Reagan’s Example On China

By William C. Triplett II
Washington Post, 18 March 1998

The recent discovery of Chinese proliferation transgressions presents the Clinton
administration
with an opportunity to regain momentum and demonstrate some foreign policy leadership.

As revealed by The Post’s Barton Gellman and John Pomfret on March 13, the American
intelligence community has discovered “secret negotiations” between the Chinese and Iranian
governments designed to transfer hundreds of tons of chemicals that could be used to enrich
uranium to weapons-grade levels. Apparently, this particular transaction was aborted by the
American discovery and subsequent diplomatic protest.

Because the negotiations were secret and at the government-to-government level, they raise
immediate concerns about Chinese government intentions regarding nuclear transfers. In this case,
the discovery of the Beijing-Tehran conduit is more important than the discovery of the anhydrous
hydrogen fluoride in the pipeline. Given our intelligence limitations regarding Chinese
proliferation activities, we can only speculate what else may have passed down the conduit and
what other deals are in the works. If, as many experts suspect, the Chinese have a full-scale
“denial and deception” program in place, any transfer could take place without being discovered.

While the Clinton administration can claim victory for stopping this particular transfer, last
week’s revelations could not come at a worse moment. Unless a two-thirds vote of both houses
can be mustered against it by today, the U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement will go into
effect. Considering recent events, President Jiang Zemin’s no-nuclear-transfer pledge to President
Clinton seems worthless.

But it’s not too late: The administration can take down the agreement temporarily in order
to
allow for “consultations” with the Chinese.

This, in fact, is what the Reagan administration did in 1984 when faced with exactly the
same
problem. In the spring of that year, President Reagan initialed the agreement in Beijing.
Immediately after the proposal was brought before Congress, allegations of Chinese assistance to
the Iranian nuclear weapons program surfaced in The Post. The Republicans held the Senate in
1984, and the administration knew that, with strong business community support, it could bull its
way through.

Instead, President Reagan chose to take down the agreement, negotiate stronger
nonproliferation commitments from the Chinese and resubmit it to the Senate a year later. This
took policy integrity, some willingness to acknowledge criticism and, finally, courage.

Following President Reagan’s path is the right thing to do. First, the president would be
seen as
standing up to Beijing, a move certain to draw praise on the Hill. Last week the Senate adopted a
bipartisan resolution demanding that the administration bring Beijing’s human rights offenses to
the attention of the U.N. Human Rights Committee in Geneva. The resolution passed 95 to 5.

Second, taking down the agreement, even for a few months, would send a strong signal to
Beijing and other proliferators that the Clinton administration won’t cover up for them. It would
demonstrate that there is a cost to be paid for supporting the weapons of mass destruction
programs of terrorist countries.

Third, it would have generalized foreign policy benefits for the president and his team. To
put it
diplomatically, his team has had credibility problems in recent months. But if he takes down the
agreement, it will signal that neither the president nor his team will square the policy circle just to
curry favor with the business community. Not only will the administration be commended,
correctly, for honesty, it will make others around the world change their evaluation of just what
they can get away with: in essence a warning to those who would consider the administration a
doormat.

Finally, the downside, the risk to the business community, is minimal. Nuclear power plants
take years and years to plan and build. This would be particularly true in earthquake-prone China.
If the president were to withdraw the agreement and resubmit it after he returns from China in
July (presumably with new assurance), at the end of the construction period no one would miss
these few months of delay.

So the revelation of China’s attempts to cheat on its non-proliferation commitments forces
President Clinton to choose. He can go the route of honesty, integrity and leadership that
President Reagan chose. Or he can try to ride it out and run the risk of further embarrassment the
next time something is discovered in the Beijing-Tehran weapons of mass destruction conduit.

The writer is the former chief Republican counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee.