of an earlier report by
UNSCOM to the effect that Iraq had secreted away at least 17 tons
of material that could be used to breed bacteria which could, in
turn, be used in biological weapons — the Center made the
following, still very pertinent recommendations: ⁽¹⁾

The U.S. must utilize every resource at its disposal
to effect the immediate elimination of Saddam Hussein and
his police-state apparatus. This will require
Washington to end, once and for all, its ambivalence
concerning the demise of the ‘devil we know.’ It will
also require a sustained campaign of covert and overt
action designed to give the people of Iraq an opportunity
to liberate themselves from Saddam’s bloody misrule.

The Clinton Administration must accord vastly greater
priority to defending the American people against
biological warfare. This will entail giving more
resources and attention to such activities as BW-related
intelligence collection, reconnaissance and detection,
individual and collective protection, inoculation and
treatment, etc. It will also demand an end to foolish
utopian delusions about verifiably banning biological or
chemical weapons from the face of the earth.

With regard to the latter point, it should be obvious that
Saddam’s success to date in concealing thousands of gallons of BW
viruses is evidence of the utter impossibility of securing
effective, verifiable and global bans of easily manufactured and
concealed substances like those used in biological and
chemical warfare. It is a snare and delusion to promise such
a result. If, moreover, in the interest of promoting such a
canard, the United States compounds its present vulnerability —
whether by failing to provide adequate defenses or by
unilaterally denying itself in-kind deterrents — it may actually
invite the use of such heinous weapons against America and
its citizens and interests.

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(1) See the Center’s Decision Brief
entitled, If Saddam Hussein Is Building Biological Weapons,
Is the United States the Likely Target? ( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=95-D_23″>No. 95-D 23, 11 April 1995).