Will Congress Give Clinton Political Cover on Ill-Advised Transfers of Strategic Technologies?

(Washington, D.C.): When the final net assessment is performed on the immense harm done to U.S. national security by the Clinton-Gore Administration, the cause of the most grievous, long-term damage may come as a surprise: The most serious and enduring harm may prove to have resulted from the systematic, purposeful and wholesale dismantling of U.S. export control mechanisms and multilateral arrangements that until 1992 governed the transfer of militarily relevant or “dual-use” technologies.

The question that is now arising is whether this evisceration of U.S. export controls will be attributable solely to Clinton Administration machinations? Or will certain Republican lawmakers — even some with conservative credentials — now looking to captains of industry for campaign contributions give invaluable political cover to Al Gore with respect to one of his greatest vulnerabilities?

Heavy Competition

To be sure, the Veep has a number of serious liabilities when it comes to his and Mr. Clinton’s stewardship of the national security portfolio. These include:

  • The effects of the chronic over-extension, misuse, underfunding and demoralization of the American military will take years to repair.
  • If a hostile power takes advantage of the Administration’s refusal to deploy anti-ballistic missile systems, the effect could be catastrophic. (Indeed, as was reported by the Washington Times’ National Security correspondent Bill Gertz last week, China recently threatened just such an attack over Taiwan.)
  • President Clinton’s unwillingness to block efforts by Communist Chinese and other “bad actors” bent on underwriting activities like terrorism, proliferation and threatening arms buildups by securing billions of dollars from unsuspecting investors in the U.S. capital markets.
  • The Clintonian determination to share sensitive intelligence information with potential adversaries which may mean that the next President — and perhaps one or more of his successors — will find themselves bereft of sources and methods of collecting such information that have been compromised and, therefore, seriously degraded if not neutralized altogether.
  • The Clinton-Gore Record on Export Controls

    As things stand now, the Vice President is fully and uniquely implicated in the practice of giving priority to politically influential companies’ desire for short-term profits in overseas markets, without regard for the larger national interest. This practice has jeopardized the U.S. military’s qualitative edge — the access to superior technology which allows America’s armed forces to fight and prevail even when substantially outnumbered.

    In addition, as successive reports performed or commissioned by the Congress (notably, those produced over the past two years by the House select committee chaired by Rep. Chris Cox and blue-ribbon panels chaired by former Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld and former CIA Director John Deutch) have documented, eased access to sophisticated American equipment and know-how is giving rise to unprecedented new threats to U.S. security from developing nations and even sub-national groups.

    Enter the E.A.A.

    Given this record, it is stupefying that the United States Senate is expected this week to consider legislation that would greatly compound the problem of performing national security-minded due diligence with respect to export controls. Were this bill — the Export Administration Act (EAA) of 2000 (S.1712) — actually to pass unchanged, moreover, the Republican-led Congress would become fully implicated in what is, arguably, the Clinton-Gore Administration’s most reprehensible act of purposeful malfeasance.

    It is noteworthy that this legislation is being brought to the Senate floor over the strenuous objections of all four authorizing committees with jurisdiction over national security matters: the Senate Armed Services, Foreign Relations, Intelligence Committees and Governmental Affairs Committees. As recently as February 29, the chairmen of these four committees (Senators John Warner, Jesse Helms, Richard Shelby and Fred Thompson, respectively), together with six other influential committee or subcommittee chairmen (Senators Jon Kyl, Pat Roberts, Jim Inhofe and Bob Smith, Connie Mack and Orrin Hatch), wrote Majority Leader Trent Lott warning that “S.1712 fails to protect U.S. national security interests” and opposing consideration of the EAA “at this time.” (See attached letter.)

    The reasons for such opposition are not hard to divine. This legislation is designed to make it exceedingly difficult — if not, as a practical matter, impossible — to impose export controls on strategically sensitive technologies. Months of behind-the-scenes negotiations by these legislators and their staff with the EAA’s proponents, primarily Senator Phil Gramm’s Banking Committee, have to date left such serious problems as the following uncorrected:

  • S.1712 would confirm in law the Clinton-Gore practice of precluding executive branch agencies responsible for national security from exercising real influence over the export control process. For instance, the Commerce Department will have, for all intents and purposes, sole authority over which technologies are subjected to tech transfer restrictions. The bill would also confer on the Banking Committee exclusive jurisdiction for areas clearly within the purview of other Senate committees charged with oversight of the defense, foreign policy and intelligence portfolios.
  • The bill unduly restricts the circumstances under which export controls can be imposed. This is done to such an extent that the next President may be hamstrung should he believe, unlike the incumbent, that the transfer of certain dual-use U.S. technology should be blocked from going to undesirable end-users.

    It would, for example, be illegal to do so if would-be exporters claim that foreign competitors can offer a comparable product. (Under S.1712, another loophole would be created if the product is not available overseas but is widely available domestically.) If the new EAA were in force, the President would be prohibited from blocking the export unless he could establish both that U.S. security would be harmed and that foreign availability can eliminated via multilateral controls in under 18 months — neither of which are likely to be demonstrable in advance.

  • In its latest iteration, S.1712 would create a new National Security Control List (NSCL). Every item currently found on the Commerce Control List (CCL) of restricted dual-use items would have to be approved by the Commerce Department before it could appear on the NSCL. In other words, Commerce could, at its sole discretion, veto any proposal to control existing, let alone new technologies.
  • Two other sections of S.1712 create worrisome loopholes: Section 204 allows the re-export of any product if the controlled U.S. content amounts to 25% or less of the value (not the strategic significance) of the product. Even worse from a non-proliferation point of view, is Section 301(c) which prohibits the control of U.S. parts or components if the item is assembled overseas.
  • S.1712 does not take into account the U.S. practice of recognizing that Israel is an adherent to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), even if Israel is not an MTCR member.
  • The Bottom Line

    In an important address to the Heritage Foundation last Friday, one of those most concerned about this defective legislation, Governmental Affairs Committee Chairman Thompson declared:

    “We need strong, principled leadership from the President and Congress on these national security matters. We can start by passing an Export Administration Act that balances trade with national security — as opposed to the current, proposed legislation that would loosen [export controls] further than has the Clinton Administration.”

    The Nation may long suffer the consequences of the Clinton-Gore team’s failure to strike such a balance. It seems equally certain that neither the “common defense” nor Republican electoral prospects will be advanced if the Senate disregards the judgment of Sen. Thompson and its other experts on national security in an effort to out-pander the Vice President for the contributions and support of high tech firms determined to sell their wares without regard for the dangers such sales might entail for the rest of us.

    Frank Gaffney, Jr.
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