Death Throes of the C.T.B.? As George Will Demonstrates, Claims for Test Ban Become Ever more Contorted, Untenable

(Washington, D.C.): In today’s Washington Times, a proponent of the
Comprehensive Test Ban
(CTB) Treaty makes what may be the most convoluted arguments yet heard on behalf of this
negotiated leap of faith. The case offered in an op.ed. article by Brookings Institution fellow
Michael O’Hanlon entitled “Why We Need A Test Ban Treaty” is all the more
pathetic when
contrasted with the attached, withering critique of the CTB —
and the fatuous Clinton
Administration policy that gave rise to it — by one of the Nation’s premier syndicated columnists,
George F. Will.

Damning With Faint Praise

In his essay, O’Hanlon makes the following rather remarkable, if unintended, admissions about
the
CTB’s shortcomings in light of Indian and Pakistani tests, events that have shown this treaty to be
irrelevant to the goal of curbing nuclear proliferation⁽¹⁾
(emphasis added throughout):

“…Nuclear weapons are hard to make, but not that
hard….Basically, once you have the
material, it is not too hard to build ‘fission’ bombs and compress the uranium or
plutonium sufficiently to begin a chain reaction that produces an explosion equivalent in
force to several tons of TNT — enough to destroy everything within a mile or two of ground
zero.”

Put simply, O’Hanlon is conceding here that the CTB will not stop proliferation
of
atomic weapons. The test ban, however, was specifically drafted to stop
the
underground testing of devices of any kind — whether atomic or thermonuclear — that
produce any level of yield whatsoever.

Later on in his article, though, O’Hanlon actually says: “There is admittedly some small
chance that…countries [other than the United States] could test advanced thermonuclear
devices under a CTB Treaty without getting caught.” He confides, parenthetically,
that
“Technically speaking, they could not test a large fusion weapon without that being
detected,
but they might be able to certify that the critical tritium ‘boosting’ process worked
properly.”

In other words, even new thermonuclear weapons could be validated by
those
determined to cheat on a CTB.

O’Hanlon nonetheless contends that “The reason [for “bothering” with the CTB Treaty] has
to
do not with basic fission bombs but with more powerful devices, particularly those fusion or
‘thermonuclear’ weapons that might be deployed on missiles. To be powerful yet also
lightweight enough to be carried by missile, they must be built with small margins for
error.”

More grasping at straws. The Indian and Pakistani tests demonstrated that both
nations already had weapons that could be delivered by aircraft. Since Pakistan at least
accomplished this feat without apparently conducting nuclear tests (albeit with a lot of
help from Communist China), it is apparent that useable atomic capabilities can be
obtained even in the absence of testing. Hence, the new-found focus on missile threats.

While it is correct to worry most about these fast-flying weapon systems —
and,
therefore, to focus U.S. energies on deploying global missile defenses that
could prevent such weapons from being used⁽²⁾ — there is no
obvious basis for
O’Hanlon’s claim that relatively crude, boosted nuclear weapons cannot be
fashioned and deployed aboard missiles without prior testing. This is especially
true in instances where close relations with nuclear powers (in India’s case, the
former Soviet Union; in Pakistan’s, the PRC) may have enabled the transfer of
technology, if not the outright purchase of proven nuclear designs.

In fact, later in his piece, O’Hanlon explicitly concedes this point. In discussing U.S. nuclear
options in a no-test environment, he blithely declares: “…If we someday lost confidence in
existing warhead types…we could build high-reliability devices without the benefit of an
additional test program. They might not be as advanced as today’s but they could
nevertheless be simple thermonuclear weapons many times as powerful as the Hiroshima
and
Nagasaki bombs (and the recent Indian and Pakistani tests). We would not be able to deliver
as many of these heavier warheads with a given set of bombers and missiles. But we could
certainly wreak unimaginable havoc against a foreign country or its military forces….”

No one outside the countries in question can say for sure whether India — which is
believed to have recently tested a thermonuclear device — or Pakistan have actually
deployed such weapons on the ballistic missiles they have in hand. But the idea that
the
CTB will prevent this step elsewhere is preposterous, particularly if nuclear wannabes
are able and willing to trade-off missile range for additional payload weight and
volume.

Next, O’Hanlon admits what most CTB enthusiasts chose to conceal: “The
reliability of our
own [nuclear] arsenal could someday be degraded as a result of the CTB
Treaty.”

Even if O’Hanlon were right that the reliability of the U.S. deterrent “could
someday be
degraded”
— in fact, such degradation is a virtual certainty href=”#N_3_”>⁽³⁾ — this prospect alone should
justify the United States Senate’s rejection of this treaty that will after all prove
ineffectual in curbing nuclear proliferation.

