WILL THE CIA’S GUATEMALA FLAP THROW CONGRESS OFF THE SCENT OF A REAL INTELLIGENCE SCANDAL — CLINTON’S RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT OF U.S. SOURCES AND METHODS?

(Washington, D.C.): As the Senate Intelligence Committee
begins yet another highly publicized witch-hunt at the CIA —
this time concerning alleged CIA toleration of inhuman behavior
on the part of foreign informers in Guatemala — it would appear
that a scandal of far more serious dimensions may go unaddressed:
The Clinton Administration’s practice of disclosing sensitive
U.S. intelligence in order to score short-term debating points or
facilitate dubious multilateral ventures.

Among the recent examples of this practice are:

• The compromise of extremely sensitive intelligence
  concerning Iranian efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.
  This was the upshot of Secretary of State Warren
  Christopher and Secretary of Defense William Perry’s
  sharing a highly classified CIA document on the
  subject with their Russian counterparts.
• The compromise of closely-held information about the
  quality and performance of U.S. intelligence satellites. U.N.
  Ambassador Madeleine Albright, a vociferous proponent of
  intelligence-sharing, made a show-and-tell of classified
  photos the centerpiece of her recent tour of Security
  Council members’ capitals. This tour — intended to serve
  the laudable objective of preserving sanctions on Iraq —
  bought but a temporary reprieve from Franco-Russian
  efforts to scuttle such sanctions. That reprieve came,
  however, at a high and probably long-lasting price.
• The compromise arising from the sharing of sensitive
  overhead reconnaissance with the international community
  in connection with the genocide in Rwanda. There is
  no indication this sharing resulted in an appreciable
  diminution of the tragedy. It may, nonetheless, have set
  the stage for larger tragedies for vital American
  interests in the future. Certainly that will be the case
  if adversaries are able to use their understanding of
  U.S. intelligence capabilities to reduce the latters’
  effectiveness.
• The recent, notorious episode in which sensitive U.S.
  intelligence that had been shared with the United Nations
  — despite the fact that at least some of it was
  reportedly marked NOFORN (i.e., not to be supplied to
  foreign nationals) — was nearly left behind when in the
  U.N. abandoned Somalia. This incident, unfortunately,
  speaks volumes about attitudes, both within the U.S.
  government and among recipients, that is extremely
  dangerous for American intelligence equities.

Unfortunately, according to Senator Olympia Snowe
(R-ME) — who has courageously sought answers about wrong-headed
intelligence-sharing from Amb. Albright and others — there
have been at least three other, as-yet-undisclosed episodes in
which serious compromises of U.S. sources and methods have
occurred. Worse yet, it seems reasonable to conclude that,
given the climate of carelessness being fostered by policy-makers
who view intelligence sharing with the U.N. as an act of noblesse
oblige, there are many other cases that have as yet been
unidentified.

To be sure, there have been instances in the past where the
policy community made use of intelligence in ways that degraded
U.S. sources and methods. A particularly notable example was the
Bush Administration’s decision to share sensitive information
about terrorism with Syria’s Hafez Assad in the fatuous
belief that, if only he knew the truth, he would shut down the
headquarters, training camps, logistic supply networks, etc. that
operate under his patronage. His response: the execution of
several U.S. sources and a general tightening up of security
which further degraded American monitoring of the terrorist
operations.

That said, there has never before been a U.S. government
that has enshrined intelligence-sharing as a good in its own
right. Unfortunately, such a policy fits with two pillars of
Clinton Administration security policy: 1) the reduction of
American power (e.g., through defense budget cuts, force
reductions and the politicizing and redirecting of U.S.
intelligence) and 2) the systematic subordination of what
vestigial power remains to multilateral checks and balances.

Boutros-Ghali’s Sensibilities Come First

A case in point is the Administration’s position that it
cannot insist that U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali
pledge to protect American intelligence shared with his
organization. To do so, Amb. Albright and the rest of the Clinton
team contend, would offend his sensibilities and perhaps suggest
that it is other than America’s duty to provide sensitive
data to the U.N.

The good news is that some, like Sen. Snowe, have begun to
point out that the American taxpayer spends billions of
dollars to acquire such intelligence. It should be a
non-negotiable precondition that — if any classified information
is to be shared with the United Nations — it must be a solemn
responsibility of the Secretary General to try to safeguard it.
Even if Boutros-Ghali were to deign to do so, of course, the
nature of an international organization largely staffed with
civil servants detailed from foreign intelligence services
ensures that there will be some compromises. This reality is
presumably the reason why no other nation appears to be
contributing its intelligence to the U.N.; it is also the
reason why the Congress should carefully scrutinize whether the
U.S. should be doing so.

The Bottom Line

While they are at it, the congressional oversight committees
had better address themselves to the larger question of the
consequences for U.S. intelligence of continuing the wanton
sharing of sources-and-methods-sensitive data to potentially
hostile foreign governments. At a time when the American
intelligence community is leaderless, increasingly rudderless and
at risk of becoming worthless, this scandal vastly overshadows in
importance the present preoccupation with alleged past misconduct
on the part of the CIA in Guatemala. (In the latter regard, see
the attached, thoughtful editorial
which appeared in yesterday’s Washington Times.)

The American intelligence community is going to need more
— not less — capability to recruit foreign operatives to deal
with such looming crises as terrorism, proliferation and emerging
threats to U.S. interests. This is true not only in the Middle
East, the former Soviet bloc and East Asia, but in Guatemala and
elsewhere in Latin America, as well. A double disservice will be
done to American security if the present witch-hunt not only
distracts Congress from the larger problems afflicting U.S.
intelligence but also serves to legitimate Clinton Administration
efforts to reduce needed capabilities in precisely these areas.