Flash: Senator Leahy Opposes Landmine Arms Control Treaty

(Washington, D.C.): Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) — who takes pride in
being the Senate’s
most zealous champion of international efforts to limit the humanitarian damage caused by
anti-personnel landmines (APLs) — is in a bizarre position at the moment: At this
writing, he is
singlehandedly preventing the United States from ratifying an amendment to the
Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) that might save innocent civilian lives by
banning the use of certain types of landmines and establishing rules of war governing the
employment of other APLs.

Apparently, the reason for Sen. Leahy’s opposition to the present APL arms control
agreement is that it is too consistent with the battlefield requirements and operational
practices of the U.S. armed forces.
His hope seems to be that, if he can scuttle the
Amended
Mines Protocol to the CCW in its present form, a new treaty will emerge in its stead
more like the
Anti-Personnel Landmine ban signed in Ottawa in December 1997 — a treaty that is neither
verifiable, effective, nor in the interests of the United States
. href=”#N_1_”>(1)

The Amended Mines Protocol

The CCW’s Amended Mines Protocol attempts to reduce the humanitarian carnage inflicted
on
civilian populations by anti-personnel landmines in two ways: 1) by prohibiting the use of APLs
the U.S. military does not use (i.e., those designed to be undetectable or to explode when
mine-detection equipment is the area) and 2) by imposing restrictions on APL- use consistent with
the
standard operating procedures of the American armed forces.

The latter include limits on employment of long duration mines — which are solely responsible
for
the humanitarian problems posed by the use of these weapons. Areas in which they are deployed
must be marked and monitored so as to create a static and closely-controlled environment,
minimizing if not precluding civilian causalities. In addition, the Protocol prohibits the export of
landmines to countries which have not committed to observe the obligations of the Protocol.
These requirements will, if observed by other states, help bring their militaries up to the standards
of conduct observed by the United States.

To Sen. Leahy’s evident displeasure, however, the Amended Mines Protocol does
not preclude
the responsible use of short duration (so called “smart”) landmines.
These mines, which
are
designed to self-deactivate or self-destruct within hours or at most a few days of their
employment, pose minimal risk to noncombatants. Their use is, moreover, judged by
present
and retired military commanders to be essential to the safety and combat effectiveness of
U.S. ground forces.
(2)

Compare and Contrast with the Ottawa Landmine Ban

In a report issued on 10 October 1998 after the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted
14-4
to approve the Amended Mine Protocol, the majority wrote inter alia:

  • “The [Ottawa] Convention served unique political purposes, rather than humanitarian needs.
    It was negotiated without any serious consideration to security concerns.
    Indeed, few
    delegations had military representatives at all. It also was negotiated in a forum with large
    numbers of non-governmental organizations protesting aspects of the U.S. negotiating position
    and otherwise criticizing the United States as being part of the land mine problem. href=”#N_3_”>(3)
    Additionally, a number of small countries such as the Seychelles, funded and emboldened by
    the various activist organization, repeatedly sought to embarrass the United States. It was, in
    short, an environment where serious consideration of national security issues could not
    occur.”
  • “The result is that the Ottawa Convention is a poorly-conceived, poorly-drafted document
    which fails to take into account any of the security concerns of the United States or its closest
    allies.”
  • “If other countries adhere to the Amended Mines Protocol, its technical limitations will make
    a
    substantial contribution to international efforts to reduce death and injury resulting from
    long-duration land-mine use. Indeed, if the Protocol had been in force and fully observed for the
    past thirty years, there would be little or no humanitarian APL problem today for the world’s
    remaining unexploded mines. The Committee recognizes that the Protocols’s specification,
    including the original concept of de-activation, were created by the United States and regards
    this as cause for particular commendation.”
  • “By restricting the use of long-duration APL while allowing full military use of
    short-duration
    APL, the Protocol strikes an appropriate balance between humanitarian concerns and military
    requirements for short-duration APL (as well as long-duration APL in static and closely-
    controlled environments such as Korea).”

The Bottom Line

Senator Leahy’s decision at the end of the current congressional session to object to the
Senate’s
consideration of the Amended Mine Protocol may reflect more than a desire to see the Amended
Mines Protocol reopened for negotiation — a process likely to result in it being rendered
incompatible with U.S. military requirements and unacceptable to the American government. The
Senator from Vermont’s obstructionism may also reflect an appreciation that his machinations on
behalf of radical landmine arms control initiatives no longer enjoy majority support from his
colleagues.

