WILL JOHN DEUTCH CURE WHAT AILS THE C.I.A. — OR MAKE MATTERS WORSE?

(Washington, D.C.): Deputy Secretary of Defense John
Deutch has reportedly parlayed President Clinton’s desperation
for a confirmable Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) into a
position with nearly unprecedented power. According to press
reports, he will enjoy not only Cabinet-rank but a key role in
national security policy-making — a status enjoyed by only one
previous DCI, President Reagan’s William Casey. A question
occurs: Will Dr. Deutch use that power to effect needed
course-corrections not only in the Agency but also in Clinton
defense and foreign policies more generally? If so, the following
are among the areas he will have to address early on:

• The Politicization of the CIA: For some time,
  there has been reason to fear that the hostility and
  distrust felt by a number of senior Clinton
  Administration officials concerning the CIA would have
  deleterious consequences for the Agency. Of particular
  concern have been efforts to “reorganize” the
  CIA and “re-educate” its analysts — measures
  that appear designed to discourage or prevent
  intelligence inputs that might confound preferred
  Administration policies. On 15 July 1994, the Center for
  Security Policy issued a Decision Brief entitled
  ‘Say It Ain’t So Jim’: Impending Reorganization of
  CIA Looks Like Suppression, Politicizing of Intelligence
  (No. 94-D 74), which
  raised an alarm about a number of these institutional
  changes.

These changes pale by comparison, however, to a new
initiative unveiled on the front page of the Washington
Post on 10 March — the day before the public learned of
the withdrawal of retired General Michael Carns, President
Clinton’s first nominee to succeed James Woolsey as the head
of the CIA. According to the Post, “the Clinton
Administration has moved to exert greater control over what
intelligence the CIA and other spy agencies collect and has
created a high-level committee to oversee their
performance.” The article goes on to report that:

“The top targets set by Clinton…’are what you would
expect,’ one congressional source said. They include
countries such as Iraq, Iran and North Korea; subjects such
as weapons of mass destruction and counterterrorism; and
‘transnational’ issues such as Muslim fundamentalism and
‘over-the-horizon’ problems that might arise in the
future.”

This list raises, in turn, a series of worrisome questions
for Dr. Deutch: In the interest of conformity with the
Clinton Administration’s political preferences and
ideological notions about “leaving the Cold War
behind,” is the U.S. intelligence community going to be
enjoined from closely monitoring ominous developments in the
former Soviet Union? Could the possibility that inconvenient
facts might be developed result in the Agency’s new overseers
directing that lower priority be given by the intelligence
community to other problem areas like China, Cuba, Haiti or
the Balkans? One wonders, for example, whether an analysis
like that leaked last week — which described the
overwhelming responsibility of Serbian warlords (with whom
the Clinton team is actively negotiating) for genocide and
other war crimes in Bosnia — would have been performed under
the new arrangement? It is incumbent on the incoming DCI to
ensure that the Clinton Administration is not able to prevent
such bad news from being collected and presented to
policy-makers simply because they may not want to hear it.

• Intelligence Sharing With the United Nations:
  Sunday’s Washington Post featured yet another
  Clinton intelligence policy screaming out for course
  correction — the growing practice of indiscriminate
  sharing of intelligence with the United Nations. This
  front-page article described how an American diplomat
  stumbled upon boxes of classified U.S. intelligence
  documents left unguarded in a vacant UN office in Somalia
  shortly before it was abandoned to the looters. The boxes
  were said to contain:

“‘source reports’ recounting sensitive interviews
with Somali informers, daily intelligence reports on the
Somali political situation, classified data designated
‘UN-releasable,’ some computer diskettes and documents
stamped ‘SECRET-WINTELL’ that involved highly sensitive U.S.
sources and spying methods, according to a U.S.
official….[Also included were] many documents marked
‘NOFORN’ — or No Foreigners — [which were] in the hands of
UN intelligence officials commanded by a Nigerian
colonel.”

This intelligence nightmare is but one of at least four
major compromises of U.S. intelligence information — if
not of the sources and methods from which it emanates — to
occur since the Clinton team started treating the UN as just
another “intelligence consumer” in 1993.

The prevailing mindset is captured in a remark reportedly
made last October by a senior CIA official assigned to advise
the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright (herself a
zealous proponent of intelligence-sharing with the United
Nations). The official instructed representatives of the
Agency’s operations and analysis divisions not to worry about
the nationalities of UN Secretariat employees with whom U.S.
intelligence was being shared because the latter are
“international civil servants” who usually have no
contact with their home governments. Such fatuous nonsense
invites incalculable damage to U.S. intelligence; it and the
policies and practices that result demand urgent adult
supervision — and corrective action — from Dr. Deutch.

• ‘Truth in Arms Control’: Dr. Deutch is said to be
  strongly opposed to the Clinton policy of permanently
  halting nuclear testing — a capability he understands is
  essential to maintaining a safe, reliable and credible
  nuclear deterrent. In his new capacity as DCI, Dr. Deutch
  will also have a responsibility to inform those at the
  White House, Energy Department and elsewhere who hope to
  negotiate a “comprehensive” ban on nuclear
  testing that such a treaty will be unverifiable. The same
  can be said of the so-called “global” ban on
  chemical weapons, purported improvements being sought to
  the Biological Weapons Convention and key provisions of
  the START II Treaty. Will Dr. Deutch have the latitude —
  and the courage — to say the emperor has no clothes?
• The Need for Missile Defenses: In his capacity as
  Deputy Secretary of Defense, John Deutch has recently
  exhibited an appreciation that the 1972 Anti-Ballistic
  Missile Treaty is no longer consistent with U.S. national
  security requirements. Specifically, he has taken steps
  that could end the United States’ present, absolute
  vulnerability to ballistic missile attack. While these
  steps — envisioning an emergency deployment option that
  would modify 20-50 Minuteman III ICBMs for use as
  defensive interceptors — have not gone nearly far enough
  in light of the rapid proliferation of such missiles
  around the globe, they have established a useful baseline
  for evaluating other, more effective options. Will a DCI
  Deutch ensure that intelligence community estimates
  finally reflect the fact that dangerous nations are now
  in a position to buy long-range ballistic
  missiles, thereby greatly reducing the time it will take
  a threat to the continental U.S. to emerge and adding
  further urgency to American defensive efforts?
• A Competent Second in Command: Given his own lack
  of first-hand experience in the intelligence collection
  and analysis field, a high priority for Dr. Deutch should
  be to ensure that his deputy is an individual with a
  considerable background in these areas. The Clinton
  Administration has made a point of turning academics,
  personnel from charitable foundations and congressional
  staffers into senior intelligence officials. The Deputy
  Director’s position should be filled by a seasoned
  intelligence community professional — not someone
  requiring considerable on-the-job-training. Will that be
  Dr. Deutch’s choice or will the choice not be his to
  make?

The Bottom Line

Secretary Deutch has his work cut out for him. The job of
improving the quality of U.S. intelligence is a challenging one
under the best of circumstances. Unfortunately, the present
Administration — with its animus to the CIA in general and its
unhappiness with politically incorrect intelligence assessments
in particular — confronts the new DCI-designate with unenviable
tests of his fortitude and policy judgment. Perhaps this prospect
contributed to his unwillingness to accept Mr. Clinton’s
invitation to lead the CIA when it was first tendered. Those who
believe that the country cannot afford for Dr. Deutch to fail now
that he has accepted this posting will be monitoring closely how
he performs in these and related tests.