Excerpts from a Speech before the Near East Institute, 20 May 1993 by Martin S. Indyk, Special Assistant the President and Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs

The Clinton Administration’s policy of "dual containment" of Iraq and Iran derives in the first instance from an assessment that the current Iraqi and Iranian regimes are both hostile to American interests in the region. Accordingly, we do not accept the argument that we should continue the old balance of power game, building up one to balance the other. We reject that approach not only because its bankruptcy was demonstrated in Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. We reject it because of a clear-headed assessment of the antagonism that both regimes harbor towards the U.S. and its allies in the region. And we reject it because we don’t need to rely on one to balance the other. The coalition that fought Saddam remains together, as long as we are able to maintain our military presence in the region, as long as we succeed in restricting the military ambitions of both Iraq and Iran and as long as we can rely on our regional allies — Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia and the GCC, and Turkey — to preserve a balance of power in our favor in the wider Middle East region, we will have the means to counter both the Iraqi and Iranian regimes. We will not need to depend on one to counter the other.

As Secretary of State Christopher has argued, we must not allow our efforts to press Iraq to comply fully with all UN resolutions divert us from a recognition of the threat that Iran poses to our interests in the Middle East. And, by the same token, we must not allow our concern with the Iranian threat to divert us from our efforts to force Iraqi compliance.

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Some have tried to portray our policy as a softening of previous policy. But by now it should be clear that we seek full compliance for all Iraqi regimes. We will not be satisfied with Saddam’s overthrow before we agree to lift sanctions. Rather we will want to be satisfied that any successor government complies fully with all UN resolutions. Nor do we seek or expect a reconciliation with Saddam Hussein’s regime. The Clinton Administration’s decision to release the Judge Advocate General’s report which details the regime’s war crimes and crimes against humanity in Kuwait was but a first step. Now, we have decided to seek the establishment of a UN Commission to investigate the charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Iraq itself and to assemble the voluminous evidence to back up these charges.

Our purpose is deliberate: it is to establish clearly and unequivocally that the current regime in Iraq is a criminal regime, beyond the pale of international society and, in our judgement, irredeemable.

We are also providing stronger backing for the Iraqi National Congress as a democratic alternative to the Saddam Hussein regime. The INC has succeeded in broadening its base to encompass representatives of all three major communities in Iraq, Sunni, Shia and Kurd. It is committed, as are we, to maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq and to adhering to Iraq’s international responsibilities. We are now urging others in the region to accord the INC the recognition and support it deserves.

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In short, the Clinton administration is intent on ensuring, through the UN resolutions and their enforcement and inspection measures, that as long as the Saddam Hussein regime survives it will not be in a position to threaten either its neighbors or suppress its people with impunity.

Containing the threat from Iran is a more difficult though no less necessary undertaking. When we assess Iranian intentions and capabilities we see a dangerous combination for Western interests. Iran is engaged in a five-part challenge to the United States and the international community. It is the foremost state sponsor of terrorism and assassination across the globe. Through its support for Hamas and Hizbollah, Iran is doing its best to thwart our efforts to promote peace between Israel, the Palestinians and the Arab states. Through its connections with Sudan, Iran is fishing in troubled waters across the Arab world, actively seeking to subvert friendly governments. Through its active efforts to acquire offensive weapons, Iran is seeking an ability to dominate the Gulf by military means. And, perhaps most disturbing, Iran is seeking a WMD capability including clandestine nuclear weapons capability and ballistic missiles to deliver weapons of mass destruction to the Middle East.

I should emphasize that the Clinton Administration is not opposed to Islamic government in Iran. Indeed we have excellent relations with a number of Islamic governments. Rather, we are firmly opposed to these specific aspects of the Iranian regime’s behavior, as well as its abuse of the human rights of the Iranian. We do not seek a confrontation but we will not normalize relations with Iran until and unless Iran’s policies change, across the board. We are willing to listen to what Iran has to say, provided that this comes through authoritative channels. However, in the absence of dramatic changes in Iran’s behavior, we will work energetically to persuade our European and Japanese allies, as well as Russia and China, that it is not in their interests to assist Iran to acquire nuclear weapons or the conventional means to pose a regional threat. Nor do we believe it is in their interests to ease Iran’s economic situation so that it can pursue normal commercial relations on one level while threatening our common interests on another level.

We will pursue this effort of active containment unilaterally, maintaining the counter- terrorism sanctions and other measures enacted by previous administrations to encourage a change in Iranian behavior. However, we recognize that success will require multilateral efforts since much of what Iran seeks in order to build up its military power is obtainable elsewhere. In this regard, we will seek in order to impress upon our allies the necessity for responding to the Iranian threat and the opportunity now presented by Iran’s current circumstances.

The necessity to act now derives from the fact that Iran’s threatening intentions for the moment outstrip its capabilities. But this moment will not last for long. If we fail in our efforts to modify Iranian behavior, five years from now Iran will be much more capable of posing a real threat to Israel, to the Arab world and to Western interests in the Middle East.

The opportunity to act now, on the other hand, derives from the fact that Iran is no longer a good commercial proposition. It is $5 billion in arrears in its short term international loans and this figure is growing in leaps and bounds. Iran suffers from 30 percent inflation and 30 percent unemployment. In short, Iran is a bad investment in both commercial and strategic terms, not just for the United States but for all responsible members of the international community.

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