Yes on SDI Too

BY: Gary Hoitsma
The Washington Post, April 23, 1991

Opponents of the Strategic Defense Initiative have been scrambling furiously to separate the
program in the public mind from the Patriot’s success in defending against Iraqi Scud missiles.
Former Carter administration defense secretary Harold Brown is among the latest to put forward
the improbable argument that the Patriot success story should actually lead us to the conclusion
that we should now scuttle SDI [“Yes on Patriot, No on SDI,” op-ed, March 27].

While most casual observers have been led to the exact opposite conclusion — namely, that the
development of missile defenses is indeed both feasible and prudent — it has taken some fancy
intellectual footwork to maintain the anti-SDI dogma.

Brown points out, correctly, that the Patriot was not, is not and will not be SDI. He reminds us
that the Patriot was developed and upgraded by the Army independently of the SDI office in the
Pentagon and without the use of SDI funds, management or technology.

All of this is true. But in the context of the continuing debate about the wisdom of going
forward with SDI, the answer to this is very simple: So what? Earlier in this century, it was also
true that the technical success of radio transmission was achieved independently of those working
on television. Should they have therefore given up on TV? Certainly not.

Brown next points out, correctly, that the Patriot is not effective against longer-range,
faster-flying ICBMs, the real targets of SDI. But again, the answer is: So what? Nobody is saying
it is. What SDI supporters are saying is that the Patriot represents progress — important and
significant progress — toward achieving a mission that only a few short years ago many were
saying was technically impossible.

They said you could never hit a bullet with a bullet. Well, now we know we can at least hit a
relatively slow-flying bullet (a Scud) with a bullet of our own (a Patriot). This, in and of itself,
directly contradicts a fundamental pillar of the so-called consensus of those who have said we can
never be adequately protected from ICBM attack.

Brown goes on to point out, again correctly, that the Scud attacks have raised public
consciousness about the growing threats of terrorist and/or accidental ballistic missile attacks.
“Proliferation of . . . missile and nuclear weapon technology in the developing world is indeed a
serious problem,” he says. No argument here. So let’s get on with SDI, right? Wrong, says
Brown.

Why? Because, he says, SDI would not protect us from nuclear weapons delivered by aircraft,
on ships sailed into our harbors or smuggled in crates across our borders — the “far more likely”
means by which a terrorist or other unauthorized attack would come.

But “far more likely” by whose calculation and for how long? What about nonnuclear attacks?
Moreover, each of these means of delivery takes more time and lends itself to other traditional
forms of defense that we fully expect our government to be pursuing — things such as intelligence
gathering and other counterespionage measures.

Finally, Brown sternly warns against any attempt by the United States to abrogate the 1972
ABM Treaty in pursuit of SDI systems. Focusing now strictly on the Soviets (leaving aside, as if
we could, the Third World threat), he argues that a breach of the ABM Treaty would lead to
Soviet countermeasures that would “undermine our deterrent and force us into expensive
responses.” This, in turn, would bring about a “destabilizing” arms race.

So where does Brown leave us? Right where we are and have been: absolutely, completely and
perpetually vulnerable to ballistic missile attack. He wants us to rein in our advancing technology
so that we make no use, or even tests, of promising space-based assets. He recommends that we
keep everything we do on the ground, in research only; that we build a few more Patriots to send
overseas to protect our forward deployed forces; but that we be sure to keep our U.S. mainland
vulnerable.

This seems more like a prescription for disaster than for stability. We can arbitrarily rein in our
SDI technology if we choose, but who is going to rein in the ballistic missile, nuclear, chemical,
and biological weapons technology spreading around the world? The experts, including surely
Brown, will tell us it can be slowed, perhaps by wise policies, but it can’t be stopped. In Iraq’s
primitive and feeble Scud missile attacks, we have gotten a glimpse of the future. We would be
wise to heed its warnings.

The writer was a political appointee in the Reagan administration and currently provides
campaign assistance to Republican candidates.