Shia militias to fight for Fallujah, U.S. Backed Forces For Ramadi

Iraqi forces are preparing to face the Islamic State head on, in an attempt to take back Fallujah and Ramadi, two key Iraqi cities IS seized control of through their reign of terror in Iraq. The fight has divided Iraq’s military forces, with Iranian-backed militants taking the lead in Fallujah and US-backed counterterrorism forces setting their eyes on Ramadi. Successfully taking back these cities would be a huge win for Iraqi forces, however each city represents different challenges and poses different significance.

Although the timing of the move on Fallujah remains unknown, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, an Iranian-controlled militia responsible for thousands of attacks on American troops during the Iraq war, insists their operation will be a success. When IS seized Fallujah in January 2014, the seizure came as one of IS’s biggest wins thus far. Fallujah has since become a headquarters for IS leaders. Recently, Iraqi militias have staged attacks against IS in Fallujah, launching rockets into the city. A main motivation for recapturing Fallujah is its close proximity to Baghdad, making a successful re-seizure a huge military and strategic necessity for Iraqi militias. Effectively eliminating IS from Fallujah would enable Iraqi forces to help protect the capital, by cutoffing off main IS supply lines.

Ramadi, which fell to IS in May, also presents its fair share of challenges to Iraqi forces. IS’s capture of Ramadi was a huge loss for the Iraqis, as it is the largest Sunni populated city in Iraq. Additionally, there was a massive symbolic meaning behind their seizure of Ramadi. Throughout the United States’ military presence in Iraq in the early 2000’s, a group of US-funded Sunni militants, known as the Anbar Awakening, held Ramadi as the headquarters of their fight against al-Qaeda in Iraq. However, once the US withdrew its involvement in Iraq, AQI, now IS, set out to take Ramadi, the home of those who opposed them.

Tensions between the two forces are already growing, and Iranian-backed militias attempted to seize a Baghdad ministry building yesterday, before being forced out by Federal Iraqi units.

Questions remain about the likelihood of Iraqi forces retaking the two key cities and to hold them against IS counteroffensive. The Iran-backed militants heading the Fallujah mission, have been accused of war crimes, including their actions following the seizure of the town of Amerli last August, when they set out to “punish” Sunnis they accused of supporting Islamic State. Furthermore, the same Iranian supported militants struggled in forcing IS out of Tikrit, where they faced a significantly smaller number of IS militants. In order to finish the mission, the US had to step in and carry out airstrikes to help drive IS out of the city.

A recapture of Ramadi is also raising concerns, as the same troops that dropped their weapons and fled the city was IS arrived, are supposed to head up the newest operation. Recapturing Ramadi is high on the US priority list, as President Obama explained on Monday; the loss of the city to IS has reportedly motivated the US to speed up its training program of Iraqi forces, although the President did not lay out a timetable for the operation. The US has been closely working with Iraqi forces to develop a plan for Ramadi, including a plan for 6,000 Iraqi troops and police to take the city, and another 5,000 Sunni tribal troops to hold the city after IS is expelled. But training of Iraqi tribal forces has been slow going, and recruiting numbers are low, nowhere near the 5,000 tribal forces needed for the Ramadi operation.

Both operations face potential pitfalls. While motivated, and willing to take casualties, the Shia militia forces will lack advanced U.S. airstrikes, and are likely to advance on Fallujah with a heavy use of less than discriminate artillery. The advancing Shia forces in large measure represent the worst fears of much of Iraq’s Sunni population, and if forced to choose between Shia militias and Islamic State, we may expect to see substantial Sunni numbers siding with IS.

Alternatively, the Ramadi operation is expected to rely heavily on U.S. trained Iraqi, and particularly Sunni tribal forces, who remain willing to fight on behalf of a federal Iraqi government. Yet that preferred force has yet to materialize, as in Syria, where the U.S. has found vetting forces actually worthy of training a next to impossible task. The solution may require finding a suitable political carrot that properly motivates a prospective Sunni force, such as greater political autonomy and independence from Baghdad.

The outcome of fighting in both Ramadi and Fallujah will play a major role in both determining the outcome of the fight against Islamic State in Iraq, but also of what kind of Iraq will exist after Islamic State is expelled.