What Should Top the U.S.-Japanese Summit Agenda: Interoperable AEGIS-Based Missile Defenses

(Washington, D.C.): As Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi begins a visit to the United
States
featuring a multi-city tour and meetings with President Clinton, there is one item that should
receive preeminent attention: The need to make an integral and top priority part of the bilateral
security relationship the acquisition and deployment of joint, interoperable missile defenses.

Why So Little Focus on Mounting Security Concerns?

Unfortunately, security concerns seem likely, as has generally been the case practically since
the
Reagan-Nakasone era, to be subordinated in the Clinton-Obuchi talks to such matters as: the
ongoing steel dispute; U.S. aggravation over the still-excessive trade imbalance; and
disagreements between high-level officials of the Japanese Ministry of Finance and the U.S.
Treasury and Federal Reserve regarding the adequacy of Japan’s fiscal stimulus measures. The
Casey Institute has long believed that serious restructuring needs to be undertaken regarding the
natural competition which exists between the economic and security portfolios in Japan.

Indeed, it is difficult to find mention of any non-economic issues in the reports
leading up to the 3
May Summit beyond the modest, but helpful, defense-related legislation recently passed by the
lower house of the Japanese Diet. According to the International Herald-Tribune of
29 April, “Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi prepared Wednesday for his summit meeting
with President Clinton working on his economic policy and pitching arm.” (Emphasis
added.)

The Gathering Storm

This is all the more bizarre in light of recent events. These include: the overflight of Japan’s
home
islands by North Korea’s Taepo Dong 1 missile in August1998; an incursion in March 1999 by a
group of apparently North Korean intelligence ships into Japanese waters, prompting naval units
of the Self-Defense Force to engage their first shooting incident at sea since World War II; and
the recently discovered No Dong missile deployment in western North Korea, within range of
Japan.

These actions take on all the more ominous character in light of the Pyongyang’s accusation
Friday that Japan is engaged in “war moves.” As North Korean radio stated, “These [Japanese
bilateral defense] bills are war legislation that will realize the ambition of re-invasion by Japanese
reactionaries, taking advantage of an overseas invasion war scheme of the United States.”
(Presumably, the latter is a reference to the U.S. involvement in Serbia — a development the
North Koreans have in other contexts welcomed as a quagmire that will tie the Americans down
outside of East Asia.)

What is more, the North Korean leadership may be further emboldened by the apparent
triumph
of its patron and ally, Communist China, in penetrating America’s most sensitive nuclear weapons
laboratories. ¹ In short, as things stand now, Japan’s most
serious potential adversaries — North
Korea and China ² — appear emboldened by the regional
“correlation of forces” and will likely
feel even more so as long as Japan and the United States persist in “slow-motion” efforts to
provide the means to defeat the threats posed by Pyongyang’s and Beijing’s ballistic missile
forces.

In fact, despite the imminent threat represented by North Korea’s Taepo Dong-1 and its
follow-on, the Taepo Dong-2 missile system, Japan has still not formally endorsed the
acquisition
and deployment of Theater Missile Defense (TMD) systems. To the contrary, in order
to
accommodate domestic political pressures and Chinese sensitivities, Japan has thus far restricted
its efforts to allocating some $263 million (Y30 billion) in the next five-to-six years to advance
missile development. These funds will be used for cooperative development work on
improvements to the U.S. Navy’s SM-3 missile interceptor being developed for
the Navy
Theater Wide (NTW) program. (Interestingly, until a few months ago, the U.S.
Ballistic
Missile Defense Organization had reportedly not earmarked any funds to permit such
intensified
cooperation with Japan.)

The Bilateral AEGIS Option – The Obvious Choice

Such a program is wholly inadequate, however, given the opportunity — and necessity — for a
more aggressive development and deployment program. After all, Japan currently
has four
AEGIS destroyers — at this point the only other country in the world to have built and deployed
the U.S. fleet air defense system under license. Tokyo plans to procure two more AEGIS ships in
the next Mid-Term Defense Plan.

In addition, the Japanese Navy has acquired seven non-AEGIS destroyers which are equipped
with vertical launch cells that could accommodate the SM 3 missile. Tokyo has plans to purchase
13 more of these vessels by 2010. It should be possible to integrate these ships as additional
“shooters” in the AEGIS missile defense network. Taken together, by 2005, Japan will have six
AEGIS vessels and some 14 other potential launch platforms — equipping America’s most
important ally in East Asia with a more formidable, near-term and affordable missile defense
capability than many believe possible. Japan also has four new 767 AWACS which could be
equipped with an infrared sensors (IRST) to provide early warning of hostile missile launches.

Secretary of Defense Cohen’s visit to Tokyo earlier this year, coming on the heels of the first
TD-
1 test, helped facilitate Japan’s decision to go beyond the studies and limited bilateral cooperation
with the United States that it has undertaken in the missile defense field to date. Will it take a
second, threatening North Korean missile test to catalyze a U.S.-Japanese commitment to begin
constructing at once fully interoperable AEGIS-based missile defenses?

