Washington Institute’s Satloff Correctly Assails Mideast Policy Being Forged by Its Alumni, Dennis Ross and Martin Indyk

But Should Have Called Clinton Most ‘Pro-Labor,’ Not ‘Pro-Israel,’ President

(Washington, D.C.): Today’s Washington Post features an enormously important op.ed. article
by Robert Satloff, Executive Director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. In this
article entitled “Target Saddam Hussein” (see the attached), Dr. Satloff takes the Clinton
Administration to task for its effort to offload onto the Israeli government of Benjamin Netanyahu
blame for the United States’ manifest failure to deal effectively with the present — and growing —
danger posed by Saddam Hussein.

Israel is Not at Fault

As Satloff puts it:

“Blaming the peace process impasse (diplo-speak for blaming Israeli Prime Minister
Binyamin Netanyahu) for the weakening of the anti-Saddam coalition sidesteps the
crass greed that motivates some, such as the French and the Russians, while it avoids
facing up to America’s own inadequacies that have turned off many others in the
Arab world. One thing is certain — for both Western and Arab allies — the state of the
peace process has almost never been a determinant of their willingness to follow
America’s lead vis-a-vis Iraq.

“As far as the former are concerned, the French and Russians stopped being
coalition members in any meaningful sense at the very height of the Oslo
process. It was in June 1993, three months before the Yitzhak Rabin-Yasser
Arafat handshake on the White House lawn, that the U.N. Security Council last
found Iraq in ‘material breach’ of U.N. resolutions. Not once during the halcyon
days of the peace process — from September 1993 to the Rabin assassination two
years later — did the French or Russians support any stiffening of U.N. spine on
Iraq.

“The Arab coalition partners have also been straying for quite some time….”
(Emphasis added throughout.)

Where Are the Washington Institute’s Alumni?

Dr. Satloff’s withering critique of the Clinton Administration’s policy toward Iraq and its assault
on the Netanyahu government is all the more remarkable since two of the most important
architects of these dismal policies are alumni of his institution: Special Middle East Envoy Dennis
Ross and Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs Martin Indyk. The former was
slated to replace the latter as the Washington Institute’s Executive Director at the end of the Bush
Administration — in which Ross served as Bush-Baker’s point man on the Mideast “peace
process” — and before he was “re-upped” by the Clinton team.

At present, the Ross-Indyk tag-team are playing central roles in promoting the policy of “keeping
Saddam in his box.” Martin Indyk takes substantial credit for articulating the policy of “dual
containment” against Iraq and Iran — a policy which has, at its root, the idea of sustaining
indefinitely international sanctions against the Iraqi regime.⁽¹⁾ Dr. Satloff correctly dismisses this
proposition:

“Today, the principal source of pressure against Saddam is the sanctions regime and
the related U.N. inspection system, both of which rely on the
lowest-common-denominator decision-making of international consensus. Arab
members of the Gulf War coalition — many of whom remain attractive targets for
Saddam’s ambitions — read the writing on the wall. With the United Nations as the
only arrow in the anti-Saddam quiver, no wonder that countries like Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia are covering their bets by distancing themselves from U.S. policy.”

Messrs. Ross and Indyk have also been associated for years with the practice of badgering
Israeli governments deemed to be impediments to the “peace process.” Ross was intimately
involved in such notorious Bush-Baker efforts to stigmatize Israel and otherwise to euchre it into
making concessions as the contemptuous invitation to the government of Yitzhak Shamir to “call
[the White House switchboard] when you are serious about peace.”⁽²⁾

For his part, Martin Indyk has repeatedly acted in a manner that gave offense to the Netanyahu
government — and comfort to Israel’s enemies. This behavior was much in evidence during his
tenure as the U.S. Ambassador to Israel. As the Center for Security Policy noted on 17
September 1997 in arguing against his appointment to the State Department’s top Middle East
job⁽³⁾:

“U.S. policy-makers like Indyk have, however, compounded the risks by
dismissing legitimate concerns about Arafat’s non-compliance with his
obligations under the Oslo Accords and insisting that Israel scrupulously fulfill all
those it had assumed, while urging that it take on ever more risky ones in the
name of ‘moving the peace process forward.'”

