Information as a Weapon: The PRC’s political warfare strategy

Rising world power China is a study in contrasts.  On one hand, it is a state-controlled capitalist economic powerhouse with global investments and an increasingly wealthy upper class.  On the other, it is a totalitarian police state that has no qualms about massacring its own citizens in the name of preserving order.  Such characteristics should not be seen as contradictory; in fact, Chinese history is replete with examples of dynasties and empires engaged in both internal and external warfare.

Unlike in the west, where politics is often thought of as a debate of ideas leading to the practical need to compromise in order to govern, the contemporary PRC sees politics as form of warfare that the state must be engaged in constantly.  Because the enemies of the revolution are always seeking to undermine it, there is no state of peace.  In this realm, information becomes a tool of war, a weapon that the state should employ with skill and precision.

To achieve this, the PRC has directed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to utilize the resources of the General Political Department and the Central Propaganda Department respectively, to conduct political warfare against the US.  The minimum objective is to reduce America’s competitive advantage in Asia, ultimately leading to our acceptance of the PRC as the dominant power in the region, to the final stage of recognizing China as an equal and eventually dominant world power.

This strategy is implemented via the ‘three warfares’ approved by the CCP’s Central Committee in 2003, according to Dean Cheng from The Heritage Foundation. Consisting of media, legal, and psychological components, the three warfares represent an all-encompassing total method of achieving domination over the enemy.  They are waged simultaneously in both public and private spheres.  For example:

Media: Influencing domestic and international public opinion through mass consumption media platforms to support or remain neutral when China pushes a particular narrative (Chinese sovereignty over the South China Sea being one of many).

Legal: Invoking international legal agreements, treaties, and laws when these suit Chinese interests, as well as the selective use of history to set a precedent (Japanese atrocities committed in WWII used to demonize Japan today, while ignoring the millions of Chinese dead at the hands of the CCP during the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and the Tiananmen Square massacre).

Psychological: The most extensive and most utilized of the three, it aims to confuse, depress, and demoralize the enemy via disinformation, recruitment of elites and notables in society to influence public opinion, agitation and propaganda campaigns in various media, subversion of public order, economic sabotage (ongoing debate over trade barrier and currency manipulation), and aggressive military maneuvers meant to intimidate.

The PRC is a highly elitist society where absolute power is concentrated at the very top, thus, their three warfares strategy is similar in its application.  Picture a pyramid divided in three: at the top are the ‘old friends,’ those drivers of public opinion such as intellectuals, writers, artists, and academics who have been cultivated by the CCP’s propaganda divisions.  In the middle are the ‘influentials’, business leaders, tycoons, politicians, and CEOs who have vast economic and personal interests in China.  They are used to promote laws, treaties, and trade agreements that are favorable to the PRC.  Finally, the bottom rung is composed of the masses, the everyday citizen exposed to friendly Chinese images in movies, TV programs, music, news, and other forms of mass consumption.

No step in the pyramid is more or less important than the other, and each one has a particular tactic. The ‘old friends’ are honored, flattered, and rewarded for their service via endowments, donations to foundations, honorary degrees, and other methods.  The ‘influentials’ are the beneficiaries of official visits, exchanges, trade missions, and joint ventures.  The general public at the bottom is exposed to official and non-official mass media that seeks to amplify or promote an agenda.

One aspect of Chinese political warfare that has garnered considerable criticism among academics are the Confucius Institutes.  Publically promoted by the PRC as cultural exchange centers in the same vein as The British Council, Alliance Française, and Goethe-Institut, Confucius Institutes are typically affiliated with universities, from where new “friends of China” can be identified and developed.  Most college students with at least a passing knowledge of Confucius regard him as a great philosopher; leaving aside the fact that Mao Zedong was openly hostile to Confucianism, the rebranding of Confucius as a prop for the PRC’s agenda at American college campuses is an excellent example of successful psychological warfare.

With approximately 100 locations throughout the US, the CI has been criticized by the American Association of University Professors for “[advancing] a state agenda in the recruitment and control of academic staff, in the choice of curriculum, and in the restriction of debate.”  Controversies at various campuses over subjects deemed off-limits by the PRC (Taiwan, Tibet, Tiananmen Square, Falun Gong, and the Dalai Lama among others) have been reported.

Two points stand out when looking closely at the CI: the contract between it and the American host university, and possible espionage activity.  The non-disclosure clause reads in part “The two parties to the agreement will regard this agreement as a secret document.” It also stipulates that the agreement is to conform to the laws of China and the host country.  Are American public universities receiving state and federal funds in a position to enter into secret agreements with and follow the laws of a foreign government?

As for espionage, unlike the other cultural centers previously mentioned, the CI are almost exclusively located at institutions of higher learning with particular emphasis on ones known for innovation and research (Stanford, UCLA, Rutgers, George Mason, and George Washington Univ. for example).  In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Stanford University professor Dr. Steven Mosher quotes Li Changchun, former CCP Politburo Standing Committee member as saying that the CI are “an important part of China’s overseas propaganda set-up.”

The PRC’s political warfare strategy will succeed when not countered by both American government and private sector.  Mark Stokes of the Project 2049 Institute proposes the following solutions: greater transparency of funding sources for universities, think tanks, and institute that originate in China, highlighting China’s appalling human rights record in all forums, establish a database and annual report on cyber-attacks similar to the State Dept’s list of state sponsors of terrorism, and countering China’s “soft power” ambitions via emphasizing the demographic, economic, and environmental challenges it faces.