What We’re Not Prepared for From Saddam’s Arsenal

How would the U.S. government and the American people react if the following nightmarish scenario materialized?

The U.S. is at the brink of war with an adversary armed with a terrifyingly lethal weapon — one capable of inflicting massive military and civilian casualties. So frightening is this weapon that its possession has been globally banned by international agreement. As a result, the U.S. does not possess an in-kind deterrent to the use of such a weapon against its forces or people; worse yet, it lacks virtually any capability to minimize the devastation the enemy might inflict by that use.

Does this sound too awful to be plausible? Unfortunately, the U.S. faces just such a prospect today in the threat posed by Iraq’s potential for biological warfare and America’s vulnerability to such an attack. Amid the feverish speculation about the risk of an Iraqi chemical attack, this weapon in Saddam Hussein’s deadly bag of tricks has received altogether too little attention.

In 1972, the U.S. and virtually every other civilized nation signed the Biological Weapons Convention, which prohibits the development, stockpiling and use of biological arms. In accordance with the convention’s terms, the U.S. has none of these terrible weapons that kill through the use of various strains or combinations of toxic viruses, some capable of replicating and spreading extremely rapidly.

This is so even though powerful evidence exists that others around the world, notably the Soviet Union and Iraq, have proceeded to acquire biological weapon capabilities, notwithstanding the convention. In fact, within the past few weeks, the Soviet newspaper Literaturnaya Gazeta disclosed that a notorious accident in Sverdlovsk was — as the Reagan administration long maintained — an "accident" in the Soviet biological warfare program.

In the face of such evidence, it is nothing less than scandalous that the U.S. government has failed for more than 15 years to conduct meaningful research even into defensive measures required to detect, type and neutralize the effects of lethal biological warfare. As a result, there is now little more than a vestigial — indeed, pathetic — program in place for protecting Americans against biological weapon attacks.

Most terrifying of all, with the dawn of the era of genetic engineering, even nations with relatively unsophisticated technology bases can acquire toxic viruses that defy ready classification, require complex antidotes — if any exist — and can penetrate the charcoal filtration systems of the best protective equipment.

For years, American policy makers have treated the growing menace of noncompliance with the Biological Weapons Convention with benign neglect. The crisis with Iraq makes obvious what should have been understood all along: Such a policy is irresponsible and potentially disastrous.

If the U.S. chooses for moral or other reasons to remain bound by the Biological Weapons Convention’s prohibition on possessing offensive biological weapons — effectively denying itself on a unilateral basis an in-kind deterrent — it must at the very least now undertake a crash program of research into technologies associated with detecting, typing and defending against biological warfare.

The U.S. must also avoid the present temptation to repeat the mistakes inherent in the Biological Weapons Convention. Completing a new and utterly unverifiable treaty banning chemical weapons — as the Bush administration is determined to do — will simply add yet another technology to the list of biological and toxin weapons possessed by renegade nations, but not by those that abide by international agreements.

What is more, the present danger that Saddam might employ biological weapons (or, for that matter, any of the other instruments of genocide at his disposal) against the forces or people of the U.S. or those of friendly nations is just one more argument for taking urgent steps to eliminate this threat. Saddam in the past has shown no hesitation in using genocidal weapons. Thousands of Kurds within Iraq, who were the victims of his chemical warfare, can attest to that.

As Sen. Richard Lugar (D., Ind.), a senior member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and respected authority on international affairs, observed last week: "I think {if Saddam Hussein merely takes his troops and leaves Kuwait, it would} leave us in a very unsatisfactory situation. . . . Saddam Hussein must either leave {office} or be removed. Likewise, {his} nuclear facilities and . . . chemical facilities should be destroyed."

Iraq’s unprovoked aggression has created a unique opportunity and compelling justification for carrying out Sen. Lugar’s prescription. Accordingly, President Bush should immediately issue an ultimatum to the government of Saddam Hussein. It should require within 48 hours:

• The immediate withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from and relinquishing of Baghdad’s control over Kuwait.
• An agreement to destroy within 30 days and under international supervision all biological, chemical and nuclear weapons-related facilities and stockpiles and ballistic missile sites.
• The immediate release of all Western nationals now being held hostage.

Such an ultimatum may encourage Iraqi opposition elements to remove Saddam if he refuses to comply. Absent Iraqi compliance, however, the U.S. (and such allied forces as are willing to participate) should move swiftly and with deadly effect against his regime, its power base and particularly its lethal arsenal of weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. Gaffney, formerly a senior Defense Department official, is the director of the Center for Security Policy in Washington.