WHO ‘LOST’ RUSSIA: CLINTON AND TALBOTT

(Washington, D.C.): As presidential elections loom in Russia,
the Clinton spin-control operation has begun to implement a
classic damage-limitation strategy. Following the defeat of its
candidate for the Israeli premiership, the Administration is
clearly concerned that Boris Yeltsin — in whom it has invested
even more political capital and taxpayer resources than it did in
Shimon Peres — might meet the same fate.

The strategy appears to be to insulate President Clinton from
personal responsibility for such an outcome. Toward this end, one
of his oldest friends and most influential advisors is being set
up to take the fall.

Over the weekend, major profiles of Deputy Secretary
of State Strobe Talbott appeared in the New York
Times and Washington Post. The common theme seemed
to be that if the Russians reject Yeltsin in favor of his
Communist challenger, Gennadi Zyuganov, it will be seen as
Talbott’s fault. Much was made of the former Time
Magazine journalist’s long-standing “romanticism” about
Russia, his reflexive, “elitist” attachment to the top
man in the Kremlin (whether Brezhnev, Gorbachev or Yeltsin) and
his determination to overlook Russian behavior that flouts
democratic norms, the rule of law or respect for human rights.
Both articles implied that — if faced with the politically
charged question “Who lost Russia?” — the
Administration would try to divert blame from President Clinton
by serving up Strobe Talbott.

The Talbott Legacy

Unfortunately for Mr. Talbott, he is well-positioned to be the
fall guy to the extent that anyone outside Russia exercises great
influence over events there. It has been Talbott, after all, who
has personally managed U.S. relations with the former
Soviet Union ever since he was appointed Ambassador to the Newly
Independent States at the start of the Clinton Administration. In
that capacity and in his current post as Number Two at the State
Department, Talbott has had a direct hand in a slew of dubious
policy decisions. These include: equating Yeltsin’s genocide in Chechnya
to Abraham Lincoln’s effort to preserve the voluntarily formed
Union during the U.S. Civil War; corrupting the
International Monetary Fund‘s decision-making process
this Spring so as to ensure that a $10.2 billion
contribution was made effectively to the Yeltsin
campaign from taxpayer-underwritten IMF accounts; holding
non-Russian Soviet republics at arms length for too long
out of deference to Moscow’s sensibilities; legitimating a
Russian military presence in Bosnia; agreeing to modify
provisions of various arms control agreements
with which Russia has declined to comply; removing Russia
from the Munitions Control list — one of the few
remaining means of blocking the transfer of sensitive, strategic
technology; and delaying, possibly permanently, the enlargement
of NATO.

The Clinton-Talbott Legacy

That said, Strobe Talbott has not been operating an
independent foreign policy. These initiatives have been
implemented with the approval and support of his friend, the
President. Mr. Clinton, every bit as much as Secretary
Talbott, likewise bears responsibility for the muted U.S.
responses even to Russian actions that could directly threaten
vital American security interests. These include:
Moscow’s transfer of nuclear weapons-related reactor
technology to Iran; the diversion of funds provided
through the Nunn-Lugar “Cooperative Threat
Reduction” program that are, ironically, being used
to subsidize Russian nuclear, chemical and biological weapons
development; Russian assistance to the Castro regime in bringing
on-line two reactors capable of causing Chernobyl-style
catastrophes up-wind from much of the United States; and
indications that the Kremlin recently conducted a covert
underground nuclear weapons test. The last item
represents a breach of Yeltsin’s declared moratorium on such
tests and a graphic demonstration of the unverifiability of the
Administration’s top arms control priority, a Comprehensive Test
Ban.

The truth of the matter, however, is that these
actions are contributing to the “loss” of Russia even
under the present regime. Indeed, thanks in no
small measure to the carte blanche given Boris Yeltsin
by the Clinton Administration, the international affairs agenda
being advanced by the current Russian government is not too
different from that likely to be followed by Zyuganov. In fact, Yevgeny
Primakov, the KGB thug picked last year by Yeltsin to
serve as his Foreign Minister might well be kept on in a Zyuganov
Kremlin. The close ties Primakov has been ominously restoring
with China, Libya, Syria, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, Serbia and
Iraq would probably continue to enjoy high priority no matter who
wins this election. So will exports of advanced weaponry and
technology to these and other unsavory end-users.

Under either Yeltsin or Zyuganov, Russia is likely to
exploit its U.S.-sanctioned beachhead in the Balkans to protect
its friends and to ensure geographic and political arrangements
there that will suit its interests following the removal of NATO
forces. Both men will proceed with Russia’s aggressive
nuclear force modernization program. (See
the attached op.ed. article on this subject by Michael Waller
published in today’s Washington Times.) Both
will carry out intensified intelligence operations against the
United States and its allies — for commercial as well as
strategic purposes — via human agents and huge, sophisticated
electronic collection facilities like that now being expanded at
Lourdes, Cuba.

The Bottom Line

In short, the policies advocated by Strobe Talbott have
contributed significantly to Russia’s evolution in a direction
inimical to U.S. interests. By once again falling prey to the
cult of personality of the Russian leader du jour — a
cult in which Talbott has been a high priest for decades — the
United States has encouraged the blurring of the distinctions
between the ex-Communist who retained power and the Communist who
wants to get it back.

It would be almost as much of a travesty to credit
Strobe Talbott with vindication if Boris Yeltsin manages to hold
on as it would be to allow him to take the full blame should
Yeltsin lose. The bottom line is that Secretary
Talbott’s Oxford roommate-turned-President bears ultimate
responsibility for a failed policy toward Russia. Both men should
be held accountable not only for the ominous implications of a
Yeltsin loss, but also those likely to arise from a Yeltsin
victory.