Clinton, Albright Pursue Delusory Arms Control Response To South Asian Nuclear Tests; Center’s Gaffney Offers Alternative

(Washington, D.C.): Yesterday, President Clinton used a Rose Garden ceremony to launch
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright on a diplomatic damage-limitation mission to Geneva that
is doomed to fail. She is meeting there today with her Chinese, Russian, French and British
counterparts in the hope of fashioning a common response to the recent Indian and Pakistani
nuclear tests. Unfortunately, the relevant Clinton Administration policies are so
hopelessly
out of touch with reality that the best that can be hoped for from this conclave is gridlock —
and that Congress will provide needed adult supervision and course
corrections. In a
“commentary” aired last night on National Public Radio’s “All Things Considered” program, the
Center for Security Policy’s Frank J. Gaffney, Jr. offered suggestions as to
what a more prudent
and realistic policy should entail. (See the attached transcript.)

Policy Disconnected from Reality

In remarks riddled with fatuous statements, the President and Secretary of State yesterday
reasserted their contention that more arms control was the appropriate response to the
nuclear tests in South Asia. Consider, for example, the following:

• President Clinton: “The present situation in South Asia makes it all the more important that
  the Senate debate and vote on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty without delay. The CTBT
  will strengthen our ability to detect and to deter testing. If we’re calling on other nations to
  act responsibly, America must set the example.”

There are several problems with this statement. The recent tests actually
demonstrate the utter irrelevance of international bans to nations which believe
that the prohibited activity is essential to their security. And it is hard to argue that the
United States has not set an example: For the past six years, it has unilaterally
refrained from all nuclear testing. The U.S. hardly needs to be permanently prevented
from doing so in the future to establish that its behavior is inconsequential to others
determined to obtain and retain nuclear weapons.

• Secretary Albright: “Our message to India and Pakistan must be that there should be no
  further nuclear testing; no deployment or testing of missiles; no more inflammatory rhetoric;
  and no more provocative military activity …. We will also be urging India and Pakistan to sign
  the CTBT now and without conditions; to stop producing fissile material; and to agree on a
  process for regional arms control.”

The reality is that both India and Pakistan were nuclear weapon states
before
they conducted the recent series of tests; they will certainly continue to be nuclear
weapon states hereafter, whether they continue testing or agree to forego it. Whether
either nation accedes to Mrs. Albright’s condescending and juvenile admonition to
“cool it,” one thing seems certain: Neither is likely to forego the further testing and
deployment of ballistic missiles unless the United States takes steps to make such
actions unjustifiable expenditures. Arms control and moral suasion will not have
that effect; only the deployment of effective, global anti-missile defenses can
accomplish such a salutary non-proliferation result.

• Secretary Albright: “The NPT will not be amended to accommodate either [India or
  Pakistan].”

It is hard to imagine a more sure-fire formula for making the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) even less relevant to the task of curbing proliferation
than by pretending there are still only five nuclear weapon states. If the Indian
and Pakistani nuclear tests did nothing else, they served as a “coming-out party” for the
testing nations that cannot be — and is not being — ignored. The Secretary’s stance is
clearly unsustainable and may not even survive today’s meeting.

• Secretary Albright: “We will affirm our resolve to bolster the global non-proliferation
  regime.
  And this means taking steps to discourage other countries from following the disastrous
  example set by India and Pakistan. And in addition, as President Clinton has just indicated, for
  the United States, this means urging the Senate very strongly to approve the CTBT. If we
  want India and Pakistan to stop testing and keep others from starting, this is the most basic,
  minimal, obvious step we can take. On this critical issue at this perilous time, American
  leadership should be unambiguous, decisive and clear.”

American leadership has been anything but “unambiguous, decisive and clear.” To the
contrary, what passes for “American leadership” under President Clinton has
generally been muddled, feckless and unconvincing to international interlocutors.
This perception will only grow if the United States persists in trying to argue that
denuclearization is the answer to the world’s most serious proliferation problem. The
only country the Clinton Administration can actually, assuredly put out of the nuclear
weapons business is the U.S. — and it is well on its way to doing so, thanks to its
refusal to conduct periodic nuclear tests and other initiatives that are undermining the
safety, reliability and credibility of the American deterrent.⁽¹⁾
More sensible and
responsible figures in Congress recognize that such disarmament by this country is
neither consistent with the Nation’s long-term security interests nor conducive to
“devaluing” nuclear arms in the eyes of other nations.⁽²⁾

The China Card

Even more laughable is the assertion by the President and Secretary of State that the Indian
and
Pakistani nuclear tests demonstrate the validity of their policy of “engaging” China. As Mr.
Clinton put it:

“Let me now express my appreciation to China for chairing the P-5 meeting to which
Secretary Albright is going. This is further evidence of the important role China
can play in meeting the challenges of the 21st century and the constructive
Chinese leadership that will be essential to the long-term resolutions of issues
involving South Asia. This is an important example of how our engagement with
China serves America’s interests — stability in Asia, preventing the spread of weapons
of mass destruction, combating international crime and drug trafficking, protecting the
environment.”

