Defining A US Space Policy: Getting From Here To There

INTRODUCTION

With the establishment of the National Space Council, a tremendous opportunity now exists to consider anew America’s near- and longer-term requirements for space. If successful, this reconsideration could result in: the wholesale reinvigoration of the United States’ space policies and programs; a new organizational approach for their management; and the pursuit of activities compatible with lasting public — and Congressional — support.

The following are recommended by the Center for Security Policy’s Space Working Group as essential elements of the Space Council’s agenda:

POLICY

  • The Council should establish three overarching policy objectives for the United States space program:
    • Assured, advantaged access to space must be the preeminent task for the immediate future.
    •  

    • Extension and expanded exploitation of space must be pursued through the development and deployment of new technology over the near- to medium-term.
    •  

    • Exploration of space and the creation of the requisite infrastructure must be the longer-term goals of America’s space program.
  •  

 

CIVILIAN PROGRAMS

In accordance with these policy priorities, the following programmatic initiatives should be emphasized by the National Space Council:

 

  • NASP
    • This system has the potential to revolutionize America’s access to space, dramatically reducing the costs, risks and inflexibility inherent in current launch capabilities.
    •  

    • NASP also will provide tremendous technological spin-offs of virtually incalculable value to other civilian and military applications.
    •  

    • NASP can provide as well a powerful means of reestablishing U.S. preeminence in space, a leadership position that will restore popular and Congressional support for this vital area of national endeavor.
    •  

    • Obviously, the Defense Department’s reported termination of any DOD role in NASP must be rejected.
    • Instead, NASP should become a high profile, "national" program funded at a level determined by the maturity of the associated technology.
    •  

    • If such a restructuring were effected, the goal of flying a DC-9 size NASP prototype by 1995 could be achievable.
    •  

    • Given robust Japanese and European interest in developing aerospace plane technologies, such a level of effort is absolutely vital if the United States is not to lose its leadership position in this and related fields.
  •  

    Highest priority must be given to the development and operational fielding of the National Aerospace Plane (NASP).

     

     

    The National Space Council should, however, restructure this program, ending its status as a "black" or special access Air Force program, whose development pace is determined by that service’s, at best, parsimonious allocation of funds.

     

     

  • ELVs
    • While NASP has the potential to provide a substantial contribution in this regard, there will be for the foreseeable future a requirement for a diversified, family of reliable, cost-effective Expendable Launch Vehicles (ELVs).
    • Consequently, the effort made over the past few years to reestablish and expand the infrastructure for producing and launching an array of ELVs should continue to receive high priority.
    •  

    • In particular, the program to develop and fly an affordable heavy-lift launch vehicle warrants the strong support of the National Space Council.
  •  

    The urgent national need is for affordable, routine, frequent, flexible — and, where appropriate, manned — access to space.

     

     

    It is a national scandal that America has been denied access to space for an extended period in the recent past; the United States cannot afford to repeat this dangerous situation in the future.

     

     

  • Space Technologies
    • Microminiaturization has the potential to transform such activities as data collection and transmission in space, opening remarkable new possibilities for smaller, less expensive, less vulnerable orbiting assets.
    •  

    • If properly exploited, Lightsats utilizing such technology can vastly increase the utility, survivability, and reconstitutability of both civilian and military satellite systems.
    •  

    • Similarly, direct broadcast satellites have the potential to enhance dramatically U.S. competitiveness in such fields as high definition television (HDTV) and international communications.
  •  

    Concomitant support should be given to technologies that offer the potential of revolutionizing U.S. preeminence in and use of space.

     

     

  • Space Station
    • Instead of moving directly toward the highly sophisticated, enormously expensive Space Station now envisioned by NASA, the Space Council should charter an interim step, one that would offer near-term insights into the challenges of extended missions in space and permit evolutionary progress toward more ambitious structures.
    •  

    • This approach would take advantage of available shuttle-based technology, namely a modified, free-flying SpaceLab.
  •  

    In light of the foregoing policy priorities, a different approach to meeting national needs for manned platforms in space seems in order.

     

     

    The experience gained from such an approach would enable appropriate changes to be made in the configuration, orbit and missions of the Space Station without further postponing the necessary reestablishment of an extended American presence in space.

 

MILITARY PROGRAMS

The genius of the Space Council’s mandate is that it explicitly envisions unified oversight of the civilian and military facets of the U.S. space program. By approaching the related technical, logistical and programmatic aspects of space in a coherent fashion, it should be possible to realize significant economies of scale and to reduce unnecessary, wasteful duplication.

Specific military programs warrant the Space Council’s strong support:

 

  • SDI
  •  

    The Strategic Defense Initiative represents a vital element of the United States’ future security posture. Its strategic benefits will be maximized by the introduction of robust, effective space sensor and weapons elements. The Space Council should strongly encourage the vigorous pursuit and expeditious deployment of such defensive systems.

     

  • ASAT
  •  

    The United States has an urgent requirement to neutralize hostile space satellites and to defend its own. At present, America has no such capability.

    By contrast, the Soviet Union has developed, tested and deployed myriad systems with the inherent ability to attack U.S. assets in space.

    Particularly in the absence of the sort of proliferated, survivable, and rapidly reconstitutable satellite capabilities called for above, the United States is in serious jeopardy of having its peacetime command, control, communications and intelligence system severely degraded in time of crisis or conflict.

 

COMMERCIAL SPACE ACTIVITIES

The National Space Council should also place high priority on the stimulus the federal government can provide to the establishment of healthy and competitive commercial space launch and service industries.

  •  
    • To this end, it should oppose future proposals providing for the launch of American satellites aboard launch vehicles of non-allied nations.
    •  

    • In particular, for commercial and national security reasons, the United States should continue its policy of prohibiting U.S. satellite launches aboard Soviet vehicles.
    •  

    • The Space Council should also seek a fair-pricing agreement with the allied launch services community to assure genuine competition for American companies.
  • The Space Council must, in particular, ensure that a climate is created in which indigenous commercial space launch capabilities can be created and grow.

     

 

U.S.-SOVIET SPACE VENTURES

Both because exploration of space should enjoy lower priority in terms of near- to medium-term demands on U.S. space resources and for sound national security and technology transfer reasons, bilateral space ventures with the Soviets should be kept to a minimum. Specifically, ventures like a joint mission to Mars should be explicitly precluded.

Center for Security Policy

Please Share:

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *