Fresh Evidence of Beijing’s Continuing Proliferation Role Demands that Nuclear Cooperation Deal Be Put on Hold

(Washington, D.C.): Last week, the Washington Post revealed what has been
known to U.S.
intelligence for some time: Despite China’s umpteenth pledge to stop contributing to the
proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the Beijing
market for
such devices and related technology remains wide open for business. This situation — if
hardly a surprise, given the PRC’s track-record⁽¹⁾ — is a
strategic problem. It must become a
national security scandal, however, if the Clinton Administration presses on with
long-deferred
U.S.-Chinese nuclear cooperation despite this latest evidence of Beijing’s bad faith.

The Cat is Out of the Bag

On 13 March, the Post reported: “Weeks after winning a Chinese pledge to halt
assistance to
Iran’s nuclear programs, the Clinton Administration discovered and protested secret
negotiations between the two governments for hundreds of tons of material used in
enriching uranium to weapons grade, according to officials with access to U.S.
intelligence.”

Such behavior directly contravenes one of the key tenets of the Administration’s justification
for
allowing the sale of advanced nuclear reactor technology to China. The Clinton team asserted
that, over the past two years, the Chinese had established a record of non-proliferation of nuclear
technologies or assistance to Iran. In fact, this assertion seemed untenable even before the
latest
intelligence turned up. As the Casey Institute pointed out at the time of the Clinton-Jiang
summit, where the go-ahead was given to renewed bilateral nuclear cooperation: “China is now
and will continue to be one of the most egregious proliferators on the planet.” href=”#N_2_”>⁽²⁾

Unfortunately, the new revelations simply confirm some of the Institute’s worst fears:

“The effect of the President of the United States formally confirming that China is
satisfying U.S. non-proliferation requirements…can only have undesirable
consequences for U.S. national interests and security. China will be emboldened to
proceed with at least the level and type of dual-use nuclear trade in which it is
currently engaged.“

Hold Everything

In light of the fact that the condition precedent for the nuclear cooperation program —
namely, a
complete cessation of China’s nuclear proliferation activities href=”#N_3_”>⁽³⁾ — has not been satisfied, President
Clinton should be obliged to suspend the launch of that program. As William
Triplett
points out in the attached op.ed., such an action would have an
important historical precedent.

The former chief Republican counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recalls in
today’s
Washington Post that President Reagan faced a similar situation in
1984:

“In the spring of that year, President Reagan initialed the [nuclear cooperation]
agreement in Beijing. Immediately after the proposal was brought before Congress,
allegations of Chinese assistance to the Iranian nuclear weapons program surfaced in
the [Washington] Post. The Republicans held the Senate in 1984, and the
administration knew that, with strong business community support, it could bull its way
through.

“Instead, President Reagan chose to take down the agreement, negotiate
stronger non-proliferation commitments from the Chinese and resubmit it to
the Senate a year later. This took policy integrity, some willingness to
acknowledge criticism and, finally, courage.“

Mr. Triplett argues that the new evidence of Chinese-Iranian nuclear
cooperation is
ample grounds for President Clinton to emulate his predecessor and “take down the
agreement” pending further consultations. What is needed at this point, however, is not
more
assurances but tangible proof that Beijing has decided nuclear cooperation with the
United States
is more valuable and important than its ties to what amount to the Iranian nuclear weapons
program — and those of other nuclear wannabes like, Pakistan, Iraq, Algeria, Egypt and North
Korea.

The Bottom Line

Unfortunately, to date, the Clinton Administration has evinced little willingness to follow
President Reagan’s example in response to Chinese proliferation. To the contrary, its
standard
operating procedure with China and, for that matter, other proliferant states (notably,
Russia and North Korea) is to seek to buy off the perpetrators.

Just today, the Washington Times’ outstanding National Security correspondent,
Bill Gertz,
reported that the Clinton team is willing to pay China in a very precious commodity — concessions
on space-launch services and related technology transfers — if only Beijing will promise
again to
conform to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Should this proposal actually be
adopted, the PRC will reap lucrative commercial and strategic returns while contemptuously
ignoring its commitments.

What is more, the Clinton Administration has “taken a dive” concerning Beijing’s
continuing, systematic violation of human rights. Despite a unanimous vote last week in
the
House of Representatives and a 95-5 vote yesterday in the Senate on resolutions urging the
President to support a diplomatic denunciation of such repressive behavior, the United States will
refrain from doing so for the first time in recent years.

As Mr. Triplett puts it: “The revelation of China’s attempts to cheat on its non-proliferation
commitments forces President Clinton to choose. He can go the route of honesty, integrity and
leadership that President Reagan chose. Or he can try to ride it out and run the risk of further
embarrassment the next time something is discovered in the Beijing-Tehran weapons of mass
destruction conduit.” It can only be hoped that Mr. Clinton understands that, in terms of
long-term U.S. interests, he really has no choice: On non-proliferation, on human rights and with
respect to relations with China in general, appeasement of Beijing will only bring grief to this
Nation and its interests.

– 30 –

1. See the Casey Institute’s Perspective entitled
The Big Lie: Long-Term U.S. Interests Will
Not Be Served By Presidential Misrepresentation of Chinese Proliferation Acts
(No. 97-C 155,
16 October 1997)

2. See the Casey Institute’s Perspective entitled
Lying for Dollars: Expected Clinton
Certification on P.R.C. Proliferation Would Demean U.S., Disserve Its Interests
(No. 97-C
140, 18 September 1997).

3. Knowing that the facts would not support a claim that Beijing had
ceased its proliferation of
non-nuclear (i.e., chemical and biological) weapons-related technology, the Clinton
Administration early on insisted that the PRC need only refrain from nuclear transfers
to warrant
access to U.S. reactor equipment and know-how — a clear perversion of the intention of the
relevant statute.