This is like using the occasion of National Fire Safety Week to pay protection
money
to an arsonist. Arguably, China bears the greatest responsibility of all for India’s pursuit
of
nuclear weapons; the People’s Liberation Army’s aggressive military build-up and its increasingly
offensive posture in regions “encircling” India — notably, Tibet, Pakistan, Burma and the Indian
Ocean — was cited by the Indian Defense Minister before the recent Indian tests as his country’s
“number one” threat. Indisputably, the PRC is the enabler of Pakistan’s nuclear program.
It is
absolutely surreal to construe Beijing as a reliable partner for U.S. non-proliferation
policy.⁽³⁾

These facts are, of course, inconvenient for an Administration that used yesterday’s Rose
Garden
ceremony to announce the President’s extension of Most Favored Nation status. As it happens,
the claim that China is behaving responsibly on proliferation is approximately as out of touch with
reality as the contention that engagement is ameliorating the human rights situation in the PRC —
a claim the President nonetheless made once again in the Rose Garden yesterday:

“…There have clearly been some concrete results as a result of this engagement as
well. Trade is also an important part of our relationship with China. Our exports have
tripled over the last decade and now support over 170,000 American jobs. But just as
important, trade is a force for change in China, exposing China to our ideas and
our ideals, and integrating China into the global economy.”

For a helpfully contrasting view of just how little is changing in China in
these regards, see
an important op.ed. article in today’s Wall Street Journal by Han Dongfang, a labor
leader
involved in the Tiananmen Square demonstrations — whose bloody suppression occurred nine
years ago today. (Presumably, the Administration decided to announce the extension of MFN
yesterday, rather than on the actual anniversary, to demonstrate its sensitivity to those
appalled
that the President will defile the memory of that massacre’s victims during his upcoming visit to
Beijing.) Particularly noteworthy were Mr. Han’s observations that:

“There is freedom to make money [in today’s China]. Yet, this kind of freedom
has
done nothing to stop the persecution of those who seek democracy and public
discussion. This approach of granting the freedom to do business, while continuing to
deny the freedom to speak, is pushing Chinese society onto dangerous ground.

“The government has time and again refused to establish the rule of
law,
allowing the tentacles of corruption to invade almost all fields of economic and
governmental activity. It is no exaggeration to say that in today’s China the vast
majority of economic activity has an illegal component, which most government
officials either ignore or directly benefit from.”

The Bottom Line

Today’s meetings in Geneva and the debate about the Clinton Administration’s policies
towards
Communist China — a debate that will only intensify as the President’s visit to the PRC,
congressional consideration of his request for renewal of MFN status and myriad investigations
into his transfers of militarily relevant technologies to the PLA move forward — demand
fresh
thinking. The recommendations advanced by Mr. Gaffney in the attachment would be a
good
place to start.

– 30 –

1. See the following Center Decision Briefs:
Clinton Legacy Watch # 14: A Doctrine for
Denuclearization (No. 97-D 190, 8
December 1997); Warning to the Nuclear Labs: Don’t
Count on ‘Stockpile Stewardship’ to Maintain Either Overhead Or Confidence ( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=97-D_183″>No. 97-D 183,
1 December 1997); First Blood on CTB: Bush, Schlesinger, Barker Make
Compelling Case for
Continued Nuclear Testing (No. 97-D 160,
28 October 1997); and Corporate Memory: Nuclear
Scientist Provides Welcome Insights Into Reasons for Rejecting a Comprehensive Test
Ban
(No. 97-D 152, 14 October 1997).

2. See Needed: A ‘Loyal Opposition’ to Clinton’s
Anti-Nuclear Policy (No. 98-D 96, 1 June
1998).

3. Indeed, as reported in today’s Washington Times, there
is evidence that China is even now
fueling tensions on the sub-continent by shipping metals and electronics to Pakistan to aid in the
production of anti-tank missiles. There are also press reports suggesting that China’s contempt
for negotiated curbs on weapons of mass destruction technologies extends to Iran — a country
that may also be corroborating with Pakistan to acquire its own “Islamic bomb.” The London
Daily Telegraph revealed on 24 May that China transferred to Iran 500 tons of
phosphorus
pentsulphide — a primary component in the production of lethal chemical weapons agents such as
VX — in yet another violation of the new Chemical Weapons Convention.