7-Eleven cuts off Chavez; it’s about time

Frank Gaffney, Jr. September 28, 2006
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Were it not for his vitriolic speech at the United Nations earlier this month, the problem of Venezuelan dictator Hugo Chavez might have passed unnoticed in Washington. The fifth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, leaks about the war in Iraq, and hurried attempts by Congress to wind up business prior to campaign season had all but obscured the troubling developments in our hemisphere – and our government’s seeming inability to cope with them.

The good news is that the convenience store chain 7-Eleven yesterday announced they were no longer going to support Chavez’s virulent anti-American agenda, by ceasing to sell oil-products at its 2,100 stations from Venezuela’s state-owned company Citgo. This sets the stage for a vigorous effort on the part of the U.S. government to attend to the metastasizing problem of Venezuelan regime’s agenda in the Western hemisphere and beyond.

The Danger Posed by Chavez

Unfortunately, neither the White House nor Congress has offered a strategy to deal with the rising threat to the stability of the Western Hemisphere and to the security of some of our most important energy supplies. That threat, posed by the Venezuelan regime and the Cuban security services that prop it up, has included:

 

  • the dismantling of democratic institutions in Venezuela and the construction of a dictatorship built around the cult of personality of Chavez;

     

  • the overthrow of the democratically elected president of Bolivia and his successor, and their replacement with the Caracas-backed head of the coca growers’ union;

     

  • other subversion in the region that has caused Mexico and Peru to all but break relations with Venezuela;

     

  • open use of oil as a weapon against the United States and its allies;

     

  • systematic alliance-building with all the countries on the State Department’s list of state-sponsors of terrorism, including Iran and North Korea;

     

  • new militarization that includes building factories to manufacture Russian-designed assault rifles, destined to arm pro-Chavez mobs at home and violent groups in other parts of Latin America; and

     

  • an unprecedented buildup of military aircraft supplied by the Russian Sukhoi warplane manufacturer and the French-German-Spanish-Russian EADS aerospace giant.

    Washington has wanted to wish away the Venezuela problem, but the actions of the regime are so alarming that the United States dare not risk ignoring the problem any further.

    Important First Steps

    To its credit, the Bush administration has made some efforts concerning the regime in Caracas. They include:

     

  • Ditching the Jimmy Carter approach. The administration finally did away with its Jimmy Carter approach to Venezuela, which was to let Chavez have his way on the grounds that he was democratically elected, even as the U.S. kept an eye on what Chavez was doing.

     

  • Attempt to stop European sale of military planes. In January, the administration invoked a nonproliferation law to stop the European Defense, Aerospace and Space Company (EADS) from selling its C-295 troop transport aircraft to Caracas, citing the planes’ many American-made components. The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) allow the president to ban foreign sales of military products and services if he deems it in the national interest. ITAR restrictions cover U.S. technology in defense products manufactured abroad, providing the president power to ban the sale of other countries’ military exports if they contain American-made components. EADS has circumvented the restrictions by seeking non-U.S. replacement parts for the C-295s. Administration action might have killed the deal.

     

  • Ban on sale of U.S. replacement parts and services. As Chavez pushed further away from the United States and toward practically any American adversary, the administration imposed a ban on the sale of military parts and services to Venezuela, effectively grounding the regime’s fleet of aging F-16 fighters and C-130 transports. By that time, however, the regime had decided to buy from EADS and Sukhoi of Russia.

     

  • Military embargo. The administration imposed a military embargo on Venezuela and urged other countries to do the same. Sweden, for example, has followed the U.S. lead, but France, Germany, Spain and Russia (the largest owners of EADS) have not.

     

  • Attempt to deny Venezuela a seat on U.N. Security Council. The administration has worked mightily to deny the regime a rotating seat on the United Nations Security Council. However, the State Department has done a poor job of working with other hemispheric countries to deny Caracas the votes. Latin American and Caribbean governments have complained of U.S. clumsiness, short-sightedness, failure to counter vastly more generous offers from Chavez, and failure to support a realistic alternative candidate.

     

  • Curb the tendency to talk loudly while carrying a big stick. The United States blusters too much, especially at the highest levels, but with Venezuela it has generally pursued the right course. The President and Secretary of State have been correct not to let the dictator bait them and thereby increase his prestige and lower theirs. The White House’s recent dismissal of the Venezuelan dictator as a "gnat" is exactly the right approach.

     

  • Increased intelligence priorities. Over the summer the administration created a "mission manager" in the intelligence community to concentrate on Cuba and Venezuela. This is an important step, signifying a high intelligence priority, as the only other country-specific mission managers are for Iran and North Korea.

    What Needs to be Done

    There is much more to do, most of which can be done easily by White House directive and by Congress saying "no" to bailing out Chavez and his friends. Policy recommendations include:

     

  • Issue a Venezuela finding. The President should issue a finding that the U.S. will not allow forces allied with international terrorism to subvert democracy and prop up dictatorships in the Americas.

     

  • Set up an interagency working group on Venezuela. The group should be modeled loosely on the new interagency working groups on Cuba. The "control room" must be in the White House, not the State Department, chaired personally by the Vice President, with the proper National Security Council staffing, budget and authority to ensure that the president’s policies are faithfully executed. A model is the Reagan-era Working Group on Soviet Active Measures.