An Administration that is ‘Labor-friendly’, Not ‘Israel-friendly’

The offensive conduct of Messrs. Ross and Indyk — and their superiors — toward certain Israeli
governments contrasts sharply with their behavior toward other governments of the Jewish State.
Specifically, the Clinton Administration missed no opportunity to promote the political fortunes of
the ruling coalitions led by the Labor Party’s Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, just as it went
beyond the bounds of diplomacy — and respect for a fellow democracy⁽⁴⁾ — to impede the Likud
Party’s bid for power, and subsequent exercise of it, under Benjamin Netanyahu. This practice
was most palpably and offensively on display recently when President Clinton found time to meet
with Peres and Rabin’s widow, Leah, having pointedly made known that his schedule would not
accommodate a meeting with Israel’s prime minister.

The fact is that Rob Satloff erred on one point only in his article: Bill Clinton has not “earned
the title of the most Israel-friendly chief executive in history.” He is, rather, the most
Labor-friendly President.

At a time when even such rabidly anti-Israeli critics as Rowland Evans and Robert Novak were
singing the praises of the Rabin-Peres governments — mostly for following policies 180 degrees
out of synch with those pursued previously by both Labor and Likud governments (e.g., dealing
with the PLO, surrender of territory on the West Bank, withdrawal from the Golan Heights, etc.)
— Mr. Clinton was perceived to be unstintingly supportive of Israel. When the people of Israel
exercised their prerogative to reject the Labor program by electing a government committed to a
different one, however, President Clinton showed himself to be, in effect, pro-Labor, not pro-Israel.

This practice is not only quintessentially Clintonian in its crudeness and contravening of
convention. It is also palpably inconsistent with U.S. interests in a strong and secure Israel.
Indeed, it is even inconsistent with the Clinton-Ross-Indyk sense of U.S. interests, namely
“moving the peace process forward” by extracting from the Netanyahu government
concessions a majority of the Israeli people do not support. After all, there is little chance of
“progress” towards a real peace as long as the Palestinian Arabs believe that the Americans will
apply further pressure on Israel if the Arabs declare its offerings to be unsatisfactory. To the
contrary, such a dynamic simply encourages Israel’s Arab interlocutors to hold out for more
concessions.

The Bottom Line

Apart from this small, but significant, misperception of the bias that animates Clinton
Administration policy towards Israel, Dr. Satloff’s op.ed. is a very salutary contribution to the
debate about what needs to be done concerning Iraq. Particularly noteworthy is its bottom line:

“For Arab leaders, the peace process stalemate is, at best, an excuse. The truth is that
many aren’t buying U.S. policy because it only treats the symptoms of the Gulf
crisis (the U.N. inspection team, sanctions, the coalition) rather than the cause
(Saddam Hussein himself). If the administration decided to pursue a new policy
using all available political, military, economic and clandestine means to compel
Saddam’s compliance or precipitate his demise — whichever came first — most
Arab leaders would fall in line and do their part.” (Emphasis added.)

– 30 –

1. See the Center’s Decision Brief entitle Take Out Saddam (No. 97-D 168, 10 November
1997).

2. Ross’ antipathy to legitimate Israeli security concerns have been on display more recently, as
well. See, for example, Will Dennis Ross Broker A Hebron Deal Right Into the Hands of the
De-Judaizers? (No. 96-D 134, 23 December 1996).

3. From the Center’s Decision Brief entitled Martin Indyk: Wrong Man, Wrong Job (No. 97-D
137, 17 September 1997). For additional details on Indyk’s reprehensible behavior toward the
United States’ most important and reliable ally in the Middle East, see the Zionist Organization of
America’s analysis entitled “Martin Indyk’s Record on Israel.”

4. See the Center’s Decision Brief entitled Besmirching the Oval Office: Clinton-Arafat
Meeting Propounds the ‘Big Lie’ (No. 96-D 43, 3 May 1996).