Clinton’s Huffing-And-Puffing On Iraq — But Lack Of A Coherent Strategy — Looks Like A Formula For Disaster

(Washington, D.C.): For seven years, the Center for Security Policy has been arguing that the
object of American policy toward Iraq — and the purpose of any military and other actions taken
against that nation — must be to bring about the removal of Saddam Hussein from
power.⁽¹⁾
For seven years, first the Bush Administration and then the Clinton Administration have tried
various alternative approaches focused primarily on containing Saddam.

What’s the Point?

Through much of this period, the U.S. government has sent conflicting — or at least
alternating —
signals about whether the Iraqi despot’s overthrow or demise were desirable, or whether it would
be enough if he complied fully with the various UN resolutions adopted at the end of (or
subsequent to) Operation Desert Storm. This ambivalence, not to say incoherence, has
contributed greatly to the present crisis. It has also undermined the confidence of regional
partners in America’s leadership and their willingness to support further U.S. military strikes.

The Clinton Administration is much given, nonetheless, to bragging about all that has been
accomplished during the intervening seven years. Its representatives, from the President on down,
repeat the mantra served up at today’s press briefing by State Department spokesman Jamie
Rubin: “The UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) has destroyed more weapons of mass
destruction than were destroyed in the Gulf War.”

Unfortunately, this misses the point entirely. Even if every
single Iraqi chemical weapon,
biological weapon and nuclear weapon-component and ballistic missile delivery system were
actually ferreted out and destroyed, it is absolutely predictable that this would be a very ephemeral
situation. As long as Saddam Hussein remains in power — and particularly once he gains
renewed access to Iraq’s petrodollar-earning potential — he will see to it that the Iraqi
scientists who know how to produce such weapons are assigned to rebuild these
capabilities.

A Growing Chorus

Consequently, it is now clear to leading Members of Congress, key allies and,
according to a
front-page article in today’s Washington Times, that the U.S. military must design its
next
military operation for the purpose of removing Saddam Hussein from power.

Congress:

House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-GA) said today: “We have to
adopt a position that
[Saddam] will either agree to unlimited UN inspections or we will have to replace him with a
regime that will agree to end this kind of (weapons) program.” According to Reuters, “when
asked if he was proposing that a U.S. military attack should aim to replace the Iraqi government,
Gingrich said: ‘This is a real problem that requires a real solution. And incremental timidity,
which only punishes Saddam [but] leaves him in place to build the weapons, is a defeat, not a
success.'”

Meanwhile, the Washington Times reported that:

“Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, Mississippi Republican,
[yesterday] called for
decisive military action that would wipe out not only Saddam’s weapons
stockpile, but the Iraqi leader himself. ‘If we’re going to do this, let’s go all the
way,’ he said. ‘Until we get [Saddam] out of Iraq, we’re never going to get this
situation under control,’ Mr. Lott said, adding that if the proper steps are taken,
‘Let’s hit ’em hard, right up front.'”

“Mr. Lott, whose comments on Iraq came as a surprise to some senators, added
that the United States must have a clear ‘end game’ and that it would make no
sense to put Saddam ‘back in his cage and then have him back out in six
months.'”

Regional Allies:

The Washington Times also reported today on the
results of Madeleine Albright’s
whirlwind tour of the Middle East. It said, in part:

“Saudi Arabia’s leaders are concerned that sentiment for the Iraqi people is so strong in
their own country that a sustained U.S. bombing campaign will provoke a fierce
anti-Western backlash, Middle East intelligence sources said yesterday. That fear
appears to lie behind the reluctance of the Saudis to offer more support to Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright, who was in Riyadh yesterday explaining the reasons behind
planned U.S. air strikes on Baghdad.

“‘For the first day of an air bombardment, everything will be quiet’ in Saudi
Arabia, one intelligence source said. ‘And maybe the second day, too.’ But the
Saudis and other Arab governments have serious concerns that there may be
massive demonstrations of popular support for Saddam if the air attack is a long
and sustained one….

“The Saudi press, which usually reflects official views, strongly
opposes air
strikes that could cause civilian casualties in Iraq. Articles argue that the
United States should try to ‘surgically’ kill Saddam himself….Why don’t they
consider getting rid of President Saddam Hussein through means that will cost the
Iraqi people the least in terms of suffering?” the Al-Riyadh newspaper asked
yesterday.” (Emphasis added.)

The U.S. Military:

The uniformed military senses that the Clinton Administration is seeking to circumscribe
any
future military operation against Iraq in a manner that is frighteningly reminiscent of the
Johnson/McNamara-micro-management of bombing strikes against North Vietnam that
contributed to the U.S. defeat in that conflict. According to this morning’s Washington
Times:

“The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are angry with a White House-designed
bombing campaign against Iraq because it does not target Saddam Hussein’s security
forces or his top aides. Instead, cruise missiles and bombs will be primarily targeted at
military facilities and sites known or suspected of holding nuclear, biological or
chemical weapons components, during a three-day campaign, according to senior
military officials. ‘The White House is only interested in putting on a show,’ said a
disgruntled military source.”