     

  • Set up a White House working group on Venezuela. The administration should create an informal, bipartisan White House Working Group on Venezuela, comprised of independent policy experts, NGOs, political strategists, public affairs practitioners, intelligence officers, diplomats and others to meet weekly to discuss Venezuela-related issues and how best to address them. This outside group would be similar to the successful White House Task Force on Central America under the Reagan Administration. In addition to helping build a constituency for action against the Venezuelan regime, it would energize outside individuals and groups, help them network with one another and with U.S. officials under White House auspices, permit them to provide straight outside advice on a Venezuela strategy, and serve as a feedback mechanism for administration policies and statements.

     

  • Systematically collect and exploit intelligence on the Venezuelan regime to educate the public at home and abroad. As the Reagan Administration did about the Soviet military buildup and about Soviet bloc expansion into Central America and the Caribbean, the U.S. must systematically collect intelligence on the Venezuelan regime and its leaders, and use that intelligence for public education and public diplomacy purposes. The U.S. has ample opportunity to collect accurate, reliable intelligence about the regime, its leaders, and their ties to terrorism and organized crime, and provide that information to the public on a regular basis.

     

  • Wage intense but low-level political and psychological warfare against the regime. The President should task the intelligence community to collect and analyze information that can be used to educate and influence the international community about the Caracas regime, and to promote operational objectives inside Venezuela. Those objectives include: divide the regime leadership from its followers, divide regime figures against one another (especially over questions of corruption and nepotism), divide patriotic Venezuelans in the military and security services from the thousands of Cuban intelligence and security personnel in the country, support and unify the internal opposition to the regime, and promote a return to democracy. Given its total failure to promote U.S. interests through public diplomacy, and the incompatibility of the mission with the culture of the foreign service, the State Department is the last place to be in charge of such an operation. The White House should coordinate the campaign across the agencies.

     

  • Create a surrogate radio, TV, and Internet media network for Venezuela. While the regime has not crushed the independent press yet, it has imposed severe restrictions that have alarmed the Inter-American Press Association. The U.S. shouldn’t wait until Chavez silences or co-opts the free Venezuelan media. It must create surrogate radio, TV and Internet outlets immediately, modeled after the successful Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty system aimed at the Soviet Union, or after Radio Marti set up for Cuba. The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) has been loath to dedicate resources toward Venezuela programming and has devoted an amount so small as to be useless. The president should stop allowing Clinton appointees to run the BBG, and appoint only BBG board members and staff who support special programming for Venezuela.

     

  • Stop U.S. government subsidy of the Venezuelan regime. The single largest American subsidy of the Chavez regime is the daily hemorrhaging of cash for Venezuelan oil and fuel services. Venezuela’s state-owned oil company, PDVSA, is 100 percent owner of the Tulsa-based CITGO oil company. By purchasing CITGO products, U.S. government agencies are diverting taxpayer dollars to the Chavez regime. Therefore the U.S. should bar any government agency or contractor from purchasing CITGO products effective immediately.

     

  • Prepare pre-emptive and retaliatory economic action in event of oil crisis. The administration should draft emergency plans to seize all of CITGO’s assets and sell them to American oil companies. Because CITGO is not private property but a foreign state-owned enterprise, property rights are not an issue. The plans should include using the proceeds to reimburse American companies cheated and otherwise victimized by the regime, finance efforts to help Venezuelans restore democracy in their country, cover expenses to clean up after Chavez in Venezuela and other countries, and reimburse regime victims. The plans should ensure that the innocent individual American service station franchises would not be adversely affected.

     

  • Show other countries that there is a price to be paid for helping to arm the Venezuelan regime. EADS CASA, the French-German-Spanish-Russian aerospace company, has gone out of its way to ignore repeated U.S. requests not to sell C-295 military aircraft to Caracas. The company has circumvented the U.S. nonproliferation law and willfully broken the U.S. arms embargo against Venezuela. It has also misled Congress about the nature of the Venezuela deal. EADS CASA planned to recoup any losses incurred in its Venezuela sale by getting Congress to buy the C-295 for the new Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) program. Therefore, Congress and the Administration must declare that the U.S. will not purchase any EADS CASA aircraft until the Chavez regime is gone. That means removing the EADS CASA C-295 from consideration in the JCA program and removing funding for purchase of the aircraft by the Coast Guard Deepwater program.

     

  • Work with other governments in the region. The U.S. has more potential allies down there than it realizes. Many governments, even those on the Left, are fearful of the Venezuelan regime and what it means for them. The Chavez style of subversive and violent revolution is a threat to the legitimacy of the democratic Left in the region. The Caracas-backed regime in Bolivia overstepped when it confiscated property and breached energy contracts with Argentina, Brazil and Spain – all governed by leftist politicians who are divided between their softness toward anti-U.S. rhetoric and action, and the trampling of their own business interests. As we predicted in our 2005 paper, "What to Do About Venezuela," Latin American leaders are getting sick of Chavez and his antics. It is quite possible for him to self-destruct – but not without American help.

    The Bottom Line

    Undoubtedly, the danger posed by the Venezuelan regime is real and growing. Steps like those described above must be adopted without further delay if the United States is to retain influence in its own backyard.

    • Frank Gaffney, Jr.
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