Indeed, Sen. Leahy was rebuffed by the Senate earlier this year when he attempted to
introduce
language into the FY 1999 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill which would have made it the
policy of the U.S. government to enter “as soon as possible” into the unverifiable, inequitable and
ineffective Ottawa treaty. In action on the Senate floor, this language was modified by an
amendment offered by Senator James Inhofe (R-OK) which makes any such a policy change
contingent upon the receipt of written certification from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Unified Combatant Commanders that “the signing of the [Ottawa] Convention is
consistent with the combat requirements and safety of the armed forces of the United
States.”
(4) The Inhofe amendment passed on a
voice vote.

It will be ironic indeed if additional casualties are inflicted upon innocent civilians
because
Senator Patrick Leahy refused to permit the Amended Mines Protocol to the Convention
on Conventional Weapons to be adopted by the United States Senate in the closing
moments of the 105th Congress.
It will be
scandalous
if in addition, thanks to such
obstructionism, American servicemen are needlessly jeopardized or sacrificed to Sen.
Leahy’s monomaniacal arms control agenda.

– 30 –

1. See the Center’s Decision Brief entitled
The Ottawa Landmine Ban: Hardly ‘Historic’ ( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=97-D_187″>No.
97-D 187, 4 December 1997).

2. See the Center’s Decision Briefs entitled
Celestial Navigation: Pentagon’s Extraordinary
’64-Star’ Letter Shows Why the U.S. Cannot Agree to Ban All Landmines
( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=97-D_97″>No. 97-D 97, 14
July 1997) and Fourteen of America’s Most Respected Military Figures Urge
Senate to Protect
U.S. Troops From Dangerous Landmine Ban
(No.
98-D 111
, 16 June 1998). See also the
Press Releases entitled Many of Nation’s Most Respected
Military Leaders Join Forces to
Oppose Bans on Use of Self-Destructing Landmines
( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=97-P_101″>No. 97-P 101, 21 July 1997) and
Generals Al Gray, David Maddox Join Call for Senate to Protect U.S. Troops by
Opposing
Leahy Landmine Ban
(No. 98-P 114, 19 June
1998).

3. Preeminent among the NGOs campaigning for the Ottawa
Convention was the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) — an organization that benefits from millions of U.S. tax
dollars yet aggressively pursues arms control agendas inimical to American security interests.
Among the many reprehensible actions taken by the ICRC in this connection was the seemingly
deliberate misrepresentation of data concerning civilian casualties inflicted by landmines.

On 26 June 1998, the CIA reported in a study entitled “Evaluating Statistics of Landmine
Casualties.” Among its highlights were the following:

    “Some often-quoted mine statistics include 26,000 landmine victims per year, $750
    million for treatment and rehabilitation, and $30 billion to clear an estimated 110
    million mines laid in some 60 countries. The primary source of the landmine injury
    data is the International Committee of the Red Cross, and much of the statistics
    quoted in the literature are extrapolations of the ICRC’s data. Most of the quoted
    figures and rates are gross misinterpretations of the original data derived without
    recognition of the limitations surrounding the collection.

    “No single organization is collecting reliable information on landmine victims that
    can be used for either national or international extrapolation. The ‘26,000
    landmine victims per year’ figure is based on old data from various sources that
    were inappropriately extrapolated using an unscientific casualty rate estimate.

    “The variations among the landmine statistics are partly the results of ill-defined
    case definitions, variation in data collection methodology and tools, duplicate
    recording, and lack of firm, standard population data for rate calculations.
    Without a standardized collection tool, it is possible to double- or triple-count
    landmine injuries.

    “The Surgical War Injury Database maintained by the International Committee of
    the Red Cross for the years 1991-96 listed some 26,000 war casualties in
    Afghanistan, of which about one-third are related to landmines. Newspapers,
    however, have quoted the 26,000 figure as the annual landmine casualty estimate
    — rather than total casualties over a five-year period — thus exaggerating the
    problem in Afghanistan by more than a factor of 10
    .

    In addition, various reports have cited this figure as representative of the
    international problem
    — rather than just Afghanistan, where the data were
    collected.” (Emphasis added throughout.)

4. See the Center’s Decision Brief entitled
Give the Military a Voice — And Heed It — on
Landmine Policy
(No. 98-D 156, 1 September
1998).

Center for Security Policy

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