India’s Nuclear Tests Demonstrate the Bankruptcy of Clinton’s So-Called ‘Non-Proliferation’ Policy

(Washington, D.C.): Yesterday’s nuclear test by India should be a wake-up call for all Americans: It demonstrates the flawed assumptions and utter futility of the centerpiece of the Clinton Administration’s pre-eminent foreign policy — the notion that arms control and other international arrangements can usefully address the dangers posed by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. India’s three-weapon shot demonstrates that this is not true today, and arguably never has been.

In particular, the underground explosions in the Indian desert showed that what animates a nation’s decision to obtain weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is, as a rule, its perceived vital interests. Typically, what is determinative are calculations of their regional security situation. On 4 May, India’s Defense Minister George Fernandes telegraphed as much, warning that China is exploiting Pakistan, Burma and Tibet to "encircle" India. According to the New York Times on 5 May, Mr. Fernandes declared "China has provided Pakistan with both missile as well as nuclear know-how" and that "China has its nuclear weapons stockpiled in Tibet right along our borders."

These factors — together with domestic political considerations — were sufficient to prompt the Indians to proceed, despite the prospect of serious American economic sanctions, as well as international condemnation. Not surprisingly, the fact that the Clinton Administration has chosen permanently to deny the United States the right to conduct nuclear tests appears to have been utterly irrelevant to India’s determination to perform some of its own.

Just the Facts, Ma’am

The same is true of other nations and other types of WMD and their delivery systems. Russia, China, Iraq, Iran, Syria and North Korea, to name a few, view arms control agreements and multilateral export control initiatives with cynical derision. If the United States wishes to subject itself to such limitations and prohibitions, so much the better; they will not follow suit — even if obliged to do so by virtue of being parties to such accords.

In fact, the record of non-compliance and circumvention of the body of non-proliferation arrangements makes a mockery of President Clinton’s contention this morning that: "This action by India not only threatens the stability of the region, it directly challenges the firm international consensus to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction."

Let’s be clear: There is no real "international consensus," let alone a firm one, committed to stopping the proliferation of WMD. To the contrary, with the notable exception of the United States and a few (but not all) of its democratic allies, most of the major parties to accords like the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty are seeking to acquire prohibited capabilities, assisting those who are in doing so or both.

Deception and Denial

The truth of the matter is that the Clinton Administration is deluding itself and misleading the American people by hyping these and similarly well-intentioned accords for countering WMD proliferation. Doing so is every bit as disingenuous as President Clinton’s endlessly repeated falsehood that "There are no missiles pointed at America’s children" when, in fact, there is every reason to believe there are lots of them aimed at this country — packing thousands of nuclear warheads.⁽¹⁾

No less reprehensible are misrepresentations about the effectiveness or verifiability of these arms control and related arrangements. For example, according to a front-page article by Bill Gertz appearing in today’s Washington Times, U.S. intelligence was caught completely unawares of India’s preparations for nuclear tests.⁽²⁾ Who knows, had it not been for the Indians wanting to publicize this event, advocates of the Comprehensive Test Ban would likely have disputed seismic and other evidence that one or more tests had been conducted, lest it complicate their sales job on the CTB.⁽³⁾ What is more, the ambiguousness of such evidence can be greatly increased by taking advantage of decoupling techniques that are well-understood by — or at least readily available to — would-be cheaters on the CTB.⁽⁴⁾

Zealots’ Response

The response of the Clinton Administration and the professional arms control community here and abroad to the Indian tests calls to mind the oft-cited definition of a zealot: Someone who redoubles his effort upon losing sight of his objective.

Even though India’s behavior strongly suggests that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will not prevent nuclear testing and cannot be verified with confidence, the Treaty’s advocates contend that Delhi’s underground events actually behoove the U.S. Senate to accelerate its consideration of the CTB. This was silly even before the Indian surprise: If India does not become a state party to the Treaty it cannot enter into force for years to come — by some estimates as many as ten years. There is no reason why the United States should be rushed into ratifying this accord when, by its own terms, it cannot come into effect.

Indeed, there are powerful reasons for the United States not to become committed to a permanent cessation of nuclear testing.⁽⁵⁾ As a practical matter, if the U.S. is going to require that its nuclear arsenal remain safe, robust and reliable for the foreseeable future, it will almost certainly have to test at some point. While improved computer simulations and other diagnostic techniques may reduce somewhat the number and types of nuclear tests America will have to conduct, testing can be permanently eliminated only at the expense of confidence that the Nation’s nuclear weapons will work when and as they are supposed to — and will not work when that is not the case.

The Bottom Line

The CTB’s champions are hoping against hope that India will now, having completed its first nuclear tests in over twenty years, agree to give up its right to do so in the future and sign on to a Comprehensive Test Ban they have strenuously opposed in recent years. Maybe so. But if they do, it will simply mean that the Indians have decided — as the Russians and Chinese, among others, evidently have — that, thanks to the CTB’s unverifiability, they can perform covert nuclear tests with impunity should the need arise.

There are certainly reasons to be worried whether the stability of the sub-continent of Asia will be jeopardized by India’s act of nuclear bravado yesterday. Being properly concerned about this development, however, is not a justification for pursuing hasty U.S. ratification of a Comprehensive Test Ban that will not prevent India or other nations from conducting covert tests in the future — but which will preclude the United States from performing safe, underground nuclear explosions essential to the long-term viability of its deterrent stockpile.

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1. See the Center’s Decision Brief entitled Senate Should Vote to Defend America ‘As Soon As Technologically Possible’ (No. 98-D 79, 6 May 1998). Even more appalling is the Administration’s involvement in facilitating the transfer of technology enhancing the missile threat to the United States even as it refuses to deploy anti-missile defenses that might mitigate these threats. See Clinton Legacy Watch # 21: Efforts to Help Chinese Missile Program Reek of Corruption, Betrayal of U.S. Interests (No. 98-D 61, 6 April 1998).

2. See Bill Gertz, "American intelligence taken by surprise," Washington Times, 12 May 1998.

3. Such was the case last year when ambiguous evidence was obtained that Russia may have engaged in covert nuclear testing at its Novaya Zemlya complex. See the Center’s Decision Brief entitled Wake-Up Call from Novaya Zemlya: Zero-Yield Nuclear Test Ban is Unverifiable, Russians Will Cheat, U.S. Will Suffer (No. 97-D 119, 28 August 1997).

4. See the Center’s Decision Brief entitled Nuclear Spin Control: Clinton See-No-Evil Response to Apparent Russian Test Offers Bitter Foretaste of C.T.B. (No. 97-D 156, 20 October 1997).

5. This concern is not alleviated by President Clinton’s pledge that he would be "willing to consider" withdrawing from the CTBT in order to perform nuclear tests if his military and scientific advisors decided that a resumption of testing was required. The same arguments about precipitating arms races and jeopardizing the peace now being made to get India into the treaty — and to keep the U.S. in the archaic and defunct Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 — would surely prove persuasive to this President and any like-minded successor.