“‘This is turning into a political, not a military, option,’ said one of
several senior military officials who spoke to The Times. ‘This is not a
political and military effort that has a strategy. All it is is a list of targets
trying to be forced into something they claim is a strategy.'”

‘We Don’t Talk to the Military’

With the sort of contemptuous condescension that has frequently characterized the Clinton
Administration’s attitude toward the armed forces — and others who dare challenge its
stewardship of U.S. national security, Jamie Rubin dismissed the growing chorus for a different
strategy towards Iraq:

“…I say to those people…that when you’re outside of government it’s always
nice
to write articles about what can be easily done. When you’re in government and
you’re responsible for policies, you deal with the way the world really works. And
our view is that the President and the Secretary [of State] and the Secretary of Defense
are focused on the national security concern that faces the world. And that is the
prospect of a Saddam Hussein with weapons of mass destruction threatening his
neighbors and threatening the world. And our policy and our actions, whether
diplomatic or otherwise, are focused on meeting that national security threat, and that
is thwarting Iraq’s capacity to develop and use weapons of mass destruction and to
limit his ability to threaten his neighbors.”

“So these same critics who would have had us — who made the same argument
that as long as Saddam Hussein is there, you’re never going to be able to deal
with the weapons of mass destruction threat need to take into account that
UNSCOM has done a superb job and destroyed more weapons of mass
destruction than were destroyed in the Gulf War, when the opportunity for other
measures might have existed. But that’s a long, long time ago. And we’re
focused on the problem that faces the nation and the world, and that is this
weapons of mass destruction threat.”

The Bottom Line

In truth, the critics are right. Using U.S. military power for the purpose of liberating the
people
of Iraq is at least as feasible — and far more therapeutic — a strategy than trying to destroy
some
of Saddam’s concealed weapons of mass destruction and hope that by so doing he will allow us,
at last, to find the rest of them with renewed inspections.

The reality is that the next American-led military action against Iraq may be the last
one in
which we enjoy the initiative. The Russian parliament has adopted a resolution urging
that the
Yeltsin government end its participation in the embargo if an attack is launched. Yeltsin himself,
in the latest of his increasingly erratic pronouncements, said today that such a strike could “lead to
world war.”⁽²⁾ If allied nations can barely bring themselves
to offer tepid support for Mrs.
Albright’s current appeals, they assuredly will decline to do so if Saddam once again survives an
American attack to become a still greater threat. And, let there be no doubt: If Saddam is not
stopped, he will, in due course, acquire sufficient WMD capabilities certainly to deter further
coalition action against him, and perhaps even unilateral U.S. strikes.

Accordingly, the United States must, at long last, use its military power — principally
an air
campaign — to disrupt, if not permanently to destroy, Saddam Hussein’s police state
apparatus. It must accompany this step with the formal recognition of the broadly based
opposition Iraqi National Congress as a provisional government. America must provide
the
provisional government with frozen assets claimed by Saddam’s regime and broadcasting
capabilities to enable it to aid, communicate with and empower the Iraqi people so as to bring
about the early, permanent overthrow of Saddam and his brutal regime. Such a course of action
offers the only hope for an Iraq that is a contributor to regional peace and stability and a nation
truly free of dangerous weapons of mass destruction.

– 30 –

1. See, for example, the following Center products:
Take Out Saddam (No. 97-D
168, 10
November 1997); Unfinished Business: Christopher, Perry Depart But Saddam
Abides — Will
‘Clinton II’ Finally Put Him Out of Business? ( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=96-T_111″>No. 96-T 111, 8 November 1996); Overdue,
Underdone: What the Air Strikes on Iraq Should Have Been About, But Weren’t
(No. 93-D 06,
13 January 1993); Getting Saddam: The Most Important Foreign Policy Initiative
in the ‘State
of the Union’ Address (No. 92-D 10, 26
January 1992); and On to Baghdad! Liberate Iraq ( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=91-P_16″>No.
91-P 16, 27 February 1991).

2. The State Department’s spokesman desperately grasped at the
straw offered by Yeltsin’s
damage-limitation officer, Sergei Yastrzhembsky, who claimed that American reporters had
mis-translated the Russian President’s remarks. Jamie Rubin blithely responded that: “We have a
very strong and constructive relationship with Russia. The two Presidents are frequently in touch.
Their relationship is strong. Secretary Albright and Foreign Minister Primakov talked at length
about Iraq, and this was not a major part of their conversation.” Others who are less
romantic
about — or who have less of a personal investment in — the U.S.-Russian “relationship” than
Rubin and Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott have a far more accurate “real world” view
about the Kremlin’s machinations on Iraq in general and Primakov’s in particular.