If properly designed — that is optimizing by the initial NTW system (the Block I
configuration) to
give it improved performance capabilities (i.e. a Block II version) — such a system would be
capable of providing comprehensive protection for the Japanese home islands and begin
to
afford protection to the people of the United States, as well (e.g., to the citizens of
Hawaii,
Alaska, the West Coast and Rocky Mountain states). ³
According to a report to Congress
submitted just last week by the Clinton Defense Department concerning “Theater Missile Defense
Architecture Options in the Asia-Pacific Region”:

Two sea-based exo-intercept systems, similar to the NTW Block I and anticipated Block II
systems, were…analyzed. For a NTW Block I-like system, four ship positions would
provide
nearly complete coverage of Japan with substantial shoot-look-shoot opportunities over
much
of Japanese territory. With the faster missile and better kill vehicle typical of the NTW Block
II-like system, which would allow expansion of the engagement volume, an even more efficient
deployment would be possible. One ship position is sufficient to provide full
national
coverage. The interceptor speed would allow this system to provide a shoot-look-shoot
engagements over the central portion of the country.

Importantly, thanks to Japan’s previous and ongoing investment in AEGIS and compatible
systems, the relatively modest cost of modifying/upgrading its existing capabilities would make
this missile defense option affordable even under the severe budget constraints facing a Japanese
economy still struggling with recession.

The Critical Path To Defending Japan and America

Given that there is precious little time left for further debates and studies, the following
represent
politically-achievable steps which can advance substantially this AEGIS-based partnership:

Secure an immediate Government of Japan (GOJ) commitment
to TMD acquisition on
an accelerated basis. This would likely involve overcoming five main obstacles: 1) a
politically tenuous coalition government and Prime Minister (although the latter is reportedly
growing stronger by the day); 2) the perception in Japan that funding missile defense would be
a “bottomless pit”; 3) the view of Japanese opponents that national missile defense is
technically infeasible; 4) concern over vigorous Chinese objections; and 5) arguments which
suggest that TMD acceleration would adversely impact other important defense-related
priorities in Japan.

Obtain a firm funding commitment from the U.S. side to proceed with joint
AEGIS-based missile defenses. Thus far, the Pentagon has only allocated some $20
million to
support bilateral R&D with respect to the SM 3 missile.

Encourage an appropriate role for Japanese industry and anticipate sensitive
technology
transfer issues. As a practical matter, if “critical mass” is to be achieved with respect to
political support in Japan, it will probably be necessary for Japanese industry to be allocated a
significant portion of hardware production and supply. This program would also need to
anticipate and avoid the type of controversial technology transfer issues which plagued the
FSX fighter program.

Overcome the “China lobbies” of both countries which will inevitably seek to derail
joint
missile defense efforts. The issue of whether Taiwan will be defended and a number of
other
sensitivities will likely surface in the process.

Establish a high level bilateral working group to advance the joint AEGIS-based
missile
defense program. Such a political commitment by the respective heads of state will
likely be
required to circumvent bureaucratic and other delays in deploying such a system at the earliest
possible opportunity.

The Bottom Line

Japan’s status as the only country other than the United States in possession of the AEGIS air
defense system makes it America’s natural partner in exploiting this most promising of the
available theater missile defense alternatives. In addition to providing a cost-effective and
near-term theater missile defense capability, a commitment to the U.S.-Japan AEGIS option
would also
go some ways toward dissipating the willingness recently announced by the Japanese government
that it was prepared to consider preemption as a necessary response to emerging threats. It
would be in both the interest of the United States, Japan’s neighbors in East Asia and the
Japanese themselves if defensive measures, rather than presumably preemptive ones,
remain the bedrock of Japan’s security.

Against the backdrop of the reported Chinese acquisition of some 50 years of America’s most
sensitive nuclear weapons legacy codes, both the American and Japanese governments have an
interest in proceeding with the most rapid possible construction of AEGIS-based missile defenses.
For its part, the United States must provide, at once, robust levels of support – well beyond those
currently envisioned – for bilateral research and development with respect to the SM-3 missile and
other key components of this architecture.

The deteriorating regional situation warrants nothing short of a crash program by Tokyo and
Washington to field operational AEGIS-based missile defenses in the next two-to-three years. To
do otherwise, while instead concentrating almost exclusively on bottlenecks in the trade and
financial portfolios – could well mean a near-term cataclysm for Japan and a debilitating setback
to U.S. strategic interests and capabilities in the region.

¹ See the Center’s Decision Briefs entitled
Clinton Legacy Watch # 41: Security Meltdown at
D.O.E. (No. 99-D 48, 26 April 1999) and
Clinton Legacy Watch # 40: A Scandal at the
Department of Energy On His Watch — Grievous Damage Done to Sell the
C.T.B.T. (No. 99-D 38, 23 March 1999).

²For their part, the Chinese military have in recent months conducted
exercises in which missile
attacks on U.S. forces based in Japan were simulated.

³ For a detailed description of such a near-term, global missile
defense system, see “Defending
America: A Plan to Meet the Urgent Missile Threat,” The Heritage Foundation 1999.