O’Hanlon goes on to cite several indisputable facts as though they support a completely
untenable conclusion: “[The U.S. arsenal] will remain both bigger and better than that of any
fledgling nuclear power. We possess multiple types of thermonuclear warheads that have all
been well tested, a wealth of experimental facilities for keeping tabs on the condition of the
warheads and the ability to remake these warheads nearly exactly to their
original
specifications to counter the effects of aging.”

The truth is that all the kings’ current warhead types, past testing and experimental
facilities will not enable the United States to be sure that remanufactured weapons will
perform as specified unless they are actually tested. For example, materials that went
into some original designs are now known to be carcinogenic and cannot be utilized;
components of some older weapons are no longer available. And, most importantly,
when one is talking about exceedingly sophisticated and complex machines like
thermonuclear devices now in the U.S. arsenal, it is not enough that the replacements
be “nearly exactly” the same as the originals. Whatever is changed could make the
difference between a weapon that works and one that does not and again,
without testing those responsible may not know which case applies.

Suffice it to say that O’Hanlon is no more persuasive when he
summarizes his points by
declaring that (despite the foregoing) the CTB Treaty will represent “a major step forward” and
“will seriously check the nuclear aspirations of other countries without placing the core of the
[U.S.] nuclear deterrent at risk.” As even his own admissions make clear, this treaty will be
unverifiable, ineffectual with respect to proliferation and an impediment to the maintenance of an
effective, safe and reliable American nuclear arsenal. Some step forward.

Enter George Will

In one of his most intellectually formidable and timely columns in recent
memory, George Will
eloquently shreds the underlying premises of the Comprehensive Test Ban. Particularly
noteworthy are the following passages (emphasis added):

even more futile ritual

the superstition of
arms
control,

The designation
‘superstition’ fits because the faith of believers in arms control is more than
impervious to evidence; their faith is strengthened even by evidence that actually
refutes it.

“Far from demonstrating the urgency of ratification, India’s and Pakistan’s
tests demonstrate the CTBT’s irrelevance. India had not tested since 1974.
Pakistan evidently had never tested. Yet both had sufficient stockpiles to perform
multiple tests. So the tests did not create new sabers, they were the rattling of
sabers known to have existed for years….

“The [Clinton] Administration would defend the nation with parchment —
gestures like the CTBT, which is a distillation of liberalism’s foreign policy
of let’s pretend. Let’s pretend that if we forever forswear tests, other nations’
admiration will move them to emulation. Diagnostic tests are indispensable for
maintaining the safety and reliability of the aging U.S. deterrent inventory. So the
CTBT is a recipe for slow-motion denuclearization. But let’s pretend that if
we become weaker, other nations will not want to become stronger.

“Seeking a safer world by means of a weaker America, and seeking to make
America safe behind the parchment walls of arms control agreements, is to start
the 21st century by repeating the worst fallacies of the 20th century.”

The Bottom Line

Amen.

– 30 –

1. See the Center’s Decision
Briefs entitled Clinton, Albright Pursue Delusory Arms Control
Response To South
Asian Nuclear Tests; Center’s Gaffney Offers Alternative ( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=98-D_98″>No. 98-D 98, 4 June 1998) and Needed: A ‘Loyal
Opposition’ to Clinton’s Anti-Nuclear Policy (No. 98-D
96, 1 June 1998).

2. Interestingly, in his previous incarnation as an analyst in the
Congressional Budget Office,
O’Hanlon routinely deprecated the value of U.S. missile defenses and generally projected the
costs associated with developing and fielding them to be staggeringly high.

3. For evidence of this reality, see the following Center
Decision Briefs: Clinton Legacy Watch
# 14: A Doctrine for Denuclearization (No.
97-D 190, 8 December 1997); Warning to the
Nuclear Labs: Don’t Count on ‘Stockpile Stewardship’ to Maintain Either Overhead Or
Confidence (No. 97-D 183, 1 December
1997); First Blood on CTB: Bush, Schlesinger,
Barker Make Compelling Case for Continued Nuclear Testing ( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=97-D_160″>No. 97-D 160, 28 October
1997); and Corporate Memory: Nuclear Scientist Provides Welcome Insights Into
Reasons for
Rejecting a Comprehensive Test Ban (No. 97-D
152, 14 October 1997). Particularly
noteworthy was a finding reported to Congress by President Bush on his last full day in office
which concluded:

“…The Administration has concluded that it is not possible to develop a test
program within the
constraints of Public Law 102-377 that would be fiscally, militarily and technically responsible.
The requirement to maintain and improve the safety of U.S. forces necessitates
continued
nuclear testing for those purposes, albeit at a modest level, for the foreseeable future.
The
Administration strongly urges the Congress to modify this legislation urgently, in order to permit
the minimum number and kind of underground nuclear tests that the United States requires —
regardless of the action of other states — to retain safe and reliable, although
dramatically
reduced, nuclear deterrent forces.”